THE AEROPLANE AND STRATEGY.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 10417, 22 March 1912, Page 3

THE AEROPLANE AND STRATEGY.

At the Royal United Service InstittW tioii, London. recently, Captain C. J. Burke, of the Air Battalion, delivered, n, lecture on " The Aeroplane as an Aid. to the Solution of Strategical Pro!)- 1 leniis." The lecturer stated (remarks' "The Broad Arrow ; ') that the princi-i pal point to be considered was the manner in which the coming of the : ro-' plane affected the two principal echoolni of military thought in Europe. Even] at tho present time tho immense possi-j bilities of aerial navigation wore not yet' fully realised; failulo or success inightf he finally determined by tho employment of this now arm. One result had, ' however, already been produced by the air craft in nianamvres— I the ordinary ' topographical features of a countryside, formerly of vast importance to the conduct of war, had largely lost their significance. Forests, hills, stroams no longer constituted insuperable obstacles or impenetrate methods for" the 1 concealment of troops. The principal function o'\tbe military aeroplane was' reconnaissance. liven to-day an average type of machine could be depended ' 011 to make a successful flight of 180 miles with one or two passengers on 80 ]>ci' cent days of tho year. Moreover, the early hours of the morning and the hours preceding nightfall, which wore >. usually Hie decisive periods of the day, > were precisely those hours when, owing to the comparative calmness of tho atmosphere, the aeroplane could ba used to best advantage. A commander could then rely -on despatching a staff officer as passenger on board an aeroplane to a. point; sixty mileß distant, and on obtaining reliable information within three hours. On the outbreak of war each army would send out its fleet of aeroplanes on reconnaissance bound. The lirst day would bring the rival air craft in collision, with.the inevitable result that tho side possessing the greater number of good aeroplanes' j would sweep the .sky and remain in command of the air.

'.] he two prevailing schools of thought in regard to .strategy might be termed tho French and German systems; the 1 utter aiming essentially at a bold advance and an enveloping attack, while tlic French .system relied principally on preliminary manoeuvring, while rfetaining a large reserve to strike at a propitious moment. There waa no doubt that the advent Of the aeroplane would prove of far greater benefit; to the French system, since the information gatheved hy the aeroplanes could bo utilised in the French system for the formation of the plan of attack; while it could only assist the German system in the execution of the plan. One important result accruing from the use of aeroplanes would be l to relieve the advance guard of an army of the duty of gaining information, and enable It to be devoted .to other purposes. In the past doubt and hesitation, incomplete information, had been the mostfruitful sources of failure; but the fog of war was now dispelled, illusion was disappearing. Conduct of a War would rapidly become a purely intellectual process. In Napoleon's day the chief qualities that went to make a great general were iron nerve and resolution; tho new commander required, above all, a-quick intelligence. In the subsequent discussion Colonel Hunter Weston, speakinjr on behalf of the General Staff, na-id there remained no doubt that the aeroplane had pro-red-its great value for reconnaissance, although it was •essential to employ only trained military observers, the information gathered by civilians generally '• being of little value. A point requiring eeriouß consideration was the" question of protection against hostile airCraft. An army on the move would be protected by throwing out a screen, of aeroplanes a$ an advance guard., while regular aeroplane patrols conld bo established. Tho possibility of des-. troying one aeroplane by attack from another was not ono be was dispose*! to : consider atfriously. "When all was Raid 1 ' and done ho was, howover, inclined to believo that the aeroplane was not likely to effect a great revolution ii: methods of warfare; the>most that would result, was a slow modification of such methods. In the end it would probably he found that the aerial forces' of one army would fairly balance those, of an opposing army, without determining supremacy finally. At tho same, time, the General Staff were fully a .live' to the importance of establishing a good serial fleet.