SAARBRUCK AND THE SEAT OF WAR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 719, 12 September 1870, Page 3

SAARBRUCK AND THE SEAT OF WAR.

(From the Ceylon Observer, Aug. 6.) I We are indebted to the same pen which so I fell and vigorously described the Prusso-I

Austrian campaign of 1866 specially from a professional point of view, for the following notice of the respective positions of the present belligerent forces : — The French generals seem to have resolved to make their attack on Germany by the way of Saarbruck. To understand the significance of this line of attack, it is necessary to comprehend the nature of the commnnications between the North German frontier and tha heart of the Confederation. It is not easy clearly to show the nature of these lines by a more description without the aid of a good map, but an attempt to do so may be made. The communications may be described as being by Trier (Treves), on the Luxemberg frontier, on the west ; by Saarbruck in the centre; an 1 by Landau, in the Rhine valley, on the east. The distances between Trier and Saarbruck, and between Saarbruck and Landau, are nearly the same, viz., 40 miles. Trier is connected with the Rhine at Coblentz, by the roads in the valley of the Moselle, but by no railway. Saarbruck is connected with the Rhine at Mainz by a railway, and by the roads in the vallies of the Blies and the Nahe. Landau is in the Rhine valley and is connected with Mainz, and tbe other points of passage over that river at Oppenheim, Worms, and Mannheim, by railways and good roads. Such are the communications with the rear of the three main entrances into the territory of the North German Confederation. These entrances are also connected by cross-communications with each other. Trier and Saarbruck are united by the valley of the Saar, running parallel to the French frontier at the distance of only four to six miles, and traversed by a road and a railway. Saarbruck and Landau are united, first, by the railway through Neunkirehen, Homburg, Kaiserslantern, and Neustadt; secondly, by the road through Homburg, Zweibrucken, and Pirmasenz. Behind the valley of the Saar, a high and bleak district — the Hochwald — renders the approach, except by Trier and Saarbruck, very difficult. It is true that it is traversed by roads, but they are not suited to a modern army encumbered with its numerous trains. Again, between Saarbruck and Landau another difilcult track intervenes, only entered from France by the road from Bitsch through Zweibrucken and Homburg. From this it follows that the French army advancing from Metz would enter the enemy's territory either by Trier or Saarbuck, and as the latter only is connected by railway both with Metz and the Rhine, that is the line which would probably be chosen, and is, in fact, that which appears to have been chosen. A French army advancing from Strasburg would advance by Landau. We learn that the French have dislodged the Germans from Saarbruck. That in itself is nothing, but it will be of importance if they succeed in crossing the Saar there, and in seizing the railway on the opposite bank. For then the Germans guarding the Saar are cut off from railway communication with the Rhine, and can only avail themselves of the roads down the Moselle. This then the French will probably attempt to do, and if they succeed, will endeavour to drive tbe Germans down the Saar to Trier, while the main advance will be by the railway on Neunkirchen, Ottweiler, and S. Wendel. The army of the Rhine will move on Landau and Neustadt in the Rhine valley, securing the lateral communications between that route and that by Saarbruck. Whether the French will succeed or not cannot now be speculated upon. There is no absolute necessity for the Germans to defend the line of the Saar. In so doing, they have the difficult country behind them. If they retire before the advancing enemy, the latter will have that difficulty in case of enforced retreat behind them. A telegram has reported that the German commanders have resolved to spare German soil as much as possible, but we do not know what authority there is for the assertion. If the Germans successfully contest the passage of the Saar, the advance of the French by that line is rendered impossible. If unsuccessfully, they have the strong Rhenish places and a difficult country to fall back upon. It is not likely (in the case of the Germans deciding on retiring to the Rhine) that the French will advance on Coblentz down the Moselle. They will rather march on Mainz from Saarbruck, and from Strasburg. Both routes are difficult and can be well contested. The former He 3 through deep valleys in a mountainous region, where the heads only of columns can be engaged ; the latter, though in a flat country, crosses numerous streams, many of which form, with the elevations rising from them, admirable lines of defence, and have been the scenes of some severely fought engagements. Both armies will have quick railway commuoication with their great arsenals — the Germans with Mainz and Coblenz, the French with M tz and Strasburg. It is not, therefore, likely that the French will succeed in reaching the Rhine of Westphalia without the most strenuous resistance, and when they do they will reach it to find its three great fortresses well armed and garrisoned — fortresses which cannot quietly be passed by, and left to be watched by small corps of observation, but fortresses which will severely test the efficacy of modern siege operations. Whether these will be so tested cannot now be known, for before that takes place the two great antagonistic races will probably have matched themselves against each other in one or more fair fights, the results of which, fought as they will be with the utmost vigour by two such nations, hating each other with a great hatred, it is impossible to foresee.