The Timaru Herald. MONDAY, MAY 2, 1927. SECURITY FIRST.

Timaru Herald, Volume CXXIII, 2 May 1927, Page 8

The Timaru Herald. MONDAY, MAY 2, 1927. SECURITY FIRST.

So eminent an authority on international larv asi the Hon. U. L. HuHies, a foimer Secretary ot State in the United States Cabinet, and once a candidate for the Presidency of America, makes the arresting .statement that the fundamental reason for the disinclination of nations' to a "Tee to disarmament or even the limitation of armaments is that the compelling' sentiment does not exist. “Nations are so intent oil preparation S' for 1 lighting, says Mr Hughes, “that they find it impossible to agree to any measures for the reduction or l imitation of. tlicir burden some expenditure on armaments.” If tills distinguished statesman had said that fear is the biggest gun to he spiked ire would have been nearer the mark. Notwithstanding discussions' of a more or less academic nature, the fact remains, that security, more than disarmament is the big' idea in the heads of: Europe’s diplomats. Given security, they argue, disarmament will follow. In other words, disarmament cannot precede security. It would he a, tr agic mistake, however, to confuse the conference of some twenty nations, including the United States, with tho actual conference on disarmament. Moreover, all the questions under discussion are difficult of solution, and some of them are apparently insoluble. According to well-informed observers these questions: arc: (1) Whether disarmament should he con hired to peace or wartime strength; (2) .Establishment of a. standard for comparing Ihe armaments of countries ; (3) Whether there are offensive and defensive arrria.ments; (4) Pr inciples on which a. scale of' armaments permissible to* each country shall he established; (5) Whether any difference exists between military and civil air-craft; (6) To what extent regional disarmament- can be based on regional security pacts. Oil the answers given to. these questions will depend the decision a.s to the wisdom of issuing another call for a thoroughly representative l international conference on the limitation of armaments. That this will npt he so simple as the reduction of naval arinaiuerjts is generally agreed. At the Washington Conference, it may he recalled, there were only three Powers whose navies were strong enough to act alone. And these three Powers—Great Britain, United States and Japan—-could “get together,” and readily come to an understanding”. But land armaments, to say nothing of the question of the battle- for aerial supremacy, means all Europe or nothing-. And the spectre of 'Russia, with its powerful army, its immense natural resources, its relentless war against the capitalistic system, and its world revolution objective, is given by Rumanian, Polish, Finnish, and other European delegates as a reason for considering the strength of their neighbours in deciding- how far they can safely go in discussing land disarmament. Moreover, Germany too points to the military strength of her Eastern neighbours as justification for her re-arming. Then there is the question which deals, with the economic potentialities of nations for making 1 war. To quote the Geneva 1 correspondent of the “New York Times ’ on the question:

“If one takes the concrete case of Franco and England one can see how great are the difficulties, of such a discussion. France has the best armed and the largest organised military force in the world. Great Britain has a small organised military force. France has a small fleet, which now is strictly limited by the Washington agreement. _ England has a large fleet. “France is loss highly organised in tho industrial field than England, She lias not such potential power for the output of munitions. She has not the -sea and fleet to protect her while training men. She is less sure of being able to transport colonial troops to Her aid.

‘ it is therefore natural that Franco should wish this question of power to be estimated on the basis of all the factors involved, and not solely on the present military strength. She wishes to consider the potential power of evei-y nation, and gage the aid it can give to an attacked member of the League in terms of that potential power,. and not in terms of the actual size of her armo# forces. “There are others besides France that take this view, and wish to calculate the strength of the various countries on the triplo basis of their army strength, their naval strength, and their industrial strength.”

But lire obstacles encountered at Geneva may appear less discouragi’n" if emphasis is put on the fact that the nations are eng-aged in mere preliminary discussions. There must always bo a begunning". Far example, the prospect of constructing' the tallest building in tlie world, if judged by tb© preliminary operations, .are very slight. Doubtless the contractor would disappoint all the spectators, if, instead of building up into the air as be was expected to do, be started to dig a deep bole in the ground. The task before the nations is to discuss a series of questions relating to possible disarmament, for the initial success of a.n attempt to obtain an agreement among many nations- in the matter of offensive and defensive strength in relation to national and international security, depends very largely upon finding ma.ttors upon which they may be able to agree.