The Timaru Herald THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1945. Control Of Germany

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVII, Issue 23215, 31 May 1945, Page 4

The Timaru Herald THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1945. Control Of Germany

yiiE division of conquered Germany into Allied zones of occupation has given rise to differences which will need diplomatic and co-oper-ative handling, if they are not to develop into sharp cleavages. Criticism of Russian policy has been rather free in the British Press, while American commentators have recently questioned the British move in making immediate use of German civilians in administration. The ideas of the United States on the control of Germany have been sharply defined. They include the stipulation that Germany should be permanently demobilised, permanently disarmed and permanently demilitarised. The “Master Race” must be reduced to so complete an impotence that the nursing of further ideas of world conquest and domination should be beyond even the most fanatical. Other United States demands are that all war criminals, from the highest to the lowest, should be arrested and arraigned and that the German people should be compelled to aid in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of those countries which German madness laid to waste. On these general principles there is no disagreement among the Allies. Nor is. there any difference of view on the necessity for a military occupation of Germany, Contention appears in the determination of the nature of that occupation. United States opinion favours complete military occupation and rule, both to impress on tile German people the hard facts of defeat and because, from the American viewpoint, there is no practical alterpative. With the destruction of the Nazi political machinery no acceptable organisation remains in the Reich to assume the responsibilities of government under supervision. There was no opposition party to the Nazis, and there is no dependable civil service or judiciary. Nor can any faith be placed in the refugees who fled the country and found refuse elsewhere. “Exactly one hundred per cent moonshine,” is how Mr Cordell Hull described the suggestion that an advisory committee of “democratic” German exiles should be asked to form a new government for the Reich. Until sound building material could be found and tested it would be criminal idiocy to recognise or sponsor any German government. Favouring complete military government, the United States also sought a unified control of Germany, a joint Allied administration establishing rules and regulations for the whole of the country.. This plan fell down against the insistence of Russia at a time when victory was still to be won, that she should have a free hand in her own zone. It would be idle jo deny that the measures alreadv taken by Russia in her territory of occupation and beyopd have virtually presented the other Allies with a series of faits accomplis which will largely determine the real foundations of post-war Europe. Russian moves were summarised in a recent London message as follows: Russia is proceeding systematically with the delimitation of frontiers in the zones under its occupation; the Finnish border has been fixed; the Rumanians have restored their administration in Transylvania; Hungary has been deprived of sections of Slovakia; the Polish Government is on the Oder; Czechoslovakia has been promised the return of Toschen and will have to cede Ruthenia to the Ukraine, but will ask for a slight rectification of the frontier at the expense of Germany; Yugoslavia has recovered Voivodinie from Hungary; Marshal Broz-Tito, in addition to wanting Trieste, also wants parts of Venezia Giulia and Austrian Carinthia. One of ihe most significant of Soviet actions has been the recognition of the Polish Liberation Committee as the de facto government of Poland and the delimitation of the western boundary of the new Polish State to follow the Neisse and Oder to the Baltic, diverting slightly to take in Stettin, including the whole of East Prussia and involving the partial dismemberment of Pomerania and Brandenburg. Apart from the fact that the proposed Polish settlement is contrary to the wishes of the other Allies, it illustrates a keynote of Soviet diplomacy —the destruction of the Prussian hegemony of Germany, the Prussia of Frederick the Great and Bismarck, the home of the Junkers, and the cradle of German military tradition. A Soviet commentator is recorded as asserting: “We Russians feel that we have saved Europe. By our sacrifices we have earned the right to take measures needed to prevent another war. If Prussia remains intact, nothing will secure the future peace of Europe.” Measures such as the dismemberment of Prussia may be classed as elements of high strategy, comparable to the traditional British policy of preventing Europe coming under the domination of one Great Power or the American Monroe Doctrine. Differences of opinion on these matters contain elements intractable to compromise. The different methods of government in the occupied zones do not fall directly into this category, but consequent long teim trends may well do so. While Britain and the United States find no elements of the German population which can be entrusted with government, Russia apparently can, and is reported to be working along the lines of giving the Germans in the East some sort of government around which the Germans can rally while the rest of the country is under the domination of the Western Allies. Such a development cannot he regarded with equanimity by Britain as it unquestionably strengthens the position of the Soviet as the dominant Power in Europe. Il explains Mr Churchill s statement that Britain favours making more use |

of German officials from the beginning, giving them more leeway in the future, with the ultimate idea of developing some kind of a German governing force. The announcement has not been favourably received in the United States, where it is suggested that Mr Churchill had sent up a trial balloon to see what reaction it would get at home and abroad. The point is one in which Britain would prefer to be in accord with the United States, but is directed on another course by an instinct of self preservation. It would be too much to expect that a settlement in Europe after five years of modern warfare could be reached without acute differences arising. But they can be resolved only in a full measure of the good will and confidence which have been expressed by the leaders of all the Great Powers. M. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, summed up the position neatly at San Francisco, when he said: “If the problem of peace is to be solved, there must be a mutual trust among the greatest Powers; they must act in harmony, the lack of which may seriously prejudice the peace for years to come.”