HISTORIC SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLV, Issue 21155, 30 September 1938, Page 9

HISTORIC SPEECH BY PRIME MINISTER

STORY OF NEGOTIATIONS MR CHAMBERLAIN’S DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENT United Press Association—By Electrio Telegraph—Copyright LONDON, September 28. In the House of Commons the Prime Minister (Mr Chamberlain) reviewed at length the chain of events following the Czech-Sudeten breach and dealt with his visits to Berchtesgaden and Godesberg. He said he had no doubt that his visit to Herr Hitler prevented an invasion of Czecho-Slovakia. Mr Chamberlain said the French Ministers had entirely approved this initiative. His letter had pointed out to Herr Hitler that the reception of the German memorandum by the Czechoslovak Government, and public opinion throughout the world, had confirmed the expectations he had expressed at the last meeting at Godesberg. The new proposal he made was that with a view to arriving at a settlement by negotiation there should be an immediate discussion between German and Czecho-Slovak and British representatives. Herr Hitler, however, expressed the view that he could not depart from the procedure of the Godesberg memorandum. On Monday night, after reading Herr Hitler’s speech, in which Hitler expressed his disbelief in the intentions of the Czecho-Slovak Government to carry out the promises, Mr Chamberlain offered on behalf of the British Government to guarantee those promises, and next morning Sir Horace Wilson again saw Herr Hitler. Herr Hitler's view, however, remained unchanged. Therefore, on Mr Chamberlain’s instructions Sir Horace Wilson repeated to Herr Hitler in precise terms that France would fulfil its obligations to Czecho-Slovakia in the event of an attack upon the latter, and that should France become engaged in hostilities with Germany, the British Government would feel obliged to support her. Herr Hitler’s Reply “Now, the story I have told the House brings us up to last night,” Mr Chamberlain went on. "About halfpast twelve, I received from Herr Hitler a reply to my letter, sent by Sir Horace Wilson. A careful perusal of that indicates certain limitations Which were not Included in the memorandum, and it also gives certain additional assurances. There is, for example, a definite statement that troops will not be moved beyond the red line. They are only to preserve order. The plebiscite is to be carried out with no outside influence, and Herr* Hitler will abide by the result. Finally, he will join in an International guarantee of the remainder of Czecho-Slovakia, once the minorities’ questions are settled. "These are all reassuring statements, as far as they go. I have no hesitation in saying, after the personal contact I established with him, that Herr Hitler means what he says. The reflection which was uppermost in my mind -..’hen I read his letter to me was that once more the differences and dbscurities had been narrowed still further to a point when it was inconceivable that they could not be settled by negotiation. So strongly did I feel It, that I felt Impelled to send once more a last appeal to the Chancellor. Message to Dictators "I sent him the following personal message: ‘After reading your letter, I feel certain that you can get all the essentials without war, and without delay. I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements for the transfer with you and representatives of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy, if you so desire. I feel convinced that we could reach an agree-

ment in a week. However much you doubt the Prague Government’s intentions, you cannot doubt the power of the British and French Governments to see that the promises are carried out fairly, forthwith. As you know, I have stated publicly we are prepared to see they shall be carried out. I cannot believe you will take the responsibility of starting a world war, which may end civilisation, for the sake of a few days’ delay in settling this long-standing problem.’ “At the same time I sent the following personal message to Signor Mussolini: ‘I have to-day addressed a last appeal to Herr Hitler to abstain from the use of fqrce to settle the Sudeten problem, which I feel sure can be settled by a short discussion which would give the essential territory and protection for the Sudetens and Czechs. I have offered to go at once to Berlin to discuss arrangements with German and Czech representatives, and, if the Chancellor so desires, with representatives of Italy and France. I trust your Excellency will inform the German Chancellor that you are willing to be represented, and will urge him to agree to my proposal, which will keep all our peoples out of war.’” In reply to his message to Signor Mussolini, Mr Chamberlain said he was Informed that instructions had been sent to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to see the German Foreign Minister (Herr von Ribbentrop) and say that while Italy would fulfil completely its pledges to stand by Germany, Signor Mussolini hoped, in view of the great importance of the British Government's request, that Herr Hitler would see his way to postpone the action the Chancellor had fold Sir Horace Wilson would be taken at 2 p.m. to-day. s

Signor Mussolini asked for at least twenty-four hours’ postponement to enable him to re-examine the situation and find a peaceful settlement. Herr Hitler responded, and agreed to postpone mobilisation for twenty-four hours. (Lour cheers). "Whatever our past views about Signor Mussolini I believe everyone will welcome his gesture,” said Mr Chamberlain. “I have already guaranteed that the Czech promise will be carried out, and I feel confident that full agreement could be reached in a week.” Mr Chamberlain then came to the most dramatic moment in his speech. —“This is not all. I have something further to say to the House. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him at Munich to-morrow. He has also invited Signor Mussolini and M. Daladier. Signor Mustolini has accepted the invitation, and I have no doubt that M. Daladier will also accept. I need not say what my answer will be." Interrupted by Cheers When the cheering allowed him to resume, Mr Chamberlain continued — “All of us are patriots, and there can be no member of this House who did not feel his heart leap when he heard the crisis had been once more postponed, and we are given one more opportunity to try what reason, goodwill and discussion can do to settle a problem which is already within sight of settlement.” Speaking with increasing emotion, which almost prevented him from continuing, Mr Chamberlain concluded — “I cannot say any more, except I know the House will be ready to release me now to go and see what I can make of this last effort. Perhaps you think It well that in view of this new development you should adopt my suggestion to adjourn for a few days, when perhaps we can meet in happier circumstances.” Warning to Germany The dramatic conclusion of the epeech was preceded by a detailed description of Mr Chamberlain’s first meeting with Hitler. Referring to negotiations towards the end of August, Mr Chamberlain said that events then occurred which increased the serious-