CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVIII, Issue 23262, 25 July 1945, Page 6

CHARTER OF UNITED NATIONS

Sccunly Council Functions Outlined i orcu((■.<; power ana l;ie yravesr I responsibility and wlikli the world | must ho:;’ will hate les: tu do than any jollier body is Hie 11-naiion Security Council. For the sake of prompt and effective action, tiiis small aeeucy. on which the five Great Powers and a’l the resources that lie li’liind Hhth are permanently represented, is enirusied with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of pence and .scciirijv. The Council will sii in continuous session, and it will have the coniinuous advice and assistance of a MTlurv Staff Committee of the Chieis-of-StafT of the Great Powers. When dangerous disputes arise between nations, or when acts of aggression are threatened or committed, it. will have the authority and the power, if it choose to use them, to act and act quicklv. first seeking peaceful means of s'dHcment and ultimately, if peaceful means fail and international security is threatened, moving powerful armed forces into play, spearheaded by highly mobile air force contingents. Settlement of Disputes The Security Council, in either a supervisory or an executive capacity, is intended to be the hub of all efforts to settle potentially serious disputes that may arise anywhere in the world The part it can play (but it is impossible to predict, the part it. will play) can be explained in theory at least by tracing the chain of events that, may be expected to follow the outbreak of a dispute between nations, over. say. territorial claims. In th'* first place the countries concerned, if they are members of the Umk-d Nations, are uncle” -m obir mum 'o • r\ to resolve lhci r cilfierenees by nr.eutiation, conciliation judicial muthc-i or any ether peaceful means ineludinu reference to whatever rpeiunal aucncies may bo operating in their part of the world. Regional arrangements already in existence include the Anglo-Russian and Franco-Russian treaties and those among the American Republics under the Act of Chapultapec. It is conceivable that one may be developed in the Pacific on the foundation of the Canberra Agreement between New Zealand and Australia. Regional agencies will operate with, the approval of the Security Council, and will be among the outside means of settling local cii.sputes of which the Council will expect every use to be ni.ade. If these efforts toward settlement do not succeed, one or the other of the disputing nations must, bring the matter to the Security Council. Both of them, if members of the United Nations, will be invited to sit with the Council while it hears both sides of the case. If one of them does not belong to the United Nations, the Council may similarly call it in. together with anv other nation it considers to be especially concerned. After this discussion, which is expected to be as full as possible, the Council may decide that a formal investigation is necessary, and so determine whether the dispute is serious enough to be likely to endanger the peace and security of the world. If so, it has to make another decision—whether to recommend appropriate methods of adjustment or go a step further bv recommending the actual terms of settlement. Let it be supposed that the Council decides on the latter course. Il may be successful; but on the other hand the terms it proposes may not be acceptable to one or both of the disputing nations. Means of conciliation •nay now be exhausted. The dispute may have reached the print of representing a threat to or a breach of the peace or a direct act of aggression. Enforcement Measures If the Council decides to take further action at this stage, it will choose between two kinds of enforcement measures. The first involves steps short of war. the second is the direct use of armed force. In both cases the Security Council can call on members of the United Nations as a whole for assistance—in the second case up to the limits fixed hy previous agreements. It is inherent in the Charter that all members agree to accent and carrv out the decisions of Hie Security Council. The measures short of war include the severance of economic and diplomatic relations and Hie cutting ol land, air and sea connections and postal, telegraphic and radio services, if they arc not enough, or not likely to be enough. Io convince a rccalcilranl. nation, the Council can call for direct action—perhaps onlv a .'■how of force at first, but then complete blockade and actual blows Jrom air. sea and land. The air forces, navies and armi required will be drawn rot exactly from an “iniernalionai police force,” but. from individual members of the United Nations who wiil have undertaken to provide them under special agreements that arc io be negotiated with, them by the So< i’.;-i(y Council, and ratified by their parliaments, as soon as possible. So (hat. action can be taken at once, these agreements will provide for national air force contin-”?n(s in particular to bo held in immediate readiness to move to the scene of the dispute. Nations that are not represented al the lime on rhe Security Council Imt are required Io provide armed forces will have no sav in the Council's decision to use them. Il thov so desire they will be called in bv the Council to help decide exactlv how and where their own forces will be used. It will naturallv be the fervent hope of the world that this hypothetical chain of events will never’ be completed. because its last act is war. Onl-/ time can t?]|. and onlv time will reveal how far this new procedure for keening the peace will actually be nut into practice. It will have been noted that at every link in the “chain of events” tbCouncil is required to make a “decision” as to whether ii will proceed to th? next stage in the method of selfing the dispute. It is iiYinnvtwni in understand that the Council is nut bound to move from one step to another. Once it has first discussed the dispute it is not actually bound to do anvthinc more. It is bound onlv tn make decisions one wav or another wb p fh o i io proceed with the ni<nu'" or i. P it. And it is the conditions undei which each of these decisions h- ic be made that form the of IH'.p new system ot iniprn -i n;r>j -m--Reprcspnialion On Toum-i) i Of the 11 members of Hie Council five of them—Britain, the Unio-c States. Ru. sin. China and France- -v.il ; have permanent seats. The other six will be elected for two vear?; nt •< tim e bv the General Asserub’’- of aU naiion.s Two factors in narticuiar will hav' l ' e bearine on Ihe chances nf each of i.h( 45 smaller nations t'lkinm it< placi temporarily on the Council: its contribution to international security anc , progress and its geographical place ii the world. But (he six nations representer temporarily on the Council al an-. Gven liiii'’ will not i nim- ecmalitv wit', the so-called Bi” Five. AH 11 member: will have one vote r ich, if is (rue bn the votes of Hie Great Powers wi! carry extraordi’wiv wei'-.h(. On win are called procedural or moi-e or routine matters, (he Co>mri] v.dl mnl'i ■ its decisions In a vote of anv se-.e-or more m-mib'-r.' On all oth'-r m liters and Iheret'oro all 'hroueh its I- ' settling di'-.pin f-s. se- im member' mns • include all five of ipe Gr-'si povur- • The single exception to this m],- js Y. } the case of ifn] )r<wns of s-'|:|Y • ment. in whi'-h anv mei-uh'T /< p. ■ Council lhal ;i i t v Hje.p,. must not vo‘e al all Thus il one o Jl lie Gienl LTwers were involved i, 1 I the disnihe. iifTeoment weoh; ijn re '■ quired only ?moi;c the other Com • together v.i'h :;l least P rop of th six non-permanenf nu-mb'-js. One 1 cil had to decide whether or not to annl “ sanctions or to use armed force, th ■ ! unanimous !i< , ’ , er;)>'>n( lt f ail (i\(' Pow( ,r 1 I | | 1 uanhnitv v ')f iinaniinilA among (he '‘o''j j- Nai ions, i hoi e loop];,rl\ as the va' S | since il Uyus each ~l l(. (ll n , . i power Io I L-- ), adiia, |,\ || n , c' l)II11( .j

essential condition of the establishment of the now world organisation. They reason that because they hold the I bulk of the potential forces and re- I sources of tl’C world, and therefore have the major responsibility for keeping the world at peace, it is imperative that they should act in agreement. They insist, therefore, that the rule of unanimity among themselves must, govern everv important move of i lix* Security Council. The success of the United Nations 1 re-1 ; hrnvilv <)••. the continuation of ! harmnnv amon*.; t.h° five Great Powers ' And in that fact lies, at one and the . same time the notential stren-*ih and th;* i)ct“Dtial weakness this new or.-.irF :i ion for world security • Umted. the Great Powers can give the organisation the signal to bring , h’fo ulav ; H its uov prfn! influences fm 1 * o', settlement of disputes or its . i iio?. it: it) forces for the enforcement of I iii-.fi •' But divided tbpv stultify these | | organised, ronemtnd forces, for it is [ I i’-. -.■urL-iq,. Dim a Great Powei ■ '•hniild be a narlv to :: decision that action should be taken against itself or even maiiisf :i smaller nation whose acts it alone may approve. I The moral obligation on everv imiion to .refrain from and resist every act of ae"ress-i l'd. and breach of the Dcace is strong; but on none is it i !] I<, £--' r! 7p P nnr ’ "' ver Y one °1 iTo b>* continued)