WELLINGTON'S PENINSULAR ARMY.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 9919, 6 August 1910, Page 1

WELLINGTON'S PENINSULAR ARMY.

Professor C. W. C. Oman, Chichelo Professor of Modern History in the University of Oxford, delivered a lecture recently at the Royal United Service Institution on "The Organisation of Wellington's Peninsular Army, 18091814." The (records " The Broad Arrow") said that although so much had been written concerning the exploits of Wellington's army during the momentous years 1809-1814, and although a considerable number of critics had dealt in more or less minute detail with the great Puke's strategy and tactics, he was not aware that anyone had hitherto compiled an account of the internal organisation of his victorious host. The second phase of the Peninsular "War with which they had to deal only opened with Yv'ellesley's return to LisDon on April 22, 1809. The total English force in Portugal' then was no more than 21,000 men, including sick and detached, and there were in addition 26,000 Portuguese regulars under arms, formed of a medley of broken and incomplete cadres. It would, no doubt, surprise many to learn that Wellesley fought out his first short campaign, that of Oporto, with no higher organised unit than the brigade. Th 4 Oporto campaign was the first occasion on which he tried the experiment of systematically mixing British and Portuguese regiments in the same brigade, and, _ although the Portuguese fought not amiss during the short campaign, and were mentioned with praise in Wellington's despatches, yet the experiment was not continued, evidently because it was found , that it did not work happily. Another point in Wellesley's organisation of his first army , was one that had a: deep meaning. His whole theory of fighting the French column formation with tb» .two-deep line had an essential postulate at the base of it, which was often omitted by the' historians of tactics. This was, that in the day of battle tho column must be . brought directly face to face with the line, and ,not allowed to hide its approach with a cloud of skirmishers, who should shield it from the fire of the ,lin<> till the last moment of contact. The rrench always cqme on with gush a screen' 'of light "troops in fioni - of" the lieavy and vulnerable mass that formed tho striking force. It. was always composed of the voltigeur companies of each battalion in the regiment or brigade. To keep off this skirmishing advance from the front of the British line Wellesley always used the device of having a heavier skirmishing line of his own, which should be strong enough to hold back the French screen, arid could only be forced to retire by the supporting coluijm. This device was accomplished by attaching to each brigade .of his army an extra company of trained light troops, selected from rifle battalions, which were broken up for this purpose and distributed, in. packets to overy brigade.' : The result of this arrangement was that proportionately the British skirmishing line was always stronger than the French in tho proportion of about four to three when the. numbers opposing each other were anything like equal. Hence came the all- ; important fact that throughout the war the English fighting line was never wor- j ried or molested by a swarm of hostile light troops. Such was Wellesley's i first ■ organisation of the Peninsular army; it only endured for two months, and the Oporto campaign was the sole : scene on which it was displayed.' . On Juno 18, ,1809,. a general order gave tho army the organisation in divisions under which it was to fight out all tho rest of its victories. The original disposition was for four divisions only, of which the.first consisted of throe brigades and the other three of two brigades each; ail the troops included in them wer© in the British service. It was in this new organisation that Wellesley's army through the Talavera' campaign and the retreat of the valley of the Guaciiana that followed it. The e©ootid great in-, novation, made in tho spring of 1310," was the creation of tho celebrated " Light Division.,'' which was to be, as it wore, tho protective, ©heath for the whole army, its strategical skirmishing lino, thrown out far in front of the rest of the troops to keep off the French till tho actual moment of battle, and to hide /tho disposition of tho main body. After the creation of this light division, Wellington had five instead of four. infantry divisions, and another was added to them in the summer or 1810, whilst during the winter of 181011 two junior divisions were created. After tho creation of the seventh division in March, 1811, Wellington never put together another divisional unit, although he received a good manv new battalions. Tho number of British battalions (including King's German Legion units and two other foreign corps) present in the Peninsula in March, 1811, was about fifty-seven, and m March, 1814, about sixty-five. Wellington persisted in regarding the singlo battalion rather than tho regiment of two battalions a3 his working unit. The mounted arm in the Peninsula was always weak. Cavalry played a comparatively small part in Wellington's scheme, of operations, and in artillery he. was almost as weak as in cavalry during the early years,of his command. Tho Portuguese artillery, being numerous and ere long very efficient, however. were largely used to supplement the British. Wellington never created army corps by name during the whole Peninsular war, but when, from March, 1811, to October, 1812, they found tile 2nd and 4th Divisions, plus Hamilton's Portuguese Division, kept permanently in Estremadura, it was hard to call that union of three divisions anything but au army corps. On the' whole, Wel'ington contrived to manage his whole mny at his own geed pleasure. He had not, however, been conceded the right of choosing all his own officers by the Some Government, and many were sent out for whom Ijq had to provide a command, although he had tho gravest distrust of their talents or their personal character.

There are fire admirals of the fleet, thirteen admirals, twenty-two viceadmirals, and fifty-five rear-admirals on the active list of the British Navy.