The Timaru Herald SATURDAY JANUARY 9, 1943. STRUGGLE FOR TUNISIA

Timaru Herald, Volume CLIII, Issue 22475, 9 January 1943, Page 4

The Timaru Herald SATURDAY JANUARY 9, 1943. STRUGGLE FOR TUNISIA

the Allied landings in North Africa began the Germans strove to belittle the whole enterprise, declaring that the invasion had been made in North Africa because Europe itself was impregnable. However, it did not take them long to modify this attitude. Tunisia, they said, was a vital land, for whoever held it could cut the Mediterranean in two at the Sicilian Channel. This is much nearer to the truth than the earliest Nazi summary of the situation. Tunisia is important, and it is especially important to the Axis because the establishment of the Allies along this portion of the North African coast would be a direct threat Io the safety of Italy: its occupation would certainly be a prelude to the invasion of Europe. The strategic importance of Tunisia is so great that the Germans will exert their utmost efforts to keep the Allies from the key bases of Bizerta and Tunis.

So far the Allied campaign in Tunisia has not gone as well as many had hoped, but quick results were expected only by those who did jrrjt know the difficulties of campaign for the first Army. Towards the end of November the Allied plan appeared to be the application of a pincers from east and west to Rommel’s retreating army. However, a military campaign being fought out in a huge area could not be brought to such a rapid and satisfactory conclusion. The Germans are resourceful and they could see as well as anybody else how high the North African stakes were. They have accordingly taken the best measures they can to prevent the Allies from completing the disastrous pincers movement. Slow Progress

Allied progress in Tunisia has been slow, and the latest report of the operations on the heights west of Mateur, which are important for the defence of the approaches to Bizerta, show that the Germans are present in force. Allied progress, however, has been slowed down not so much on account, of the enemy’s military pressure but because of the physical difficulties being encounter ed by the Allies. The supply ships of the First Army were loaded so that equipment needed for immediate fighting could be unloaded first. This was the correct procedure. It was also known that some resistance in French North Africa had to be expected. This need to meet the requirements for the initial fighting meant that supplies and material for the Royal Air Force and for the development and servicing of airfields had to be kept back to the last. It is necessary to remember this because the Tunisian airfields situation is plainly unfavourable to the Allies. The Germans are established on good airfields in the neighbourhood of Tunis and Bizerta. The Allies hold equally good airfields near the Tunisian border, but it is impossible to send from these aerodromes adequate fighter cover for the Allied front line which lies close to the German airfields but far from our own. Allied aerodromes are being developed nearer the front, but the construction work is being hampered by bad weather and poor communications. The Allied communication system on the whole is bad. From Bone, the nearest Algerian coastal base, there is a single tr#ck, narrow and inefficient railway running to the Tunisian border at La Calle. From there all supplies have to travel by road and the roads pass through a defile which is open to air attack. This part of the transport problem is further complicated by rain which bogs the roads. Axis Reinforced These are the handicaps the Allies had to overcome; they are being overcome, but a lair balance between the Allies and the enemy has not vet been attained. More airfields are being brought into service, and more aircraft are being sent into the air. Fighter escort is available for the increasingly heavy bombing attacks on the Axis ports at Bizerta, Tunis, Sfax and Gabes. The Allied North African air pincers from east and west has already met; this can be considered as preliminary to the meeting of the land pincers. The difficulties confronting the Allies have, unfortunately, given the enemy time to bring substantial reinforcements across the water, but in doing so he has suffered heavy losses. Between October 23 and December 30 the Axis lost 60 transport aircraft and 47 supply ships, but in spite of these losses it is estimated that the Axis forces in Tunisia now number between 35,000 and 40.000 men. The enemy is also estimated to have a considerable air force consisting chiefly of fighters. The Tunisian situation is admittedly difficult, but it should not be considered in isolation. It is only one part of the North African campaign and the handicaps of the First Army are being largely compensated for bv the advantages in the general situation for the Eighth Army. General Montgomery's task would have been made more difficult if the German air support and troops-, in Tunisia had gone instead to Rommel. The speed of General Montgomery's advance was maintained because the Germans were compelled to concentrate on the defence of Tunisia. That Rommel has been left in the lurch can only mean that the Germans have not the supplies available to defend both Tunisia and Tripolitania. The benefit of the Eighth Army s advance ’is that airfields are being gained from which attacks can be launched in the east against the Axis bases in Tunisia. However, it is possible that the Eighth Army is now close to the limit of its immediate advance. .General Montgomery is now 440 miles from Benghazi, the nearest (port, and he cannot advance swiftly until supply dumps are established.