GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONTIER.

Timaru Herald, Volume CI, Issue 15443, 4 September 1914, Page 9

GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONTIER.

ITS PRINCIPAL DEFENCES. ! FEW OBSTACI.K> TO RUSSIAN | ADVANCE. A good description of the frontier : country of (•; rinany and Aust ria-Hun-ry bordering on the I'u-Ma;t Empire : i'. remained it; tin- work •>?' :i we'l- ! known (I, i'lirali g'o_rapit< i\. III". ■ I'artM-h. In hi- volume t>n " Centra! I Europe." 1 > 11!.!i~:i1 in London a few r year.-. Dr. Part-h devot.d a I'm a' i chapt* i t.< ""Tii.- Geographical Condi- ; turns i>:' National Deienoe." In the i portion of th:.s . hapter <!■ ;ilillv.it'n the i lri>u::ir» of Germany ami Aus- | tri-i-l I unwary .-aid:— j •' While it i> certain thai Germany | will never covet a Mpiare mil ; > of Rusi sian soil, no one can answer for it thai i t!:t> Riixiian Coiessus. in its unceasing f expansion. may not miiih- day attempt i :>nce imii'i to push it- frontier ; forward. No natural harrier-, difficult I to ero>». protect Germany on the cast, i OuJv liu* power of the German pcoplo i to defend itself can p:ot"i t ill's hnund- [ »ry. •• Til-:- iash is rendered more difficult by the length and its retreating curve to itic westward- The frontier measj tires "."M) miles from Memol to the Three l Emperors* Corner at Myslowitz, j and while the direct line from the east- , cit (nils of East Prussia ami Silesia I passes through Wa:.-aiv, tlit- Russian | territory on the miiliUe Wart.i pushes I s<> far westward that Merlin stands at t a distance of only miles fiom the [ frontier- Th:.-; wedge <>: Poland points I menacingly towards the German capi- | tal, aiul leaves the military strength of t Itussia free to choose upon what part j of tile long frontier line it will direct [ the full force its onset. Ea-t Prus- ; sia. surrounded on the .south, east..and ! north hy Russian territory, expesed oil ; the north-west to the attack of the Russian Baltic fleet, is connected with the main body of the Empire only hy n length of To miles, and lies in the greatest danger. The first effort of any Russian attack would k- to tiaralvsrthis wing of the Prtk-uian Eagle. If ill" armies of Germany were compelled to act on the defensive here, tin y wonld find their task lightened only nlr.ng the southern border, where there are- woo (Is and the tantded waters '>T Masuria. Between the long lakes with their many arms, the roads have "to en across narrow parages which would ho li'sy to defend, even if the closing of thsm had not b.-en prepared in lime of peace. by (wilding little forts like • Fort Uoyen and Lotzen. For great ■[hostile undertakings this- tract of coun- | try is in any case less suitable. ! NATURAL T.INF.S OF RUSSIAN f ADVANCE. | "Tlio natural line of Russian advance [ ore th. broad valleys o! the Pregel and j the Vistula. T'ne Russian railway .syste;n has prepared in the junctions ol Vilna and Warsaw, points of departure for both these lines of attack. 'the fortifications ->f Kovno. at the crossing i of the Nienun. form a base from wh:ch an arniv which was not opjuv-ed by an I equal force would find the way open j through the Pregel district as far as f Koniimsherg. A wide ring of tor is has •if late years made this place into a lortrt ss cf the first rank, which cannoth" fully surrounded so long as the Frischo Haff, with its fortified entrance, the Pillauer Deep, are not i;i the' enemy's hands. Willi as a base. ;i lesser Prussian army might ir.aintain its footing upon the is'aml of •he coast betiveen the HafFs and the ::souths of the Pregel. whose brandies fall into theiii: or. stationed behind the 1); ime and the Alle. such ail army could protect all East Prussia. Its situation wo-.iUl only ho serimis'.y endangered if a Utissian army from the Vistula were to gain a decisive success, and to cut East !coiitir.unications on the v.-c«t. The sLrontj fortifications on the line of j 'he Y'stuh li.nv Uoon ori-itrtl io meet ' this danger. Thorn, in particular, has | a rin>£ of detached forts oonunaiid--1 iii'j both hanks of the river, and able I with an energetic and active garrison jto extend their influence north-cast-I ward, as far as the Prussian lakes I country, and south-westward as far as i the lakrs of the Upper Netze. Only thirty miles further to the jiorth lies 1 Graudenz. at- the head of an important ! bridge, which has recentlv been strong!'v fortified, and lies half-way. b. tween i"Thorn anil the de'<a of the Visiu'a. 1 The area of the delta ready for !m:n•da t ion strengthens the i:<isition of ! D:;utz ; £ which the forts on the west".n j hiils and at the mouths of tlie river ( have maile inti; a spot most capable of I 'leing..defended. It is connected with Kopigsberg on one side hv the Frisehe j MafT. J THE IMPORTANCE OF POSF.N. | "With the great military strength ! which Ru.s-iia luis at command, it would i untk>uhted'y be possible that, simu!tancously with an invasion along the Pregel and A'istula. an advance should b.- atieiuptcd towards IS:-rl• ti. The advancing armv oil the left bank of the Virtu'u would be threatened on the j ilnuk by Tbovn. :'iitl eotild rot oil ! until had completely invented - this | l-ortn ; but it it di>l siiei ,'eil in reaclti ing the ensteni border the provin.-e I of Posen. it would come Into a country ! much cut. up by long lakes running ! from north to south, and f.tTering many f posirions fnvourah'e to the defence. Hei vond !i«- the "reach of the Wa*ta that runs northward, and uroii it the strong ; fo'.'tt"' v >s of P.isen. Here ihe lines ; of pomiminir:u : nn from ail tic- eastern ; j'ortrons of '.he Enipi:.» <-onverge, j \n interrui>ti,.n of tliesr comnuinici!- ' 'ions, by tiie surrciindim- of Po-en. - would 1k» a heavy blow wiiii-h the Ger- ' t'tan militarv leaders wntiM have to .every "sert'in to pr vent. The wide | rit'i£ oi ( >rt.s and the leodern methods j of I oust ruction i;ivc- to IVs..ii a great ■ power of r%->i-t:i»e.> to •< si. .re. the J liiat. ri.1 1 .; !'»r whivh would have to be 1 htoui'ht -fro'ii a great •''■' tsnce. and by ' lerv difti; ult re-ids. Taken togeth-r: | K"'/iiin!»sb->rg. Dantzig. Thorn, -m!! 1 f IVsen, form a r : n" f.irtrisses tin'. ' :i i»;iLur:il divi^-'li of teri iir* v ; ;.»>d life"My . iihav.-e its |:owr of ile- ' feii.-e, Tlie line of the Oiler i> i f bn l | -s-totdin-v importance. Since i'»- ve.zi'.i:: :»i" the de'« II"- s ef S'ertill. ii |.-i» i>or 1 l>ut one stroii'c fortrt-s-.. Cr-n ii'. | " h'eh ha-. "Utlyiii" fort-, and .-;aml al t!o. .-irl>r>"ehtu\. of the Wartl'-i. in ; - r»rca of • -•-•1 v-Mi oil".' | '.''entry. >:»uth or jl*- Obra l»n;"V I e'..,.'i ro'iile:-', the Wat. a and I '•( jiV'e:. a».l abr nrids the sphere of inI "l:ell< .' t,. [1,,. fort re «s • ' I I'"- v. !\ s hut t-e f,-!-i • i th" load ef a l»'id"e. f:!.r.;an. Si|. -'•> j .--s 'iet':»r,ant l::r lh». :i r; r-t in.' th' •••i>t'-i!i from ier. I. I '' v ; not l'e ill the J' ;i tn-:d i;,. . I !{e-ad'-;i'i,-e. ae-J i.-, in >m.. ,|.-. | .. !• ' .1. 'e»d. .1 l.v tbe r" "- I'loj -.ie: I wai-il of th.- Ait.-trian Empire. I A BORDER DIFFICULT TO HOLD. ! " The \\ ho!i' eoihhtion-, nf national ! j d>-t. nee alonv :!ii> frontier v. it.h it- u!i- j j .Hoiuabli. p < u'iai ilie-. -!l;;-; that] i * 11:• border cannot i.exit i.-l'ai-toriiv he'd I ■•it the defensive, and that ..erio'u.-, in-I ■ur> i:-n only !..■ averted bv a vi;or..i:- , "'F- n-i*. . In th-- e.i>ti en proiinci <! •I'r.-ie tio river i-irr:-. Irk.- ihe ISiiine. I ' Iv. it!, t!i■ - trotuier- ~i:iLiiu; a ; b:l-;» ot d' t. |l.■>., th. |.!a eo! ,-i'llie sU"il | b.is voul'l hale t'. b .-iipplfd alt if 11 *- j j a. ly by railiiay line, i iitui'ti ; tiie t "iild-r. 'lhe i are;ul!y 'aid ..in ;<[ 1%-iiiiutmi. at ion, i i ivartd tv.o. and '..mi iiin.s ~u' I'.n- I j di-tai:; I - tl'.r.e, independ.-nr |,n. -. 0 : j [ railway running p-iratl-l «ith tn-.,,,-! j Iter, ami the.—-it .-at i^iar;..:. I'.- , t :-i I ai/aiit-c, 'i< -cru-tiv.- atta.-l-- In bodi- I

t L IP!- . (

sihle a rapid displacement of troops. They ertn, however, only be so guarded by a considerable ridvance of German troops. As the different sizes of the :n«:s to he covered, and the differences in railway development in the two era?>iro.~. would undoubtedly assure to the Gormans tile advantage of being more quickly ready for battle, it is obvious thai; .Russia must in case of war. upon taking up at first a purely defensive attitude. She has prepared ior it by constructing the square of Polish fortresses —Xoro, G'eorgiewski, Ivangorod, Brost-Litewski. and Goniondz—which will enable her to collect her forces behind the great river frontage of the Bohr. Narew, Bug. and A istula. and there to await- with confidence the approach of any attack. Warsaw lias also been made into a- stronghold.

"This conception of the position de]vnds upon the paucity of railways, economically so much required in the u:vafc district on the left bank of the Vistula. trusts for. protection, even in this first stage of a war, to lu r superfluity of space, and to that "fifth element" which Xnpoieon discovered with terror —the unfathomable mud of the roadway, which paralyses the most active strategy and tires the most valorous soldiers. The offensive side of national defence, therefore, presents serous difficulties.t«> Germany. But_lhc rich cultivation and increased population of Poland have in the course of a century changed the character of the battlefields, and deprived ■.'Russia- of the exceptional position which .she appeared to occupy after the experiences of Na-: poleon. Tho Russian Emnire cannot bs rruarded as so invulnerable and so unapproachable for hostile troops at the present day ns it was in 1812. The | method of defence wlrch was possible; then cannot be reoeaied. i

AI'STRIA-HI'XGAHY'S POSITION.

;: Calm and expert- judges'," continue? Dr. Partseh, '••.no inclined not 1c oi-o.siiniatc l ilip ilanjit-v nt' a war wiih jlussia. Much would, of course, depend upon whether Germany had to bear all tho weipht of it alone, or whether it could reckon 011 the aid of its present ally. Austria-Hunjiary. The po.-it ion nl that Power in ii'^an] to Itussia is ossoiuiallv different. The .■ii'eater part of tho Knipiro i.s slirltered bv the Carpathians. Only Silesia,! Gnlicia. and the linkovina stretch down j into t!ie plain of Eastern Kurope. and j al>s:>!int-fy demand an armed defence n:.':iinM. their m-eat neighbour. Three I ra.hvavs lc:u! iroin Moravia and five] tioni. I into the district where tile Oili i* risis, and into the basins of the Vistula and Diiie-tor. Of tlns-e ' railways, six debouch into the valleys «>! tile N istula am! San. heliind which > ihe principal defensive for.'f l would hav<- I t:> .supuortod by the two re;l li>rt! es -ies o! Cracow and Przemysl. which are connected hy two inil* prudent lines. Ise ciiuld also he made 1 the 'mics in the valleys oi' the Waat; and Hcrnrtd. deep in rhe mountains, it trooiis hail to h-> carried from one side to the o;he:\ 'lhe cho-cp nf two point-* o! (ijiicentration. only l/jO ini!;>s apart. beor< wit»pss clearlv i-nnutrh tr» the convpcrloti thai- a strip of land so lonir. •mi! at the <Tids.si> narrow. as the oiiter li ii.ier of the Carpathian* f; air. Test-lien '■' C-/.en>o<v. : tz (4ISI iiii'i -i. Mil <.,ilv b> de r *>nded hy forces well belt! together, and iv-ml.v to take the offensive. The [attraction t>* t!i.> enemy hv a stromr ;ir:t!y serves betie - - ihan a dispersion cf j W>r. es to j-'-cim- district th.*> r He at a | dUtanee. \\ hi!,- tlie army of Cracow. in a we" chrism position. would to- | wards the Polish sear of war. and at I tbc same t:n-e he ready. h- eps<> c" ie. | a'l ance. for co-ope: n; ion "-ith tiie Grr I n.au force-. lb- army cf I'rzomv-d and | Lvai'mi-fi would k> refiuired to advance

towards Volhyhia and Little Russia. In consequence of the division of the country into a northern and southern field of operations, separated by the. groat marshy district of the Blip: and the Pripct. thii army would choose an independent aim. namely, Kiev.' 1