The Timaru Herald. THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1885.

Timaru Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 3263, 12 March 1885, Page 2

The Timaru Herald. THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1885.

One of our contemporaries, in an interesting but somewhat fallacious article on the threatening aspect of affairs between Russia and England, deals with the question of whether war between the two Powers " would be such a terrible thing for the colonies after all ?" It apparently comes to the conclusion that it would be rather jolly than otherwise if such a contingency did arise, and that there is an excellent chance of its making our fortunes. The effect of war, it says, would be to send up the price of corn, meat, wool, and other produce. There would be an expenditure of at least a hundred and fifty millions probably within the next twelve months. Our fleet, it continues, will keep the 6ea, after blocking the Baltic and Black Seas, to the great injury of the Russian commerce in corn, wool, tallow, and hides. The writer then goes on to say — " There will be war risks for us at sea no doubt, for there will be swift steamers armed and , commissioned in the Russian service. But we shall have swift steamers too, armed and commissioned, and the ships of the Royal Navy will not be in port. Now, as our people have always in all ages given a good account of themselves at sea, in every part of the globe in all weathers, they may be relied on to do so again. Cruisers may find their way to our coasts occasionally, and probably will. But with our ports in a state of defence, they will not find themselves at all well off when they get into our waters. As the ports are to be put into a state of defence we may look forward to the coming of Russian cruisers with complacency." Now, we do not dispute for a ! moment that in the event of a war breaking out between England and Russia, the result would be tremendous injury to the trade of the latter country, and a very substantial rise in the price j of most of the articles of commerce exported by New Zealand and Australia. Our contemporary, we believe, has taken a very modest view of the probable effect in this respect. The two principal countries trading with Russia are Germany and Great Britain. Of the imports about 40 per cent annually come from Germany and 20 per cent from Great Britain ; whilst of the exports each country takes about 30 per cent. The chief article of export from Russia to the United Kingdom is grain, mainly wheat. During 1882 the value of the grain and flour exported from Russia to Great Britain amounted to nearly eleven millions sterling, being one-sixth of the entire amount received by the latter country from abroad. The fact of such a supply being suddenly shut off would of course materially enhance prices, and we should not be surprised if the mere prospect of such a contingency were at once to cause a slight speculative rise in the market, unless the diplomatic horizon becomes speedily cleared. From a standard authority we learn that the principal other articles of export from Russia to Great Britain in the year 1882 were flax, exported to the value of £2,227,000 ; wood and timber, £3,112,916; flaxj seed, rape and linseed, exported to the value of £2,453,627 ; hemp, £521,811; and wool, £617,199. Minor articles of export to Great. Britain are tallow and stearine, bristles, cordage and twine, oil-seed and tar. The mere stoppage of the Russian exports, therefore, would cause the produce markets to become brisker. In addition to that there would be the demand for stores for the troops, and a small illustration of how that may affect the colony was given the ether day. For some months past tho preserved meat trade has been very stagnant, and the production in New Zealand has been kept within very narrow limits. A few days ago, however, a large quantity was required for the troops in the Soudan, and what

had been a drug in the market, immediately rose to a premium. The Home authorities cabled to Sydney for a supply, the Sydney people telegraphed to New Zealand, and pretty well the whole stock in the colony was cleared out, no doubt at a very good figure. This is the bright side of the picture, but we are afraid that our contemporary has not fully estimated the im- | portance of what has to be said on the other side. It might not be so bad if we possessed the cruisers and fortifications about which the journal in question speaks so airily, but which exist only in its imagination. We are glad to see that the Government have determined to push on the defences of the colony on the plan proposed by His Excellency the Governor and worked out by Major Cautley. Fortifications are not to be built in a day, however ; their construction is a work of months, and even years. If the work is to be done in a hurry, it can only be carried out at ruinous expense, and at a sacrifice of efficiency. For anything like extensive works there is not even the money available, nor could it be procured until Parliament had met and sanctioned a loan. Unless the requisite materials have been imported within the last few weeks, we have not the requisite appliances for working our torpedo boats, even if we had crews capable of manning them. Except for such protection as the English navy might be able to give us, we are absolutely defenceless against foreign privateers. Should one of these manage to j elude the British cruisers — a very possible contingency — a levy could be made on one or more of our seaport towns that would effectually run away with any profit we might make on the increased price of wheat. There is no doubt our direct steamers and the Union boats ought, in accordance with the Governor's advice, to be adapted so as to be available as auxiliary cruisers, but at present they are not in that position. Our contemporary says that the signs of war are so serious " that sensible men must make up their minds to think as if they were quite certain that war will be declared within the next fortnight." If such a contingency should actually occur we are very much afraid that we should not be able to make much progress with our defence works until the opportunity of their being of any use had passed. Summarising the position, we should say that in the event of war between England and the Northern Power, this colony, under the influence of panic, would certainly be plunged at once into a heavy expenditure to secure the best defence works possible in the short time at our disposal, and that it would run the risk of serious losses from attacks on its merchantmen and possibly on its towns. In return for this, there would be a temporary spurt in the value of its produce, which might certainly put money into the pockets of a few, but which would inevitably be followed by the reaction which always succeeds a war. The high prices wonld bring other competitors in the field, and these would probably remain even when the temporary inflation had been succeeded by the contraction of the spending powers of the people at Home, which would assuredly be brought about by war taxation. Putting aside all question of sympathy with the suffering and distress which would be caused in Great Britain by a war, and looking at the matter from the lowest and most selfish standpoint, it is evident, we think, that this colony has a hundred times more to lose than to gain by the outbreak of hostilities at the present moment.