THE SWISS “WAR”

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVIII, Issue 23315, 26 September 1945, Page 3

THE SWISS “WAR”

Defence Preparation Great Alpine Stronghold Now that the great military secrets of the war are being disclosed, the story can be told of a remarkable undertaking: the Battle of Switzerland, says the London “Sunday Times.” ft is a silent battle, a contest of wits, bluff and ingenuity, and the Swiss victory was complete. Switzerland in past wars always found itself between the Powers engaged. In such circumstances the obvious thing to do was to man the frontiers against both parties, arid the modest Swiss forces were consequently assembled on the French and German frontiers when this war began. The French collapse of 1940 confronted Switzerland with an entirely new problem because from that moment Switzerland was com: etely surrounded by the Axis Powers. It was impossible to defend the whole frontier (the length of which approximately equals the distance from London to Tunis), and moreover the French campaign had shown that motorised divisions could break in at any point they chose and take the remaining Swiss forces in the rear. Swiss military policy had to be rapidly and completely changed, while maintaining its paramount aim. which is first to deter a great Power from attacking Switzerland at all, by offering the prospect of losses in one form or mother which would renderconquest barren, and second to ensure that if there is a fight it should take place in the best conditions for the Swiss army. Defending the TunnelIt was clear that the main strategic object of any Axis attack would be tc gain possession of the tw’o railways, the Gotthard and the Simplon, cor - necting Germany and Italy: the Brenner- route, through Austria, was already seriously overstrained and vulnerable to air attack, and the alternative route through France was long :.d devious. Thus the Swiss Commander-in-Chief, General Guisan. hit on the idea of a Swiss Redoubt (which German propaganda afterward borrowed for South Germany). The decision was taken to leave only light forces, ordered to fight to the last, in the flatter frontier regions, a- I to withdraw the bulk of the Sv.iss army to a small, inner, mountainous zone enclosing the two vital tunnels, which were to be blown up if Switzerland was attacked. This meant abandoning the Swiss industries i which were also prepared for destruction), the five chief towns, and the Swiss population, which was told that in case of invasion it would have to stay, and that any mass attempt to enter the Redoubt area would be forcibly prevented. Prepared for Siege Thus a formidable deterrent (the certain loss of the chief prize) was offered to the invader: the front to be defended was greatl” shortened: and the Swiss chose for the battle the most favourable terrain, namely, the mountains which geographical Providence has given them. As the Swiss factories were outside the Redoubt, stores of munitions and food had to be brought into it and placed in huge caverns blasted in the living rock. Field hospitals were erected in the mountains, roads built for bringing up heavy artillery, cable railways prepared to supply the outposts at 10,000 ft and higher, flying strips made for fighters, and so on. Swiss military training was revolutionised overnight. The silent battle was won S . itzerland was never attacked and the Swiss authorities are eagerly waiting t see whether, among the German military documents captured by the Allies, there are any which explain why. At the end of 1944, when the Allies were deep inside Europe and the new danger arose that the Germans might invade Switzerland, not for conquest but to block any filled short-cut. Switzerland partly reverted to the traditional policy and the low-lying frontiers were again man I.

The Redoubt will remain a permanent feature of Swiss defensive policy in the future.