%\t ®bmbtx AND FREE LANCE. " Let there "be Light."

Observer, Volume 7, Issue 334, 2 May 1885, Page 12

%\t ®bmbtx AND FREE LANCE. " Let there "be Light."

Saitjbbay, May 2, 1885.

That great effects from little causes spring is a well recognised truism, and it applies with great force to the events of politics. No better illustration could be given than that of the threatened rupture between France and Egypt during the past week. There has been a small weekly newspaper printed in the French language at Port Said called "Leßosphore Egyptian." The. aim of the paper was to advance the interests of French bondholders in the Suez Canal, and generally to advocate French ideas in Egypt. To an ordinary observer it would seem that this might safely have been done without much either of good or evil resulting. On the whole the paper circulates some five hundred copies, nearly all of which must be read in France and not in Egypt. To any ordinary Government it could matter but little what so feeble an organ of public opinion might say of it, but unfortunately the Egyptian Government is not an ordinary Government. Its councils are confused, its objects are uncertain, and its administration is feeble. In such circumstances even a very small blast of hostile criticism strikes chill upon the political constitution. The criticism of Le Bosphore was not favourable to the financial proposals of the Government of Egypt, and the Government adopted the time-honoured French practice of suppressing the disagreeable critic. Anything less likely to prove an occasion of war between two nations it would at first sight be hardly possible to imagine, yet the suppression of Le Bosphore has been considered a sufficient ground for sending* a French fleet into Egyptian waters, and for partially withdrawing the official representatives of the Republic from the country. No doubt the whole proceedings are veiy much in the nature of bounce. The French authorities would not for one moment have hesitated to suppress a newspaper published in France, which, in the Egyptian or any other language, used systematically strong and abusive language about the administration of the country. Had the suppression been that of a French paper in London (had that been possible), or in Berlin, which is much more probable, France would wisely have taken no notice. The matter would have been a private one, and as such the sufferer would have had to suffer. In Egypt it is otherwise. There the Government is weak and the country powerless — then, therefore, the entire liberty of the French press can be safely vindicated.

In all probability no great quarrel ' will arise out of France's unjustifiable attitude. England, indeed, though, not directly, is somewhat indirectly interested in the matter. It is true that England would never have suppressed a newspaper . that opposed her views ; but it is certain that Le Bosphore was strongly opposed to English interests, and that in suppressing its publication the Egyptian Government, no doubt,, felt that they were fighting our battles. Moreover, we are' in occupation of Egypt; to a large extent w.e.are responsible for the stability of her Oovernment and the safety of her people ; and we must have stood between her •Government and any overt attempts to oppress them. Thus a collision between England and France might have sprung from the enforced discontinuanca of a weekly paper which circulated about five hundred copies. Fortunately there

seenis but little risk of its coining to this. The English Government can have no real sympathy with so un-English a proceeding as suppressing a newspaper. The French Government cannot seriously desire to risk the peace of Europe by insisting on an interference with the internal affairs of Egypt such as no custom of nations could justify. The trouble, will, therefore, no doubt pass over safely. The Egyptian Government will withdraw its prohibition and allow the little weekly French paper to publish its five hundred copies of criticism on the Egyptian finances; and the French Government will admit that these criticisms must in future be made a little less severe. Of course, the real question is' not that of this little newspaper. That is only the flumsy pretext for an interference intended, to re-establish French influence, and to restore the armour propre of the nation which the events of the last few years have grievouslywounded. For this France would sacrifice much, and would risk more. To feel herself playing a secondary part, or occupying a second-rate position, is naturally gall and wormwood to a nation so long accustomed to be the most innuentiaj. of European nations. The shadow of her great defeat of 1870 hangs over her still, and renders her peevish and even dangerous still. The campaign against Tunis, the expedition to Madagascar, the war against China, were all spasmodic efforts to regain, in her own esteem the position she then lost. These efforts have in no case been very satisfactory. They have resulted in no great victories, in.no important acquisitions of territory, and in no war indemnities to repay expenses. On the other hand, they have not sensibly weakened the nation, which yet feels itself able to afford both men and money for the gratification of national vanity. In such circumstances any nation, and especially one so powerful and so warlike as France, must necessarily be dangerous. She will be ready to take offence, even ready to make offences where none exist. Only thus is it possible to understand her terrible menaces to Egypt about the suppression of an insignificant newspaper, and in her present temper it is fortunate that it should be possible for Egypt to offer her satisfaction. Her reported interference with the United States in respect of Panama may well prove more serious. On American questions the States have always been inclined to be touchy, and French interference especially will be resented, if only from the remembrance of the attempt to establish a Mexican Entire.

The continued prospect of a great war naturally calls attention to the strength of our expected enemy for attack, and to our own resources for defence. Of course, while putting the matter thus, we do not mean to say that we must necessarily act on the defensive in a campaign. If war actually breaks out at present, it will be a defensive war on the part of England, even if it takes the form of a bombardment of Constadt and Odessa. We shall fight, if we fight at all, to protect our own dominions, which are threatened by the Russians, not to gain any territory for ourselves, nor in any other way for our own aggrandisement. What, then, • t may be asked, will be the probable posiIbion and resources of the two nations, if a collision should actually take place at present ? From the point of view of these colonies it is natural to look first at the sea. We have heard a good deal first and last about what Russia can and will do on the ■ ocean in the event of a war. Her ships of war in the Pacific have been paraded in the newspapers and telegrams until we might fancy she was a first-rate naval power, with ships and seamen second to none. We have also heard a great deal of her cruisers, which were specially destined for the commerce of these colonies, and, in all probability, to enter our ports and levy black mail upon our towns at pleasure. A very little consideration and inquiry will show that these anticipations are mere creatures of the imagination, and ha^e no real foundation in probability. To begin with, Russia is not, and never has been, a naval power of the first class. She has never had the wealth at command which is requisite to produce a first-class fleet, and she has not done so. A few first-class modern ships have been built from time to time, but these are and always have been kept either in the Baltic or Black Sea. For ocean-going purposes in these seas she has not one really first-class man-of-war. The flagships on this station, that on the American station of the Pacific, that also on the North Pacific station — are all of them more powerful ships by far than the most powerful vessel of Russia in the Pacific. And what is true of their best ships is true also of the rest of the fleet. Russia's fleet in the Pacific is no match for the fleets which England keeps afloat in these seas. Iv the event of war, the single fleet of Russia would be opposed to three English fleets, and after the first few weeks would be practically

harmless if, indeed, it was able to continue at sea at all. It is, of course, true that Russia has some swift cruisers in these seas as well as her regular navy. The number and power of these has, however, manifestly been greatly exaggerated. Having been mainly bought in America some eight years ago, they are necessarily neither the very best nor the very swiftest of ocean-going steamers. The cruisers now taken up by Eagland for service in these seas would necessarily be superior to them in every way. They are bigger, swifter, more suitable, and they will certainly be better found and better manned. An experienced Indian sportsman being asked whether it .was good sport to hunt elephants, replied, "Excellent, so long as you hunt them, but less pleasant when they hunt you." In case of war the experience of the Russian cruisers is likely to be somewhat similar. The fun will be good so long as they are the hunters, but less satisfactory when the time arrives that they are the hunted. That time would not bo long: in coming. In case of a war our cruisers, like our fleet, would act with an enormous advantage over the enemy. To them all ports would be open — all supplies would be readily obtainable. By means of the telegraph they would know within a very little time whereabouts the enemy was to be found, and in case of his venturing on an attack on any port, they would at once learn exactly where it was. The reverse of all this would be true of the Russians. In all these seas they would not possess one friendly port. If they wanted supplies they must obtain them by force, and with the risk of failure and of capture from a British port. If they wanted intelligence — and without it they would be nearly helpless — they would require to procure it by force, even if they could get it at all. To attack a port would mean to risk finding a man- o'- war at anchor within it, and to incur the certain danger of being instantly reported by telegraph to the nearest station where a man-o'-war was stationed. Under these circumstances it is clear that there little need of alarm, and none whatever for panic. Some damage to our shipping might indeed be looked for, but with any reasonable arrangements whatever for defence, our ports may be considered safe. Such arrangements are now being made in JSlew Zealand at all the chief ports, and the result will be ihat we shall uot be molested. In the war. if war there is to be, and this is not so certain even yet as many suppose, the sea must, after a very short struggle, be possessed as of old by England. Russia has no fleet, either at home or abroad, that can compare with that of England, and she has no naval stations which can render a fleet really effective even if she had it. The report of a united fleet of twenty men-of-war sailing out of the B.altic could not but be a piece of unwelcome news to a British Admiral, as once out of the Baltic they would have no reasonable hope of returning. With a fleet, moreover, England could deal as effectually as ever. Nothing that Russia could send out in this way could possibly equal the force which England has at hand to repel attacks, and even with equal armaments it would be strange if British sailors were not more than a match for those of Russia. In short, there is no cause for anxiety, so far as England's old domain is concerned. So far as Russia, at all events, is concerned, Britannia will still be found to rule the waves, and in her sovereignly the colonies, with a little healthy exertion on their own part, may easily participate and find safety.