CAVALRY.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 10925, 14 November 1913, Page 7

CAVALRY.

(Wo ptiblißh the following article by reason of the fact that it is from the pen of a recognised military critic, and that it deals with the possibilities of cavalry from ft point of view held by sundry competent judges, and which is, therefore, at all times worthy of discussion and argument. To prevent possible misconception, we wish, however, to state that it ia printed without editorial endorsement, and that for the views expressed the author alone is responsible.'—Ed. ' Army and Navy Gazette.") (By LIEUT .-COLONEL ALSAGEIt POLLOCK.) A recently published brochure, by! " A.P.," entitled " L'endivieionriement do la Cavalerio Francaise," .should make furiously to think all .who seriously concern themselves with the employment of cavalry in future wars. Tho author contends that the lessons, of war ami of manoeuvres, during more than a century, prove incoutestably that neither in strategic exploration, nor in tho battlo or pursuit, has a mass of cavalry so large as a division succeeded in justifying its existence. "A.P." challenges the citation of any historical example serving to show that an independent cavalry division or corps had performed effectual services of exploration; and having himself searched history in vain for any such example, ho arrives at the conclusion that the role in question cannot successfully be performed by a division, except " Lorsqu'ello n'aura plus d ennemi devant clle." In a word, negative information the so-called »jtrategic cavalry may indeed procure, but positive information is to be obtained only by means of aircraft, scouts, spies, and secret agents. It is a misconception to suppose that Napoleon relied upon cavalry exploration; the Emperor employed his cavalry for such purposes in conjunction with the other arms. In tho opinion of " A.P." the prevalent belief in the potentialities of great cavalry masses for purposes of strategical exploration is rounded upon an erroneous appreciation of the cavalry lessons of 1870. What is the truth in this connection? Before the defeat of the French Regular forces the German cavalry effected nothing; after the creation of tho National armies and the organisation of "Franc Tireurs/' the German cavalry once racro became powerless; only during the interregnum —i.e., while there was no _ opposition, was the service of exploration successfully performed. Similarly, the fact that Murat in 1803 rode, 'with htfi cavalry alone, through Prussia, receiving'capitulations of fortresses, resulted simply from the absence of resistance. At the French manoeuvres of 1908 General Tremeau attempted exploration by means of a cavalry corps, but quite ineffectually: the "mixed detachments " covering the opposing side easily, prevented"the intended investigations. Iri reference to this latter case, be it remembered that umpires are- notoriously more indulgent than bullets. Having roughly impeached the utility of cavalry divisions or corps for the purposes of exploration, ." A.P.'"' proceeds to assail with equal vigour and success the efficacy of the cavalry division as a tactical unit, in the battlo oi in the pursuit. Many and brilliant have been the coups effected by small bodies in battle—(o.g. } Von Bredow's six squadrons at Yionville.—Mars-la-Tour, and the half-squadron of the Austrian lancers of Sicily, which luinsd an entire division of Italian infautry at Custozza); but where is the achievement of anything by a division or corps of cavalry? What was the fate of tli€ French cavalry at Waterloo? ' As in the battle so also in the pursuit. At Worth the German cavalry had, apparently, a great opportunity; but just because of its organisation in masses, which could not live in the forefront of the light, it was not disposable to seize the. current while, it served. In the cases of Ohanzy s retreat from Orleans on Le Mans, and Faidherbo's from St Quentin oiii Lille, the German cavalry had; theoretically, at its mercy, beaten armies of pooi .quality—yet it effected'nothing. Albeit tha German army 'was imbued with the finest offensive spirit, and it is not reasonable to suppose; that the '." descendants of Ziethen and Seidlitz " alone among the German soldiers were, deficient of that spirit. Clearly it was not tha will to attempt but the power to execute that was lacking. The Japanese cavalry was powerless after Mukden,■ and the 'Bulgarians effected nothing in pursuit of the beate'-i Turkish armies. In the battle of Sept-ember 15, at the French manoeuvres of 1908 already mentioned, General Tremeau launched -a division of Cuirassiers to the charge, but although this operation was well prepared and also well conducted it manifestly railed. The innumerable failures of cavalry; acting in masses have invariably been explained away on all sorts of plausible grounds; but where is even one success wherewith to,justify the contention that abnormal circumstances are accountable for all the failures? The general conclusion to which " A.P." arrives is that exefept for one particular service, for which, he would employ a division, the brigade is_ the largest cavalry unit that can effectively be employed in war. To each army there should be assigned a division of four regiments, at the disposal of the commander, as protective cavalry, for the purpose of assirjng " Une zone de securite suffissament etendue." This army cavalry shoiud not trouble itself to seek combats wit: the hostile cavalry, and therefore should not include Cuirassiers or Lancers. To each corps d'armee should belong a brigade 'of three regiments. F the corps d'armee should march on a single road the commander might use for special services two regimeni.s, retaining one for the advanced guard; or, if the corps d'armee should mauii by two roads" one regiment would te attached to each column, the corps commander retaining the thirl at Lis own disposition. For purposes of battle, "A P " urges that each force detailed lor a particular attack ought to include a brigade, regiment or squadron of cavalry. " Prete a profiter de toute occasion." It is obvious that with the size of the unit employed must increase the difficulties of utilising even the most favourable ground, so as to continue, without courting destruction disposable within roach of the fleeting opportunities of the combat. In truth, by the very fact of seeking to acttactfully as a division, a cavalry elusion renders itself incapable of acting at all? It has been recognised ahvatiy that infantry can no longer fight in masses; the same fact has need to be recognised in respect of cavalry. Only small bodies can worm their way to the front under fire. It would seem that, in default, at all events, of evidence to the contrary, " A.P." has made good his case. Hicontention, briefly repeated, is that strategic exploration by a cavalry mass has never been, and never can be. successfully effected in face of appreciable resistance offered with modern weapons; and that neither in the battle nor in tho pursuit has a cavalry division done, nor can a cavalry do. really effective service—simply because its size prevents it from being on tho snot to seifi'? its opportunities betimes. On the other hand, brigades and i smaller bodies have done, and can still | do, great things, because it is possible | for them to he on the rpot ready to do \ thorn. Therefore the unv.i'ddb" cl'vi:.!"'' ! ou.?hf:- to bo d'Vcarded in favour o!' i surlier find roo'lv sorviV-ahle units. ! "A.P." dor-s to irrontio" ! Fir John French's ride to Knibc-rh'v I h-:t v-bilo bo do?* hrvvo™ "an vw ' d'..••■ il ot a. l.avdo.rr" of the h po|ntp but Hint tlie very facility wlv 1 - : which the wn<? accomplished aVo-'ir? of c-> v; -ioi-"? ro'-i-tanco'i re(i.,r, |i, ■'.* i-.ii pyr-vple f \y? quoted ar:"ii; c t hi*, nrpnuivut II 'has not r.uv'gpstod that n )pos<; >■'' cavalry cmnot <?o wlitp it nlonrov. ■' long as it is nrjop-ro-ed. F<-r siniihv reasons he rules out of court the alleged

capture of the frozen-up Dutch fleet in the Texel by French' hussars. _ - Finally there is one more point in. favour of small cavalry units in battle, to which "A.P." draws attention, namely, that having delivered a sud- 1 . den blow at the enemy, they can speedily regain safety, whereas largo units are liable to sustain heavy losses from other hostile troops —b3cause voirable, owing to their size, to disengage themselves with the requisite rapidity.