THE CHINESE PUZZLE.

Timaru Herald, Volume CXXV, Issue 18598, 20 June 1930, Page 6

THE CHINESE PUZZLE.

KAI-SHEK THE KEYSTONE. BRITAIN MUST BE VIGILANT. “Shanghai will have to look after its own British, and international interests. The people at Home are not interested in us.” Rather bitterly one of the most prominent British residents in Shanghai made that remark to me. this summer. “There is absolutely no interest in China,” confirmed the editor of one of the largest London dailies when I returned Home. “No one wants to read what is going on out there.” Now comes the report that China will withdraw extra-territorial rights, thereby subjecting foreigners to Chinese law as applied to China's 500,000,000 nationals. China forces interest. China news has broken into the front page of newspapers repeatedly since August. And. the only safe thing to prophesy about China, is that she will again and again force British and world interest in her. China will not long at a time stay off the front news pages however reluctantly room is made for her there. First it was the seizure of the Chipese Eastern Railway. Then it was Soviet Russia’s undeclared war and raids back and fortti across the Siberian-Man-churian border. Followed Washington’s historic first message to fifty-odd nations that America was called upon by Russia and China to observe the Kellogg Pact. Came also Germany’s ambiguous answer, Japan’s complete aloofness, Mascow’s sharp and not diplomatic retort, which seems to have made the American Secretary of State, Colonel Stftnson, no less than angry. Several European chancellors chuckled almost aloud. Some newspapers hawhawed. The revelation that there still are some dissidents to the American captaincy of the worid appeared to touch their sense of humour*. A Check to the War Lords. The perennial revolts have broken out again in China against the Central Nationalist Government, and at this writing American destroyers, British and Japanese cruisers are rushing to Nanking, Hankow, Ichang, and foreign women and children once more are being evactuaied from danger points. General Chiang Kai-shek, youthful head of the semi-SovieLised Nationalist Government, refuses to accede to the demands of revolting would-be j warlords that he should resign, emphatically declaring that he will stick j to his presidency until a better man is | found. Chiang Kai*shek is right. With I all his faults, and the weakness of a system of government, ‘for which he alone is not responsible, he is a better man than any other who so far has loomed on the Chinese political hozizon. He still is the keystone to the i Nationalist edifice. His retirement at I such a moment would bring greater confusion, worse chaos. The Government that would follow at such a ' time would probably be no better, probably worse. War amongst the warlords for power and greed would continue. Chiang Kai-shek is hated in Chinese Shanghai, and not particularly loved in the International Settlement. He was once a broker’s clerk there, now he is President. He is hated in Peking, and in all those Chinese quarters where there are men who would like to be in his place. The reactionaries say he is too radical. The Red element, still strong in China, and given new inspiration by Russia’s success in Manchuria, charge him with being reactionary. The inexcusable seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway, not dictated or authorised by the Central Government, and subsequent humiliation, was a severe blow to Nanking, even if not responsible for the act. America, too, which was strongly supporting the Nationalist regime, suddenly became rather cool. Progress in Chiang Kai-shek’s aim to create a military air force and whip even a small part of the Nationalist army into modern shape, undertaken by a staff of about twenty Germans headed by Colonel i Hermann Kriebel, Major Baron von Wangenheim and Ottfried Fuchs, is advancing slowly. The task is gigantic, the available means small. Red dreamers in Russia, China, and even Japan have visions of a Red Triple Alliance one day. It is to be believed that the withdrawal of extraterritoriality inasmuch as protection has been the basis of the structure of foreign trade, guaranteeing a safe passage to the outside world, and a degree of economic and political support from the West, may cost China itself an economic and social setback. In any case, for the time being at least, such a step must expose China in greater degree to the machinations of Moscow. Britain must interest itself that much in Shanghai.