THE SLAUGHTERMEN'S STRIKE.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 9015, 23 August 1907, Page 1

THE SLAUGHTERMEN'S STRIKE.

♦ ENFORCEMENT OF FINES. POWER OF IMPRISONMENT AFFIRMED. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL. [Fhom Our Correspondent.] WELLINGTON, August 22. Judgment in the ca6e Pedciie v. Millar, establishing the power of the Arbitration Court to enforce its orders by imprisonment, when failure to pay lines _ooaurs, was- given, by -the -<3onrt;of-Ap-peal to-day. There were two dissentients from this judgment, Mr Justice Williams and Mr Justice Denniston, and their reasons were embodied in judgments on the lines of that given by Mr Justice Williams when the case was before him in the Supreme Court at Dunedin some time ago. The' majority of the Court of Appeal Bench, the Chief Justice, and Justices Cooper, Chapman and Button, gave their decision in separate judgments. That ot his Honor the Chief Justice reads as follows:—" The question raised in this appeal hss given rise to a conflict of judicial opinion. It' is whether the Supreme Court can issue an attachment to enforce an order of the Court of Arbitration established under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 190-5. This Court of Arbitration has no jurisdiction to entrain suits for debt or damage, but it makes awards, and can fine those who infringe the awards made. By the amending Act, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act, 1905, certain provisions were made regarding strikes and lock-outs, it being enacted, inter alia, that any worker, etc., who shall strike, etc., shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable to a fine, and may be proceeded against in the same manner as if h© were guilty of a breach of an award. The fine in the case of a worker i 6 not to exceed £10. The proceedings for a broach of an award may be initiated by an inspector of award applying for the enforcement of an award. The Court, on the application of an inspector, may fine for the breach. The Arbitration Court has not, however, been granted any power to enforce its fines. Subsection (e^ of Section 101 of the Act provides that a certificate under the hand of the clerk and seal of the Court may be filed in any Court having civil jurisdiction to the extent of the amount of the fine, and shall thereupon, according to its tenor, bo enforceable in all respects as a final judgment of euch a Court in its civil jurisdiction. Up to the nnal certificate there is no doubt the matter was a criminal matter cseo Vlellor v. Denham, L.R., 5, 8.D., 467, Regina v. Paget, L.R., 8, 0.8.D., 151). But the Statute states its enorcement is to be as if it were a final judgment of the Court. In this case, as the certificate was filed in the | Supreme Court in its Civil jurisdiction, reference must therefore be made to ! the code of civil procedure to learn how a final judgment on the civil side of ™ Supreme Court is enforced. Rule oSO of the Code says: ' Judgments may )e enforced by any one or more of the following writs as hereinafter provided — viz., a writ of sale, a writ of possession a writ of attachment.' Rule 342 provides that an order may be enforced m the same manner as a judgment to he same effect. Then comes Rule 386, which states when a writ of attachment may be issued. It states : 'When by any judgment of the Court a party is ordered to do or abstain from doing any act, not being a payment of a sum of money recovered in an action for debt or damages by any judgment of the Court, and fails to obey such judgment, the party entitled to the benefit of the

judgment may, by leave of the Court, issue a writ of attachment, etc' It appears to me that, unless it can be said this order was a judgment for the payment of a sum of money recovered ' in. action for debt or ! damages, it is a judgment or order that can be enforced by attachment unless there is some statute preventing attachment issuing. If it is an order for payment of a fine, it was admitted that the Imprisonment for Debt Abolition Act, 1874, would not prevent the attachment issuing. The whole' question, therefore, is narrowed to this: Ha® this order for the payment of a fine become, because of the provisions of Sub-section (c) of Section 101, a judgment in an action for debt or damages? If it has not, then it .appears to me clear that an attachment can issue under Rule 336. Was the character of the order changed by compliance with, that Sub-section (c)? It has to be enforced according to its tenor as a final judgment of the Court in it® civil jurisdiction is enforced but, as has been pointed out, some final judgment in the Court's civil jurisdiction may be enforced by attachment. It is not enough therefore, in my opinion, to gay that the order has become a judgment in an action for debt or damages, or can only be enforced as a judgment in an action for debt or damages. Can this be said even if it ie assumed that the order has been transformed into a judgment of the Court in its civil jurisdiction, and not merely an order to beenforced, a matter of procedure, as a . civil judgment is enforced? Sub-see-i turn (c) does not directly say so. The I proviso to Sub-section (c) is relied on, j and it is as follows : — ' Provided that j for the purpose of enforcing satisfaction j of such judgments wherever there are | two or more judgment creditors there- ; under, process may be issued separately I by each judgment creditor against the property of hi® judgment debtor in like manner as in the case of separate and j distinct judgments.' This proviso can only be invoked in aid of such an interpretation by the us>e of the words 'judgment creditor and judgment. I debtor. ' They are not inapt words to use in a judgment in a civil action where the judgment is for the payment of money, and the proviso was no doubt necessary to enable those entitled to the fines to more effectually recover them. lam of opinion that the use of these words is not sufficient to transform the order, or, if it 3ias become a judgment, into a judgment for money recovered in an action for debt or damages. This being my view, it follows that in my opinion the appellant is entitled to avai] himself of the provisions of Rule 386, as the order has not been transformed into a judgment for money recovered in an action for debt or damages, nor has it to be enforced as if it were a judgment in that form of action. In my "opinion little aid can be got from a consideration of other clauses or sections of the Arbitration Act in the interpretation of Sub-section (c), but even if a reference were made to the history of the legislation, in my opinion, it would be iseen that the. Legislature assumed that under similar provisions attachment could issue. The question is really : What does this subsection provide? It has not been suggested that any^ other section modifies or varies this subsection (c). It may be that it appears strange that a fine of £10 can be enforced by an attachment which might entail imprisonment for as long as twelve months, whilst a fine under some sections of the Act ur> to a much larger amount than £10 "may not be visited with such a lengthy imprisonment (see Section. l 63). On the other hand the breach of an award may lead to a fine of £500 (6ee Section 97). Can it be that theee large fines of £500 should not entail possible imprisonment, whilst- minor offences under subjection (f) of Section 81 might entail imprisonment? Is the failure to attend <a*? a witness, for which a fine of £10 is imposed, of less moment than the breach of an award for which a fine of £500 is imposed? And yet if the Act is^ not construed as we " have construed it for the minor offence imprisonment may be imposed, but not for the latter, though the fine is fifty times lai-ger. Other examples might be [riven, if, however, other provisions of bhe Act were oone : dered tiiey would not sEow that the interpretation which I have put <yn subsection (c) of Section 101 was contrary io what might be termed the general scope of the Act.