NOTES ON THE WAR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 11504, 28 September 1915, Page 8

NOTES ON THE WAR.

ON LAND AND SEA. ; k Tho last, big offensive undertaken b.V - tho French was that in Artois when I tho Germans worn pushed off tho plateau of Notre. Dame do LoroU-C, when Ablain, C'arency ami Neuvilkt were captured and when the greater part of the Labyrinth was cleared. That series of operations lasted about five weeks, ill April md May. Back in February, commencing on February I 15. t.b(s French bad opened a, big of- • foiiMV'o iii tho Champagne country, in . front of Sotiain, Perthes and Bcatisc- J jour. That, effort exhausted iteelf by March 7, but during the next week the) ( now front was greatly improved by a minor offensive in tho Bois Sabot, north-east of Souain. These have been the only sustained attacks delivered in) the western theatre since the beginning of the year. Many .smaller actions have been fought, of course, such as 1 those m the neighbourhood of Ypres, but they have been confined to comparatively narrow frouts and they fall" within tho description of purely positional fighting. Neuve Ohapelle, Festiibert, llebutenie, Tracy le Va-1, Vtniquois, on the odgo of tho Argentic, Les Eparce.s, Leintrey, the Fecht Valley and llnrtmannsweilerkopf are among tbo more important points that have figured in the communiques through offensive efforts by the Allies, but in no case was tho objective a distant one. t Something bigger is believed to he i involved in tho latest actions. To • commence with, the regions iu which 1 the most violent fighting lias occurred! and where tho gains are most substan- [ tial aro precisely those in which groat) i events aro to be expected. Tho Ger- ■ man position in France is a pro- , noimced salient. That is to say, it ' forms an angle, not, so sharp, however, ! as to be dangerously weak. Now in i the Woevre the Germans hold a salient | of which the angle is unduly sharp, so ! sharp that if the French were to » break through the defences, Bay, in the J Bois le Pretre, along the southern side, > they would cut tho lines of communi- ' cation of tho garrison at St Mihiel, i on the Meuse, and if they advanced ' no more than half the distance that \ the garrison retreated in the same i time the garrison wonld be intercept- : ed. The St Mihiel salient, therefore, i is, theoretically, a weak one, but it i<9 i supported by 'extremely strong defen- | sivo works in hilly and wooded country. It can fairly safely be said that the . Germans would have no chance of > maintaining a, biff salient in France 1 with an angle no greater than that of the St Mihiel position. An angle • of 60deg would be, generally speaking, \ dangerous, and in the present caso tho angle exceeds 90deg. If the Allies were to break down the enemy's! defence in Cliampagno or Artois the whole front would be profoundly affected and the Germans would have to retreat to new positions. But the advantage of speed in movement would be with them, because they would hare their railways to facilitate the transport of men and material, and the troops holding the angle should be able to get clear before the Allies would be in a position to intercept them, The actual problem, however, cannot be stated' in simple terms, because it depends largely on the railways. The ' German front is maintained by ten or ! twelve routes, all but three of which pass through Belgium and link up with the main Belgian routes into Germany. ! Actually they are using ten lines across ! the Belgian frontier, but the number • of routes available is determined not ; by the number of lines but by the 1 number of junctions controlling [ groups of lines, and the fact that the . important junctions are all either west ; of the Oise or close to the Belgian bor- : der makes the Artois sector of greater • value to tho Germans than the Cham- ; pagne sector. Four great junctions. ) Douai and Valenciennes, Cambrai and Le Cateau are the critical pointe for ; the German saliont. Douai and Cambrai are immediately threatened by the attacks on tho : Arras-La, Bassee front., and tliat fact accounts* for the enormous strength of the German fortifications, of which the famous Labyrinth is an outstanding example. Hulluch is a village on the , road from La Bassee to Lens, about ; midway between the two towns. Loos : is about midway between Hulluch and j Lens, but a little to the west of the direct road, and it is evident that the ■ British in their rush swopt right ! through Loos and across the 1/cns road, because they report the capture of Hill 70, a gentle rise north of Lens. Be- : twecn Loos and Souchez no substantial progress is reported, but tho trench and' British rushed the_ village of Sou- | cbez, long since in ruins. Between Souchez and Ncuvill-c-St Ya-akt tho advance reached the farm of La Folic, | across the road, from which aro tho villa2os of Vimy and Farbus. and, a little"to the south, Thelus. The effect ; of the operations has been to push ; back the German advanced position at Souchez. and to threaten Lens from < the north, tvhilo south of that town the I French arc making au effort to reach Ballcul. Another rush from Hill. 70 • would cut the railway between Lens ■ and LiUe. The fighting on the Arras-La Bas- . see front.' L> that which interests British reader•> more particularly, and the ultimate objective there is undoubtedly important- But iho great success of the now offensive has been gained away ( on the Champagne front. From tho . Suippc to the upper Aisne ihe attack was launched along the _ whole front, , the principal progress being made ap- \ pan-ntly ou the. eastern wing. Chalk ] downs\ 'with poor soil and stunted trees pl'tu'ed plentifully, characterise the - (Jh am pagne. The hills arc nowhere / hieb, and the country ought, to be ' j comparatively easy for military opera- , tio;;. ; . Bin ihe French attacks c-irly j < iu the year show that the Gerrn.-nt -system of' field' fortification was. every- ( - where thorough. Advnntage was taken' of every scrap of timber, and the woods auto found to be infested with machine gut!--. flAmcnibei'ing the of- j fort that- it cost to win an advance of f perhaps n mile on a five-mile front, one can the better appreciate the present j success of the French troops. They - hare recorded an advance on 3 fifteen- j nv-lc front, occupying the whole of the t first hue of the German trenches, and j it is cprtain thai the success will be *j pushed further. Such an attack would : not have been opened' if the intention £ had rot l>een to sustain it. (