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WAR IN NORWAY

CAUSES OF ALLIED WITHDRAWAL

Absence Of Fighter Squadron

Struggle Will Be Continued

British Official Wireless Received Mav 5. 6.30 p.m.) RUGBY, May 4. Clearer views of the military operations carried out by the Allies in Norway and the tactical conceptions which inspired them are now possible. The latter were based on certain assumptions which, it can now be seen, did not allow enough either for the ingenuity, thoroughness and disregard of conventional restraints of the Nazis o. for the failure of the Norwegian authorities to realise the danger which threatened their country. With the knowledge that the Germans were practising ambhibious operations, the Allies prepared small forces which would have been sufficient to forestall the Nazi invasion had the call for assistance come in time. Forces provided for the purpose of establishing a protecting ring round ports such as Stavanger, Trondheim and Narvik, behind which reinforcements and supplies could have been landed, and through w’hich larger forces could be passed when pecessary to the assistance of the Norwegian Army, were on a scale sufficient to carry through an unopposed landing, but were insufficient to do much more than had been planned for them. The rapidity with which the Germans established themselves in key ports by attacks treacherously executed and treacherously aided by elements suborned within the Norwegian defence organisation presented the advance parties of the north-western Expeditionary Force with problems quite different from those for which they had been prepared. This force, like the one prepared for Finland before it, was held in readiness against the eventuality of a call for help from the country for which it was destined. British and French aid, unlike German “protection,” is not given unasked, nor does it take the form of a forceful seizure of the ports and aerodromes of the country it purports to be defending.

Equipment Dispersed

The troops were derived from formations gathered earlier to hlep Finland. but much of the equipment of the Finnish Expeditionary Force had been dispersed, and among tuis—unfortunately, as it proved in event—a considerable part of the provision of anti-aircraft guns, because the advance parties, after landing successfully, were subjected to very severe attacks from the air. Anti-aircraft guns i_i whatever quantities would probably have been inadequate to the task of beating off these attacks, and the supreme lesson which emerges from the experience of the Allied troops round Trondheim is that, with the support of fighter ’planes operating from an air base in Norway, the force sent would have been adequate not only to carry out its original tasks but to whatever additional demands the early German successes necessitated.

The Allied troops had the most valuable support from the R.A.F. long range fighters and from the Fleet Air Arm—support generously acknowledged by the military authorities. One fighter squadron based nearby would have made all the difference between success and failure. The lack of the right kind of support from the air, which it was not possible to provide ’ i

time, made inevitable the withdrawal of troops from round Trondheim carried out so skilfully this week. The importance of Narvik in the scheme of the expedition was due in part to the fact that it could provide a centre from which the Allies could operate less menaced by an intensive aerial bombardment such as was to be expected, and was met with further south. Successful landings north and south of Trondheim found early justification in drawing off the enemy and in bringing needed moral support to the Norwegian forces. The Namsos force, under the command of Brigadier Phillips, included men from the 49th division, and their landing was unopposed. They pressed on towards Trondheim.

British In Bad Position

While British troops were pressing forward on the northern coast of the fiord, the enemy made use of the mobility afforded to them by the presence of German ships in the neighbourhood and delivered a flank attack. For a time the British were in a very bad position, but they extricated themselves and reformed, even though some of the advance troops had been cut off. The landing at Andalsnes, some 200 miles further south, was carried out under slightly more difficult conditions, but Brigadier Morgan, who was. in command, carried through the operation despite enemy bombing. It is now known that Brigadier Morgan was immediately faced with a difficult problem. He received an urgent call from the Norwegians for help a considerably long way down the Gudbrandsdal Valley. Without waiting for reinforcements, Brigadier Morgan responded, and in a very short time had pressed forward to Lillehammer. His action is fully endorsed, since it was an essential object of the expedition to bring aid to the Norwegian forces in their resistance to the Nazis’ aggression. General Paget followed with the French contingent and the German advance was held up. Several enemy tanks were destroys i, but events at the base which was being formed at Andalsnes made it too difficult to maintain supplies and evacuation was ordered. Persistent bombings were aided by shortening nights, and the landing of further troops and supplies became too hazardous to warrant further attempts. Namsos, too, came in for severe air attacks and some supplies and munitions were blown up. From the military point of view’, the withdrawal from round Trondheim is regarded by good judges as by no means all to the disadvantage of the Allies, though it is not disputed that politically it cannot but occasion some temporary loss of prestige.

Freed from what turned into an unprofitable commitment in the south, the command of the North-Western Expeditionary Force is in a better position to push forward vigorously in co-operation with the Norwegian Command, with the scheme of operations

more securely’ based. It may confidently be assumed that Allied military authorities in Norway are fully aware of the intention of the British and French Governments not to abate the effort they promised to make in support of Hitler’s latest victims.

REACTION OF NEUTRALS AMERICAN JUDGMENT FRIENDLY United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright (Received Mav 5, 6.30 p.m.) LONDON, May 5. Keen interest is shown by the press in neutrals’ reaction to the Allied decision to withdraw from the Trondheim and Namsos areas, and to transfer the troops elsewhere. The “Daily Telegraph” says: “It is a notable fact that the opportunity for criticism has been foregone more widely than it has been abused, which suggests that sympathy and respect for this country are more deeply and widely diffused throughout the world than its enemies would like to allow. Of all the neutrals the one to whose judgment this country will turn most attentively is the United States, and in this hour of adversity it is especially gratifying to note how friendly that judgment has been. It is with sincere satisfaction, also, that the Allies will note the friendly tone and comments of the Spanish newspapers, which hitherto have not been too favourable to the Allies’ cause, Thus official organ ‘Span’ commends Mr Chamberlain’s candour in telling the truth to ‘his great people at a time when the news is hidden under the most absurd propaganda’.” “Depend on Yourselves” “The Times” commenting on the report of one Swedish paper which advises all small neutrals “to depend entirely on yourselves alone if you are in danger,” says: “It is because they almost all chose to depend upon themselves alone until it is too late that it is so difficult for the Allies to render the aid which they are more than willing to give, and which, with mutual preparation and understanding, could be made doubly effective ” Stressing the different outcome of the first phase of the Norwegian war I which would have resulted had Sweden been an ally of Norway and her airfields therefore available for the Allies,” the “Times” says: “Action in the air would have been more than redressed, and British and French fighters could have cleared the skies of Nazi bombers. They are entirely ready to extend their help to all countries which take up arms against Germany, but the position in the Norwegian campaign is that ground troops have little chance of success against an army whose air arm has obtained supremey. Britain, therefore, is obviously better placed to turn the scales when it is possible for her to employ her air power as well as her sea power.” Swedish Press Criticisms The “Daily Chronicle” also criticises the attitude of the Swedish press: “If Sweden had contributed half as much to the Norwegian cause as the Allies— I if she had only put an airfield at our | disposal—the result might have been I different. The fact is that Norway. | like Sweden, put her sole faith in I neutrality, and that was the basic cause of the calamity which has overcome her.”

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/THD19400506.2.66

Bibliographic details

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLVIII, Issue 21646, 6 May 1940, Page 7

Word Count
1,463

WAR IN NORWAY Timaru Herald, Volume CXLVIII, Issue 21646, 6 May 1940, Page 7

WAR IN NORWAY Timaru Herald, Volume CXLVIII, Issue 21646, 6 May 1940, Page 7