THE ARMY OF BRITAIN AND HOW IT IS DISTRIBUTED.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 740, 6 October 1870, Page 4

THE ARMY OF BRITAIN AND HOW IT IS DISTRIBUTED.

At this juncture special interest attaches to the facts noticed in the following article from the London Times -. — If I peace is ever to prevail on earth, and the probability of that desirable result is to be estimated by the falling off of military force, a return moved for by Mr Eastwick, and just laid before Parliament, must be most welcome to all who believe in the possibility of a general disarmament. This return purports to show the number of effective men of all ranks in the British army stationed in the several colonies and possessions of this country on the 31st day of March in each year for the last ten years. It has been said, indeed, that with figures you can prove anything, and as this Parliamentary paper is all figures, a great deal more than is actually the case may, perhaps, be proved by it. But, so far as they go, here are the results. We begin with Gibraltar. Our readers will remember that we did not agree with Admiral Q-rey when he proposed that Gibraltar should be given up and Ceuta either ceded or seized to supply its place. The great progress which Eevolutionary Spain has made in every direction except self-government has quite justified our view. We have kept and shall keep Gibraltar, and shall certainly not give it up, if we ever give it up at all, until Spain has shown that she is able to hold, it for herself. But we keep it at less cost than we did ten years ago by just about 1000 men. The •whole British force of all arras on the " Rock ', in 1860 was 5876, and on the Ist of April, 1869, it was 4826. Next to Gibraltar stands Malta, in our opinion a much more valuable position, and which we hope never to see abandoned to what is called by themselves, but we believe by no one else in the world, " the Maltese people." Well, what does Malta cost us, judging by this standard of numerical force in 1869 as compared with 1860? On the Ist of April last year there were 5908 effective men of all arms in Malta, and at the same date in 1860 there were 6113. No great saving, it will be said — a mere driblet ; but if we look more closely at the return it will be seen that in 1860, from some cause or other, the British force in Malta on that day was abnormally low. In 1861, for instance, the total was 7085 ; in 1862, 6873 ; in 1863, 6608 ; and so late as 1868, 6202. So that, striking an average of years, there has been a considerable reduction in the force stationed at Malta. The advocates of reduction may therefore rejoice over Malta as well as over our other possessions. We share their joy, and only hope, as the defences of Malta have lately been considerably strengthened — that is to say, enlarged — 5908 British soldiers may be able to hold that key of tbe Mediteranean if they are ever called upon to maintain it. Next stand tbe lonian Islands. Here all lovers of reduction in the national expenditure may perform what we suppose we must not call a war dance. They may, however, perhaps, prefer another custom of the Eed Indians, and smoke the calumet of peace over the cession of these lovely islands to Greece. But they will not know the full measure of their satisfaction till they read the figures in the return. On the Ist of April, 1860, there were 4276 British soldiers in the lonian Islands, and now there is not one left to repair the roads or root out the brigands, who are beginning to show their ugly faces in each of the islands. So far as expense is concerned, we believe that seven islands paid the greater part of the cost of the British force stationed there, and therefore, our gain is not so much in money as in having more regiments available for the arduous duties which our army has to discharge both at home and abroad. Next comes the Cape of Good Hope. Here the results of the return are not so hopeful. Between 1860 and 1869 the return only shows a reduction of 559 men, the numbers standing at 4775 at the former, and 4216 at the latter period. But, for the comfort of our readers, some of whom may not have such long memories as our own, we may tell them that the 4000 or 5000 men at the Cape are a mere detachment compared with the dark ages of Expenditure before 1860.

We run rapidly over St. Helena and the West Coast of Africa, in both of which the reductions have been very small. Nor does Mauritius show much diminution till last year. In 1860 there were 1671 men to restrain any outbreak on the part of the saccharine population, and in 1868 there were 1555, but last year the force dwindled to 648 — a difi'erence, we conjecture, between three regiments and one. Ceylon remains nearly stationary, the number being, for 1860, 2460; and in 1869, 2113. The Straits settlements, having only lately been taken under the protection of the War Office — in other only recently transferred from the Indian to the home establishment — make their first appearance in the return with the respectable force of 1475 men in 1869, of whom we observe, with satisfaction, that 939 are native troops furnished by the Indian Government. China and Japan tell their own tale of war and peace. On the Ist of April, 1860, there were 7692 men of all arms in these Eastern lands. At the same date in 1861 there were 11,695. Those were, of course, the years of our last struggle with China. In 1862 the British force fell to 5420, in 1863 to 4953, iv 1865 to 2811, and, finally, in 1869 to 2094. We very much doubt whether, what with the claims of fever at Hong Kong and the fear of massacres in Japan, it will be possible to reduce our force in those countries to a lower level. Happy the colony whose military annals are dull. Such a one is Australia, properly so called. The whole of the ZBritish force on that huge island continent in 1860 was 1695. In 1869 it was 994, and even this reduction was not so great as it had been, for in 1864, 1865, and 1866, the total force was 369, 405, and 359 respectively, those being the years when all our colonies in that quarter of the world were drained of troops to assist in our great military mistake. We have only to name New Zealand to show what that mistake was. Here are the figures for those islands : — ln 1860 there were 1120 British troops there ; in 1861 there were 4451 ; in 1862, 5708 ; in 1864, 10,336 ; in 1865, 10,036 ; in 1866, the number dropped to 6692 ; in 1867, to 2820 ; in 1868, to 911 ; and in 1869 to 797. The moral of this military expenditure is only partially included in this return, for in 1870 the British colonists in New Zealand, without our military help, are successfully doing for themselves what they could not do effectually with 10,000 British troops six years ago, and what, in all probability, they never would have done, had they not been taught by stern necessity to rely rather on their own resources than on those of the mother country. Next comes Canada, which shows the bad effects of contagion in war. In 1860 the British forces in Canada were only 2,263 men, but in 1862 the United States had become a great military power. War was raging between the North and the South. We had nearly gone to war with the North in the Trent affair, and consequently Canada was full of troops. In 1862 there were 12,949 effective men in Canada ; nor was the amount much diminished till 1865, when it fell to 8,238. In 1867 came the Eenian " scare," and accordingly we find 11,923 represented as our force in Canada, In 1868 the return gives 11,210 as the total. In 1869 it sinks again to .8,118. Nova Scotia, including Newfoundland and New Brunswick, follows the bad example of Canada, and catches the infection of war. In 1860 the numbers stand 2,037; in 1869 they are 3,896. Why Bermuda should rise from 1086 in 1860 to 2160 — that is, twice as much — in 1869 passes our comprehension. The force in Jamaica remains like Jamaica itself — stationary. The same may be said of the Bahamas, of the Falkland Islands, where the majesty of England is amply asserted by 34 men, and of British Columbia, where the whole force is 131 effectives. Honduras shows a decline from 350 to 227 ; and the West India Islands a very considerable reduction — from 2275 in 1860 to 1400 in 1869. India remains on the list. The tale of the three presidencies is soon told. Bombay and Madras remain nearly as they were. There were 12,263 troops in Bombay in 1866, in 1869 there were 12,102. In Madras atthe same periods. there were

10,873 and 10,984. Bengal, as the progressive Presidency, exhibits thei I great reduction of 10,000 men — from 47,816 effectives in 1860 to 37,662 in 1869. Have we anything more to add ? Tes ? Abyssinia stands last on the list, and comes limping in with 4001 men on the Ist of April, 1868, on which auspicious day so much of the invading force had not quitted that inhospitable country after avenging our wrongs on the lunatic ruffian Theodore. We dismiss that wretched story from our thoughts, wondering only how many millions those 4001 men had cost before they returned to their quarters at home or abroad. We have now gone faithfully through Mr Eastwick's Return. Members of Parliament have so many reasons in moving for such returns that we can scarcely speculate on Mr Eastwick's intention in this case. Our object in noticing it has been to show that it is possible to garrison and protect our possessions abroad quite as efficiently under the new system of reduction as under the old. With colonies increasing every year so rapidly in population and wealth as to be able to protect themselves, with increased means of communication, with such new facilities as the Suez Canal affords, with railroads throwing their network of metal all over India, with huge steam transports by which thousands may be carried where hundreds could not find conveyance before, with new tactics and greater care of the soldier's health and comfort both in garrison and in the field, it will be hard indeed if in these days one British soldier should not be, to all intents and purposes, as efficient as two 10 years ago. We think, therefore, that whatever else this return may be intended to prove, it furnishes abundant proof that the reductions we have indicated are not only necessary in an economical point of view, but that they may be further extended without injury to the public service.