The Timaru Herald. SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 1886.

Timaru Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 3288, 11 April 1885, Page 2

The Timaru Herald. SATURDAY, APRIL 11, 1886.

While Russian diplomatists have been parleying with England over the Afghan question, Russian troops, it appears, have been settling matters m the rough-and-ready fashion most favored by soldiers. At the very time the Court of St. Petersburg was sending " pacific assurances " to the Court of St. James General Komaroff was actually engaged

m hostilities with tbe Afghans, whom he attacked on the River Khushk, the pretext being a change m the position of the Afghan outposts at Penjdeh. Information received by the English Government, however, is to the effect that the Afghans gave no provocation for the attack made upon them. If the military movement were made m accordance with direct instructions from headquarters, it, of course, only affords another instance of the audacity of Russian treachery and duplicity. The Czai 1 , and hiß Ministers, it will be seen, have declared that the Russian officers m Central Asia were unaware of the agreement arrived at between England and Russia that no advance should take place on either side pending the existing negotiations, and have expressed a hope that parleying may be continued, notwithstanding the late " incident," as it is politely termed. Needless to say the time haß gone by when England would care to attach the slightest weight to any assurances made by Russia, and one is therefore obliged to look to surrounding circumstances to see what corroboration or otherwise they afford to her assertions. Pledges and assurances are evidently regarded by Russian statesmen merely as expedients for blinding other Powers, and for gaining time. As for the idea that they are to be kept, the Moscovite laughs at the notion as Jove is said to laugh at lovers' vows. In estimating the value of M. Giers' statement to the British ambassador, we have, therefore, to see how far it is supported by the history of recent events. At the outset, when- England was supposed to be overwhelmed by her Egyptian difficulties, the Northern Power, there is no doubt, had made up her mind to carry everything with a high hand. After the Russian suggestion of a Joint Commission had been accepted, and Sir Peter Lumsden, the English representative, had made his way with infinite pains to the disputed locality, the Russian Government, with a flagrant discourtesy that bordered on open insult, left him there for months without any attempt being made to send their own envoy to the spot. More than this, they proceeded to occupy Pul-i-Khatum and other places of strategic importance on the frontier, and generally to behave m a manner that made it clear they were not sincere m professing a desire to have the matter settled m a pacific manner by a Commission on the spot, but intended, cither by fair means or foul, to get the utmost advantage out of what they considered Britain's extremity. All at once the Russian Joint Commissioner, having never entered on his functions, was superseded, and the Imperial Government sent another delegate, M. Lessar, to -London to argue out the question with the, authorities there. M. Lessar, it may be mentioned, is a Frenchman by birth although a naturalised Russian subject. He is an engineer by profession and has an intimate knowledge of the disputed country. It is suggestive, moreover, as showing the real object of Russian aggression, to learn from The Times that M. Lessar has actually! marked out a route for a railway from the Russian possessions east of the Caspian to Herat. It is satisfactory to reflect that something more than marking out the route is necessary before tbe railway becomes an accomplished fact, as Russia will probably find to her cost. The object m sending M. Lessar to London was a " deep " one. The Rubsians knew the proverbial weakness of our Foreign Office m geography, and they thought that M. Lessar, with his local knowledge, might be able to bluff and bamboozle the English Government into acceding to their preposterous demands. Fortunately Lord Granville stood firm, and M. Lessar's mission was a complete failure. Foiled m this impudent attempt, the Russians proceeded to make further military advances on the frontier until they were at length brought to a halt by the English ultimatum. From this point matters took a different turn. England roused herself with a promptitude and potency that evidently surprised and disconcerted the Northern Power. The most complete preparations for war were at once set on foot by the British Ministry, the Commander-in-Chief m India was ordered to take the field with 50,000 troops, and so far from Hindostan being disaffected, as Russia had fondly imagined, the leading native rulers were prompt m their offers to England of valuable contingents, some of .which, at least, would contain fighting men of a quality not easily to be surpassed. Not the least unpleasant factor m the situation was the threat of Sir Peter Lumsden to march into Herat, and his appeal to the Afghans to resist by force any further advance of the invaders —an appeal which it was evident would be readily responded to. In an early stage of the negotiations, it may be mentioned, Russia showed herself obviously disconcerted at the strength of Sir Peter Lumsden's escort, and made that one of her grounds for* refusing to go on with the Commission. Events have proved that the Government showed a wise prescience when they decided to furnish their representative with an adequate following. The moral effect of that little band of 500 fighting men, bo close to Herat, inspiring the patriotism, and strengthening the confidence of the Afghans by their presence, has been of incalculable benefit throughout the crisis. Finally, there was the rapprochement between England and Turkey, raising a fresh difficulty m the path of the Northern Power. Altogether Russia, instead of finding England unfriended and overwhelmed, ready to agree to any proposals that might be made, discovered that she had, involved herself m a most critical position, from which there seemed scarcely any escape without humiliation. The tone of her subsequent proceedings tended to show that^ she realised this fact, and was endeavoring to shuffle out of the dilemma m which she had been landed by the fatuity no less than the unsorupulousness of her statesmen. ; It is not impossible, therefore, that the Russian diplomatists may be for once m a way, telling the truth m saying that the late attack was unauthorised. Can there, however, be any reversion to the status quo P Can England accept Russia's explanation and go on again with the parleying P There are the gravest diffioultieß m the way of such a solution. In the first place the-

spirit of the English nation has been thoroughly aroused by the obvious untrnstworthiness, to use no stronger term, of the Northern Power. There is a strong feeling that nothing but a thrashing will check her crafty aud treacherous designs upon India. If Russia gives way now, people argue, it will only be because she finds we are too strong for her, and she will seize the first opportunity presented by any signs of embarrassment on our part, to resume her policy of aggression. Far better, they say, to have the matter out at once than postpone the evil day to a time when we may not be so well prepared. Secondly, there is the effect on the Afghans to be considered. This, indeed, is perhaps the most important factor m the situation. We have solemnly bound ourselves to support them against Russian aggressian, and those pledges have been ratified within the last few days m the most open and impressive manner. How can we, m the presence of their slaughtered countrymen on the Khushk, refrain from at once taking up arms m their cause ? What would be the effect, moreover, on our Indian subjects of any appearance of weakness at such a moment ? Unless Russia concedes at once the main points m dispute and makes substantial reparation to the Afghans for the late wanton and unprovoked attack, war to the knife between Great Britain and the Northern Power seems inevitable.