RUNNING TERRIBLE RISKS

Timaru Herald, Volume CXXXVII, Issue 19626, 21 October 1933, Page 17

RUNNING TERRIBLE RISKS

SEQUEL TO NAVAL RESTRICTIONS OUTSPOKEN CRITICISM BY LORD BEATTY United Press Association—By Electrle Telegraph—Copyright (Received October 20, 7.55 p.m.) LONDON, October 19. The Duke of York, owing to a slight cold, was unable to atend the Navy League's Nelson Day dinner. Lord Lloyd presided. Naval Strength Insufficient. Lord Beatty proposing the toast "The Imperial Forces,” emphasised that the Navy was the handmaiden to foreign policy, “but,” added Lord Beatty, “we have carried out disarmament to such an extent that our naval strength is insufficient to make us an attractive ally or play the part of a great Power, and thereby help promote the restoration of international confidence and guarantee Our ships safe passage on the seas.” Grave Risks Revealed. Lord Beatty said that Mr Baldwin had claimed Britain had kept down armaments in order to restore credit, In which she had succeeded, “But at what a sacrifice?” he asked. “Other countries had not restored their credit but had maintained their armaments. He added that now Brtain's economic difficulties were becoming less acute, defence difficulties were becoming more insistent. The time had surely come when Britain must meet the just, right and proper demands of those responsible for supplying and maintaining the defences on which the Empire actually existed. “We have no right,” said Lord Beatty, “to continue to run the terrible risks of recent years. The overdue replacement of battleships, postponed by the London Treaty to 1936 was certainly inevitable, as the whole of the Imperial security finally devolved on the navy. The British proposal at Geneva to reduce the size of battleships to one-third, conflicts with the Americans idea to reduce the number of all ships to one-third. We want more ships, owing to greater responsibility at sea than any country, but if we can reasonably reduce the size and the battleships, we can considerably reduce the expense on naval armaments. Chapter of Blunders. “We are also tied by treaties and conventions regarding cruisers,” added Lord Beatty, “to which our requirements are greater and entirely different from others. Consequently I the acceptance of fifty cruisers at the London Conference was a deplorable blunder. There was another chapter to this unhappy story. The Admiralty, in 1925, proposed a ten-years cruiser programme, giving seventy vessels, which would have kept the shipbuilding and armament firms going, providing work far thousands, and thereby doing what America is doing, which is the most economical way of ensuring the safety of the Empire. Nevertheless, the Cabinet, in 1927, reduced the programme to such an extent, that if we build three cruisers a year, we cannot exceed the fifty cruisers allotted by the London Treaty, by 1936, This position must be retrieved by the conferences of the signatories to the London Treaty, when we must not again bind ourselves to such an unsafe limit." Early Survey Suggested. Lord Beatty said that meanwhile, they must endeavour to ensure a satisfactory position in other ships, particularly aircraft carriers, and defensive vessels against submarines. The country requires information whether the stocks of reserve material are being replaced, whether the Singapore base, which is the key to the Empire in the East, and other bases, can be properly defended against attacks of modern aircraft, submarines, or heavy ships. Inadequate Estimates. Lord Beatty concluded by saying that out of £55,0Q0.000 expenditure on the Navy, new construction necessitates the allocation of £10,000,000, and it was impossible to imagine how adequately to provide for the other necessities of the Navy, on the remainder of the money. Moreover, while nobody doubts that the maintenance of British sea power was essential, when the time came to make provision for it, they seemed to forget it. Messages From Leagues. Navy messages were read eulogising the League's work, from the Wellington, and Hawke's Bay Branches.