THE MOTOR CAR CASES.

Timaru Herald, Volume XIIC, Issue 14038, 22 October 1909, Page 2

THE MOTOR CAR CASES.

1-nmiEi: legal argument. ■\ .JUDGES DECISION CHALLENGED. What are now familiarly known as tho motor car cases, in which Percy Klworthy. and a number of oth.r motorists are charged with various breaches ot the Borough by-laws, came before Mr V. G. Day, S.M.. again yesterday. when further legal argument was heard. Mr itolleaton appeared >r tho defence, and Mr Kiniierncy (instructed by the Borough Council*. i( •' tin 1 proscvufcion. Since tin 4 r:isi*s were l»elt>re -it" Court, tlu* .MiiLTistr;iie Mihiiiittod t<> counsel, three points, which had occurred to him wh.u considering the case, for legal argument. These were: — (1) Supposing the by-law to be properly made, has sub-section 2 of section 6 of The Motor Regulation Act 199fj, any application (This deals with the publication of the by-law. and the erection of sigu-posts.i (2) Does the word "such in that section retcr only to by-laws made under section 1 of that Act. or to all bylaws which might happen to be in force at the time? (3) If sub-section 2 anplies generally, does the failure on the part ol the local authority to erect sinn posts, render by-law inoperative I' In renly to question 1. Mr Kolleston replied yes. by virtue of section ■"> ol The Intemretation Act i.t 1903 — assuming that the by-law had been properly made under the Act ol 1902. It. as his learned friend had argued, the Act of 1902 continued in force for the purpose of completing the by-law, section 5 of tile huci-pi nation -vet ol 1903 applied, and tiu Borough Council wguM be under tiie liecetsuy of advertising thti by-law., alter tliey were made, and would also require to erect sign-posts, neither oi winch had been done. Mr Kinueruey said the by-laws had been advertised before tiny Here finally adopted, and that was sulticient, as they had uot been altered attemards. -Mr Hollestou contended that the law said they should he advertised after maikng, and as they had uot been so advertised, and no sign-posts had been erected, there was no stable Inundation on which to base a prosecution, it sub-section 2 did not apply, then they had this position: Thai statute law said one tiling, and the Borough Council's by-laws said another. the law said motorists were entitled to be warned as to the rate at which they could drive cars, and for this purpose sign-posts must be erected by tne i.u-.u authority at dangerous places, yet the Council had not done tins. 11l reply to question 2, .Mr Rollcstvn answered that tho word "such" applied to all tin so by-la .>s because unuv r section o of Tho interpretation -\c"., 1903, they were made unuer the Act <1 1900. In reply to question 3, Mr Holleston answered in tne altirmative, saying mat :>lr Justice Williams had so decided 111 ins JUUgUlcllt IIL ill> eicii. gin. -Mr Kinneiuey replied that tins judgment lias not oclimi, and was cviii. a, _> to one given by the -\p|>cil Coum. The .magistrate tnat the Invcrcargiil cas-j heard by Mr Justice Williams, aid not appear to nave .'aim argucu at any longm. .Mr Kniiiei ue> miu that was so, auu added that U as ajiparentlv a judgment given under a n.isi oncepcioi.. (.lue judgment icietTvd to uas uuin. Tile -uotor iteguiatiun Act It.'OO, aiiu tliV Judge held mat tne lailure to erect, rendered tne by-law inoperative.,)

Air Rolhston said they must accept the law laid down by. the Judge of tiie Supreme Court, ;.iui Judge- i\ uhanus liu.l .-.aid that ii a l_oijj-oiaiioi. made a by-law restricting me use cl motors, such by-laws ::iu.-1 oc tubjeci to the -Motor Regulation Act. Tliac was what ho contended in tins ease. Even if the Council nad made its by-iaw.s under the 11/02 Act, such by-laws weie subject to the .Motor Regulation Ac. liXJd. l'rovision had been made in tins Act whereby motorists were to receive notice of the speed at which they eonlu travel, and this was put in with the intention that it should be obeyed, not ignored. The Magistrate said he did not hold with the contention tha the was bound by the decision of Mr Justice V> illia.'iis. Air Kiunernev said no, lie was iu lit. way bound by it, if contrary to a judgment of tho Court of Appeal, and if this case should go to tho Appeal Court, ho (tho speaker) would endeavour to show tfial the judgment referred to was uot in accordance with the law. Air Kinnerniy went on to argue that neither the provisions of sub-section 2 of sectioin -1, or of sub-sections 1 and 2 of section (i of Tho Motor Regulation Act 1906. apply to by-laws made under the Act of I'JU2 as were the by-laws of the Tiniaru Borough Council. When two distinct matters were mentioned, even in the same statute, and the word "such"' was used with reference to one or other of such matters, the word was construed as referring to the last preceding matter only. In support of this contention he cited the case of ex parte Barnes (1896) A.C. (Housl- of Lords) 146, at pages 150 and 153. The word could not be interpreter! as applying to by-laws made under a different statute. The contention that section 5 of the Interpretation Act of ■ 1903, applied the provisions of section -1 (2). and section tj (I) atid (.2) of The .Motor Regulation Act 1900, to by-laws made under tl"Act of 1902, impliedly admitted . that but for section 5 those provisions would not apply. He contended that section 5 did not maKe those provisions applicable. Such a provision ill The Interpretation Act was not meant to be literally construed. Its object must be considered, and the generality of its language limited to effecting that object. The object of section o in the Interpretation Act was to enable bylaws made under a repealed Act, to be altered or revoked notwithstanding the repeal of that Act. A contrary construction would result iu absurdity and injustice. It was a men- accident that the bv-law now iu question was confirmed on the very day that the repealing Act was passed. The by-law might have been made twelve months before, in which case the Act of 1906 could not have been complied with in it. Section 5 of The Interpretation Act was really a machinery clause relating to the administration of by-laws made under the Act of 19!)lj, and intended to be carried out when the by-laws were passed. To apply it to the Act of 1902 would take away right.-,, and impose additional obligations on local authorities. As to section <5 (2>. His Honor Mr Justice Williams merely referred to the question of the non-erection of sign-posts, but it was necessary for the purposes of his judgment. !l his judgment was based on it. he (counsel* would respectfully submit that the judgment was not law. It Would be absurd that a by-law should bo in operation while a sign-post was up, and would automatically cease to operate when it was down —a kind ol jack-in-the-box business. If His Honor held that the operation of the by-law was dependent on the sign-posts, his judgment was contrary to that of the Court- of Aopcal in Hooker v. Morris. 20 N.Z., L.R., (C.A.) 195, 196, 224. and in some other cases (cited). Mr Kinnerney contended on the point raised at the previous hearing, that a motor car is a vehicle even apart from

the statutory definition. the word being derived I'riiin "vehcrc, t" carriage or car. however i>r.»iMMlctl s w .u> :i vehicle. T.he U'lin had been licld }° include n bicvclc. In conclusion, lie contended that, there whs always po« ci tu j.-gnlate. all vehicles using tin- strec >, under the st.ituti s governing tin- attuns ..l boroughs and cities. 'the- L 1,1 Arts merely gave increased powers, am Vlie observance ol' the, provisions ot those. Acts was only applicable to by-la" 6 made under such increased poueis, an referring specially to dangerous places, not to tile ordinary trailic along tne streets, or around street corners. He cited numerous authorities in snppui oi liis contentions. Mr Hollestou replied, and His »o:ship said lie would take time to consider his judgment, the vasi'S being further adjourned for a tortnight.