The Timaru Herald. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944. Germany’s Economic Weakness

Timaru Herald, Volume CLVI, Issue 22998, 15 September 1944, Page 4

The Timaru Herald. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944. Germany’s Economic Weakness

IT has now been revealed that 1 economic experts, collaborating with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, had their part to play in preparations for D Day on the western front. These experts were able to furnish a report on Germany s internal condition, and it was as necessary as it was helpful for the Allied commanders to know what the industrial core of the German defence system was like. D Day came with the landing of the Allied Forces in France, but the first mortal strokes against the enemy were struck long before June 6. The methodical and sustained bombing of German industrial centres decreased immeasurably German capacity for resistance as the campaign in the west developed. The great land advances which took the Allies through France and Belgium and have brought them now to the outposts of the Siegfried Line, were stupendous achievements in themselves, but they were made possible by the superbly planned bombings of Germany which had been carried out for more than a year before the invasion began. Since Germany was held in the iron grip of the Allied blockade around Europe, she had to rely upon her own resources and those of the impoverished occupied countries for war materials. The British ana American Air Forces, therefore, concentrated on the single task of reducing the productive capacity of German industry. The effect of this scientific bombing offensive was revealed in the opening stages of the European invasion by the negligible opposition offered by the- Luftwaffe. Had German war industries not been severely crippled the enemy would have been able to defend himself in the air, or at least reduce the present vital margin between Allied air strength and his own. It was estimated in London at the beginning of July that German war economy was geared to run at top speed for a period of three to six months and no longer, and would probably remain effective until the enemy armies were finally defeated in battle. But if the Germans are not defeated totally in the field by the early winter, then the industrial weakness of the country should bring about collapse soon afterwards. It is stated that the rate of attrition is too high and the demand for the replacement of lost material too great for Germany to stand. It is clear that control of war economy no longer rests with Berlin. The pace has been forced by the Allies through their land offensives in the east, south and west and by the punishing attacks on the enemy’s home front. The strength to wage a major war depends upon two factors: manpower and raw materials. There is clear evidence that the industrial output of Gerntany is declim ing and that the last reserves of men have been tapped. Plant efficiency has been declining throughout the Reich and machines are wearing out without prospect of renewal. Io crown this the Allies are now able to concentrate upon a Germany standing alone, for satellite Stales have abandoned her and previously accommodating neutrals have been brought to heel. Recent reports stale that the latest call-up in Germany was for men of 50 and boys of 16a years of age. Yet the Army will fall 500.000 short of its recruitment figure for this year, and there is no hope either of recovering the losses suffered in Russia, Italy and the west.

The raw material outlook in Germany is hopeless. With the exception of coal, an industry which has thrived during the war, the story is one of shortages on every side. The Ministry of Economic Warfare has concluded that the recent sudden increase in the export of German coal to Sweden was due to the inability of bombed industries to use coal. Bad as this situation is, it has been suggested that German war industries would be able to struggle for many months were it not for oil. What oil stocks Germany does possess are frozen in dumps strategically placed for use of the Army. These stores consist of two months’ supply for the Army and three or four weeks each for the Navy and the Luftwaffe. To increase their difficulties the Germans have the task of moving oil stocks about the country in face of persistent bombing attacks. The recent loss of the Rumanian oilfields was not important, for the refineries in Rumania were long ago put out of action by Allied bombing. Synthetic oil plants within the Reich have also had their productive capacity seriously impaired by bombing. ‘•The industry of Germany is so rigged that it might plod on almost indefinitely under conditions that existed in the first year of the conflict,” writes the London correspondent of the Aew York Times. “To-day it is an entirely different matter. Synthetic processes that absorb man hours cannot be raided by an army searching for recruits; heavy industry deprived of alloys cannot turn out tanks and guns to meet the demand. The men and women of Germany, war weary, often threadbare and homeless, and depressed by bad news and bombing, cannot exert themselves more than they have done.”