THE WAR IN EUROPE.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 721, 14 September 1870, Page 2

THE WAR IN EUROPE.

+ THE DECLARATION OF WAR. (From the Times, July 16.) The greatest national crime that we have had the pain of recording in these columns since the days of the First French Empire has been consummated. War iB declared — an unjust, but premeditated war. This dire calamity, whicb overwhelms Europe with dismay is, it is now too clear, the act of France— of one man in France. It is the ultimate result of personal rule. Clearsighted people had too good a reason to believe that they could detect the Emperor Napoleon's designs against Prussia in his appointment of the Due de Grammont to the oflloe of his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. de Grammont was well known for his perfect neutrality in home politics. He was a thorough-paced, devoted state servant, and had filled the post of French ambassador at Vienna for the last 19 years, including the disastrous crisis of Sadowa. Recalled from Vienna, and trusted with the management of the Foreign Office, M. de Grammont had not been many days in office when he startled the world by those few words read in the Legislative Body — words which were substantially a repetition of the Emperor's famous New Year's greeting to the Austrian ambassador in 1859. M.de Grammont's words in the Chamber, we repeat, were not spoken, but read. They had been carefully weighed and sifted, and whether or not they had been drawn up with the knowledge and consent of M. de Grammont's colleagues, they had been certainly submitted to, if not actually inspired, by M. de Grammont's master. In the same manner, too, it is but fair to surmise that it was with the Emperor's concurrence, if not at his suggestion, that M. Benedetti, a diplomatist of more than 20 years' standing, and therefore not excusable on the score of unacquaintance with civilised usages—aggravated an offensive message by the unheard-of discourtesy with which he delivered it. It is only too easy to appreciate with what spirit and with what aim a negotiation which began with a gratuitous threat and ended in an insult was undertaken and conducted. It was a slap in the face given with the left hand, while the right is already on the hilt of the sword. It was the deed of a duellist grasping an adversary by the throat with the cry, " Your honour or your life 1" It is now too evident that nothing short of an. amount of humiliation to which no powerful nation could submit, would have given Prussia a chance of escape. The opportunity for showing the wonders of the cbassepot and the mitrailleuse was not to be resisted. France flattered herself that she was marching to certain victory. She gave no time for diplomacy to stay her arm or to baffle her of her prey. The reliance of the Emperor on one Minister was so manifest, that the very man whose wondrous pliancy and complacency have been most conspicuous during its tenure of office — the Keeper of tbe Seals, Ollivier — was mystified and thrown off the scent. He was kept so completely in the dark with respect to the real mind of the ruler on this important matter, tbat he was proclaiming peace in tbe lobbies of the Legislative Body at the very moment in which his colleague of Foreign Affairß was throwing out broad hints from the tribune about the necessity of *■ further negotiation " with Prussia. We shall not venture on any com.ment upon the terms in which M. Ollivier announced the outbreak of hostilities in the Legislative Body. The aim of France in this deplorable war is well known. She claims the left bank of the Rhine. On the other band, Prussia has often protested that, if she was ever driven to take the field against France, she would not lay down her sword till the ancient German Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were restored to the Fatherland. We know, therefore, tbe primary cause and real aim of the war. The champions in the lists are only two, and the prize lies -within each other's territory. Could their differences be settled by arbitration, or the contest be decided by one great battle, no other conntry in Europe need be affected by tbe change. This amounts to saying that no state in Europe need join in the fray, or, in other words, that the war can be localised. And yet what probabilities are there of a long-continued observance of the laws of neutrality? Belgium and Holland, the countries most immediately exposed to the trampling of the contending hosts, have lost no time in declaring that they will stand on their independent rights and the inviolability of their territory. But there is hardly a precedent of a war being waged on the Rhine without the immediate occupation of those fertile plains, and the unprincipled attempt to involve the King of tbe Belgians in the Hohenzollern quarrel opens no very cheering prospect before those who rely on the sacredoess qf international treaties as a safeguard to F anders or Luxembourg. On the other ! hand, Austria, udder the influence of Von | Buest, hastens to declare that she will keep I aloof from tbe strife so long as two combatants alone »re in the field, but " not if a third power takes part in the struggle " — an intimation which seems mainly aimed at Denmark or Italy, should thos - states lock

upon the concentration of French and German forces on the Rhine as a favourable opportunity either for an inroad into Schleswig or an attempt upon Peter's patrimony. Till something decisive has been achieved on the Rhine, nothing is more likely than that there may be peace on the Danube, on the Tiber, and the Elbe It is only when exhaustion sets in on either side that the rancours, jealousies, and ambitions of bystanders will have full play. Unless powerfully awed by Russia, it is difficult to imagine that Austria will long remain neutral in a struggle, the main object of which it is " Vengeance for Sadowa;" nor is it very certain that all the otber sufferers from that victory — Hanover, Hesse, Frankfort, Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg— will not rise in full cry against Prussia the moment she exhibits any signs of faintness in her death grapple with her chief antagonist. France has doubtless reckoned on all this chapter of accidents, and she will exert her self to the utmost to insure a first advantage. But many will feel inclined to back German steadfastness against French impetuosity, and will have little hesitation in looking upon another Jena only as the natural forerunner of another Leipsic. Few men will be so ingenuous as to imagine that the consciousness of a righteous cause will be of much avail against the preponderance of big battalions. Yet there can be no doubt as to the side on which the world's sympathies will be enlisted, and, whatever may on former occasions have been the offences of Prussia, she will in this instance bave on her side all that moral support which is seldom denied to those who take up arms in self-defence. It is otherwise with France, whom nothing short of a long victorious career will rehabilitate in European opinion. It is still difficult to conceive what infatuation can have committed the Emperor Napoleon to a course which is as impolitic as it is criminal. We cannot admit that foreign war was prompted by the necessity of guarding against distubance at home. The Plebiscite had re-established Imperial omnipotence in France. In Emilie Ollivier, Napoleon IH. has found as passive and as serviceable an instrument aB in the more brilliant and genial Rouher. Legal opposition showed utter incapacity for •organisation, and ultra -democracy was dying of its own rage. What better foundation to his throne could the Emperor wish for than his eight millions of peasant votes ? Or how could France lie more helplessly at his discretion ? It was, it seems, fated that the ideas of the first empire should from beginning to end be tbe bane of the second. The Emperor himself .however, had drawn the proper line of distinction that was to separate the two epochs. The empire of the 2nd of December was to be peace, and Napoleon 111. had good reason to doubt tbe popularity even of bis successful and not wholly unrighteous wars. But the Prussian war now opening, will, when the first feverish enthusiasm abates, appear indefensible even to the most selfish ana vainglorious patriotism. It is important that the Emperor should act upon his favourite maxim — " Strike soon, and strike ' hard.' " If the expenditure and the hardships of the campaign be prolonged, the French people and the French army itself will find that even tbe Rhine may be bought too dear. Woe to the Emperor if the ardour of his troops has time to abate — if there is anything like a check in the enterprise — still worse, a repulse. There is no possible return for him, except as a conqueror, and a conqueror on the scale to which Austerlitz and Wagram accustomed his uncle's subjects. But it is very questionable whether one Solferino will dispose of Prussia as easily aB it did of Austria ; and even were Prussia utterly overcome, forces may be found drawn up behind her in second line.