The Timaru Herald MONDAY, JANUARY 4, 1943. GERMANY’S MISTAKES

Timaru Herald, Volume CLIII, Issue 22470, 4 January 1943, Page 4

The Timaru Herald MONDAY, JANUARY 4, 1943. GERMANY’S MISTAKES

THERE was no coinfort for the German people in the New Year messages of Hitler and of Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister. Goebbels has at last reached the point at which he is inclined to admit that Germany can lose the war, “but only through our own mistakes.” “Our maximum effort will be made in 1943.” declares Hitler. “The winter mar be hard, but it will not hit us harder than it did last year.” The Fuhrer was being no more than platitudinously encouraging when he announced that the maximum German effort would be made this year, for it is fairly safe to say that Germany has already made her supreme bid for victory. Surely the time for the Reich to strike with greatest effect was when her opponents were at their weakest. Germany had prepared for. war; her whole social and economic organisation was being geared for war at a time when other nations in Europe were still relying upon the ascendancy of reason in international affairs. Germany chose the time of striking and that time would not have been chosen without the most carpful estimation of German prospects in the field. Hitler threw Europe into war because he believed that the initial advantage, which unquestionably lay with Germany, would be so great that all her enemies could be smitten before they had a chance to put up an effective defence, much less have the chance of accumulating resources for a holding war that would give them time ultimately to match their strength with the aggressor. The same idea was in Hitler’s mind when he opened the war against Russia. He believed that a full-scale use of the initiative on the eastern front would first shatter the Soviet Union and then paralyse it bevond hope of recovery. His estimate of Russian strength was inaccurate: he was deceived by the infinite defensive capacity of the Red Army. It had to take shocking punishment, but it was not broken at any time. Hitler brought his greatest strength to bear in the east through the summer of 1941, but he failed then, just as he failed in the summer and autumn of 1942. It is too late now for the Fuhrer to delude the German people into thinking that his maximum offensive strength has yet to be marshalled. Fears of Goebbels The most significant statement in these two Nazi New Year messages is that-of Goebbels “We can now only lose the war through our own mistakes.” It is clear enough to observers outside Germany that the decisive mistakes have already been made by the German leaders. The first fatal mistake was the failure ti press the great advantage gained after the collapse of France. The British Isles stood almost naked before the blast of war, but for reasons not vet fully known Germany was unable to continue with the assault against the British people. The second fatal mistake was that of attacking Russia. The Germans have had major victories, but the clearest pointer to the outcome of the war is that with the exception of France Hitler was not able to administer a mortal blow in the west or in the east. What he has not been able to do in the past he shall certainly not be able to do in the future. Then there was a third fatal miscalculation, the full effect of which cannot yet be seen, but which can be confidently anticipated. The Nazis must have known that they would come sooner or later into direct conflict with the United States, but their hope was that America would be fully occupied with her war against Japan. The Axis, in its formulation of general strategy for a world war, must have assumed that the United States, if directly attacked, would concentrate its war effort in a limited field. This has been proved "another disastrous Nazi miscalculation. American forces, or American materials, are being used in every war theatre, and the onlv certainty is that greater and still greater American strength will be spread throughout the world in those places where it will cause the greatest confusion to Axis plans. The North African campaign is only a forerunner of America’s offensive power, and the Axis already knows that America need not concentrate her full strength in the Pacific, or in the Far East when the war travels that way again. Truth From Hitler There is probably an unintentional element of truth in Hitler’s declaration that the maximum German effort will be made this year, yet it will not be an effort towards victory, but the much more hazardous and necessary effort to avoid defeat. This vear will see a massive summoning of the combined resources of the United Nations, but it cannot be «aid that even 1943 will see the productive and offensive power of the Allies at their peak. The strength of the United Nations lies in the fact that they can march confidently from one year into another. Thev would naturally like the war shortened, but they are not compelled to consider the time factor. There is one common thought in the minds of the United Nations: the overthrow of the Axis. The United Nations know that cleansing task can be accomplished; every human and material asset has been dedicated to that purpose. Goering, in an interview with the late Sir Nevile Henderson. British Ambassador in Berlin up to the outbreak of war, said that the history of Germany was one of ups and downs, and that this was one of the “up” periods. Germany was in the ascendant in ’ 1939, but it can now be seen that I her declension is inescapable. She | was not equal to the task the | power-crazed Nazi leaders set her.