THE SIEGE OF '7O-71.

Timaru Herald, Volume CI, Issue 15447, 9 September 1914, Page 3

THE SIEGE OF '7O-71.

TLMES HAVE CHANGED. GERMANYS STUPENDOUS TASK. A MILLION .MEN REQUIRED. 'Vliat could the Germans hope to gain by investment of the huge forts of Paris 1- In l?70-7l they numbed the nervous centre of the nation, hut toei times have changed (say* a writ or in the Wellington --I'-vening Post"'): «' very different Franco lias developed: during forty-three years. This will he admitted by anyhody who compares the France of 1870-71 with the nation of I'M I. as shown in the records. Frame declared war against Prussia on HUh .lulv, IS7O, and disasters followed with staggering swiftness. In six weeks the victorious Prussians were ni:>*sfd l>v the French capital. An excellent historv of the trom the Ge>man viewpoint, is given in Niemanns •■ Military Description ot the Fr.-nt-h Campaign." .. - On the evening of 19th September, he wrote. •• the Third Army held the hue BougevaL Sevres. Mention. Bom-:. l.Hav. Chevillv. Thiais, Chorsy 1.. Rot. Bonne-nil. This day. the first of the in-v.-tnieiu. had hocn very disastrous tor the French." His terse summary is: •For four months and a half, halt a million of well-armed defenders ot their conntrv allowed themselves to he shut up in the greatest fortress of the world hy i>O!HY>O men.*' TRANSPORT PROBLEMS. AVhen the besiegers settled down to starve the city. the Gorman public clamoured for it bombardment. "To provide the necessary la rye park of guns." commented Niemann, " and the. ammunition necessary lor a protracted bombardment, such an enormous transport maieria! would be required that the army supplies might have_ sulfi'iijl in consequence. In order to judge of the difficulties of this alone, one must consider that the investing army required, on an average, daily :—150.000 31h loaves. 1»»1X> :•»[. of rice and bailey. GOO oxen or their equivalent in meat of various kinds. 1.10 cwt. of salt. '25.000 quarts of brandy: in forage, 10.000 cwt of oats and 2-1.000 cwt of hay." A bombardment began on sth January, but it was not a very destructive! pounding. Tit? transport ilifth nlties of the Ger-J man- then are not comparable with thej invaders." problem to-day. j LACK OF A LEADER. I The Parisian -pnhlie had no confidencein (federal Trochu, who had the supreme command, and as the siege progressed a strong revolutionary faction deve'opod. A n> w Republic was taking shop.-* while the Germans were knocking at the wall*. " General Trochu." says Niemann. ywas a very unfit Commander-in-Chief f-it- such forcrs. A soldier n'l scientific education, experienced :ind sensible, he p< s.M'ssevl ;ii-t siii'iii-ienc penetration t> see- rharly all the defects of hi.* ariey. but had not the energy -mil t.-i'eiit to obviate these defects and to I ring the strong side of i> into aecemt." He -aw the woil difficulties wit!> a v. ry lame capital 1): he hesitated, and lest Paris. "CVi-iriinly." cn>>tinues the German historian. •" if MacMahon had been allowed to lead the armv (which came 1 tf> ruin :rt Sedans -to Paris, the German Army Direction would not have Iron a'lle to can v nut the investment of this «•!:•.-. and if. instead of going to the I:e!|. of Bazaine. ho had drawn towards. Orients, the siege of Paris could not lt::v<» b on undertaken at all. The forces ot France were allied with unexampled misfortune; they were squandered awayj before the siige of Paris, and trifled away while it was going on." SPLENDID ADVANTAGES FOR DEFENCE. After describing the formidable! strength ef the girdles of forts and en- ] trenchtaenfs, Niemann remarks:—"lt :"sj al t> important to obs.uve thai lor inak-1 ing sorties, cither on a small scale or I «.!'. the largest, with hundreds of! thousands, no more advantageous for-! mation than that of the fortress of Paris can be imagined. Each two forts make an excellent sortie gate, and these can prepare for it and support it by the fin- of their heavy guns. A whole army can. any day. he hrought together, un-s'-.'ii. inside the. enceinte, or at many p.nnts immediately behind the forts this army might break forth between th- foils the next morning at dawn, in splendid development, and always he i'r.tir. five, or six times .-.uperior to an I enemy at the given noinr. who has not a whole million of .soldiers for the i_ . - r Since IS7I the defences have been im. | mensely improved, and the defenders an- not the chaot-e aggregation of ct'ds that oll>ritl such an impotent resKtauc- to the Prussians foriv-three years ago. ILL-DIRECTED FORTIES. "Two special circumstances which impeded the success of the sorties anp.'ar pn.uiin.titly." states Niemann. "•• In j the first place, .-amnion-, labour and [tide were required to bring together I the badly-disciplined French troops, on v.ded with few .servictrthte officers. '■ It v. as ev.-n iie-ivssary to assemble the tn ops for a sortie the day before, in ;-.r!fr to have th-in on the spot at the light time. TVs. however, naairallv j the soldiers dining the fight. . and in November. De.-emlx-r. a «ul i J••uitai-v _ they wit. benumbed and , :.lis:nr:iil by 'he sevete told. Then, .-«H-t;::d|y. tin- noUy and visible orcpara- ; tions fur tiie concentration of these ; ;i; ops mad. the German posts of ob-cr-j vat ton aware of the enemy's t:ud»r- ---| taking ss) early, that m ra n:t cases the army ot investment was ab'o to make arrangements, quite undisturbed. for th' reception «.f the ent-mv."" It is inconceivable that such muddletne:it v.-tt! lv repeated. THE PART OF THE PROVINCES. Paris looked to ti : ,- provinces for re-'lr-t. :„„! t 1,.» ~r „ vj„..,.._. v j„. .,.._. 1,,,,,,.,, ,„,. MIUU _ ■ Mutu; be-tt-r tluiii st 111.,-lat-. ion and Sp-«-r.!„.[[,. .-:,!![;.< (.-,„„ |> ar ,v. ; '•' V 'V-' " ,!i -" [ y •" ihe Commune ". I s . I. Li-.s:igarav vav.s:-- \ - At ti„. .11-! ot Dctohir, 1*7.). the array I, rore P ;l[ i.s ? .stronttlv ftetife d ag.un-t th- ti;wii. was not n t a!i c»jv.-i.ri from .|„. N ;,|,, „, jj,,. |ir , >v i lu . rs . II:-- :tpp»aranc>- of .TO.<MJ<> men. iveii of young Ft'eiu-EiMi.-ii would 1, :1 v,. for.-"«! tiu- Pnts,; :m .s t-, ,-;,:>,. t |„, 1.1.H-ka,!,-." Hi.- French hail iind.r-. stiir.au d tie* I'i .t-.-an p.»u...-. but Xf.-muim admits that a pr-.p,-|- organisation „f ;| l( , |, r , ; . . vin.-ia! r.-oitrets could |,av«. sevi.,u>lv trouole,: t h.- C.-rmans. ||.-re is his trihv.iy to the rural armi.-s whi.-h t |„. i„. va-t. i.s !,;,.! to i-atuiiit.>h :• - | • When iw m,. th.,l in s ,>h 0 „f <lu .) x itniavoiirabl . i-i:i-iiiii.s:ain and ..• a f.H.Mtudy dictator fCaiiihVit :l i ' ,!,',. n. r.ly-.n-ani-e.l IJ. oiil.fi. an annies j-...- ii-v.-rtlt •!....< :l l,< t . ~, „,.„„.„ ~„. 1.--'. army in th. world, a-ain and a-ain , m the ..[.-Ti ti-id. though : ,f» : ,v< ,-„„- ; qn-r.-.i. and t:» d-liv.r .-. him.he.l' tights. ■=dtKoii-h no pit.-hed battle. „ v liill.-i •.u'fmgly allow that the Fr. n, I, i,aiio-i. ltd of anient pair otism, 1,. 1S i-icleied' I Us.,-1: -.v.jtthy ...f e;t'...-iu."'