ENGLAND'S THREATENED INTERESTS.

Timaru Herald, Volume XXVII, Issue 1761, 22 June 1877, Page 3

ENGLAND'S THREATENED INTERESTS.

A correspondent signing himself "Anglophil" writes as under to the Daily Telegraph of April 27. The letter is such an able one that we reprint it as fully as possible, more especially as " Anglophil," according to the Daily Telegraph, has every right to speak with authority : —

" Sir, — The war so" long foreseen by those who hare looked below the surface, and known that the fluctuations of the money market and varying opinions of the press marked no real change m the political crisis, is now begun. While the diplomatists of Russia, have amused the public mind with notes, and memoranda, and protocols, her soldiers hare gone straight forward m their course of preparation fur war. While a muliitude of physicians, each with his own nostrum, has been busily prescribing fo-* the Ottoman Empire, the Turks, wiser than them all, have diagno«ed correctly their own malady, and have steadily collected their forces to resist those external causes which, more than any internal disorders, have been, and are, the root of their disease. And now the preliminary details are over, the armies are gathered together for the combat ; and o.i all sides it is taid that Russia and Turkey arc left face to face. But, Sir, it seems to me that Russia and England are also left face to face ; for Russia knows well that, beyond the hulf-disciplined, ill -organised armies of Turkey, she has to face the might and wealth and stern reeolve of Britain ; and every British Patriot— thank God they are many! — feels iv his inmost heart that English interests ore menaced, and that no blow can fall upon Turkey that does not strike at the Imperial power of her who is Queen of this realm and Empress of India. It is vain now to retrace the devious track of diplomatic intrigues, vain to debate whether this step or that might possibly have led to paths of pesce. Wat is, m fact, declared, und the armed hosts of Russia are already marching forth to disturb the pease of the world. Every stage which they move is an advance towards the inevitable collision with England.

Up to tho present hour her Majesty's Government has never breathed one word, m Parliament or elsewhere, which could be constructed as hostile to Russia. Not one farthing has been spent upon military preparations. Our fleet, it is true, has been strengthened, and kept m Turkish waters. But to all who know itussia's naval weakness and Turkey's strength m the Black Sea, it is evident that no British ships are needed there, and that such naval preparations were but the precautions taken by the mariner who sees m sultry weather and falling meroury the signs of an approaching storm and knows not from what, quarter it may blow. Now the squall is upon ut, we know whence it blows ; and it is surely time to decide upon the course we mean to steer. In this letter I propose, with your permission, to indicate those dangers which menace most directly our Imperial interests, and to suggest those steps which, amongst politicians and soldiers who are not trammelled by tbe chains of party are considered most fitted to avert the threatened evils.

For many months past the attention 'of thin country has been concentrated on the Danube ; yet it is not ou the Danube that we hare least to fear. Other Powers, wielding mighty armies, hare interests there so great that they may safely be relied upon for their defence. Be the understanding between Russia and Germany what it may, it is certain that the 1 Emperor William will allow no State ruled by a Hohenzollern to fall permanently under Russian sway. If we admit freely the' internal weakness and financial poverty of Austria and Hungary, still it is ceaiain that Austrian and Magyar will fight to the death rather than allow the outlet of the river that luves the walls of Vienna, the Kaiseratadt, and flows beside the RtikosfielH of Peeth, to fall into possession of the Muscovite. The politicians who speak of tripartits alliances ignore the fact that no nation ever allies itself against its own material interests ; and it is safe to assert that no alliance , has been made by Germany that would permit Russia to gain foothold upon the Danube. Whatsver advance Russia may make m this direction, she will make it with the foregone conclusion that she must give up, under the penalty of long and bloody war with her Western neighbors, every foot -of land that she "may occupy or conquer beyond her present European frontier. To England the advance of Russia to the Balkans would be of no direct injury. Indirectly, as crippling and weakening the Power which guards the Bosphorous and as materially lessening the distance between Constantinople any a great aggressive nation, it would affect v«, were Russia's stay south of the Danube likely to be permanent. That, however, is not unlikely, but it is, to my mind, without the range of practical political possibilities. So, too, it may safely be predicted that any attempt by Russia to make herself mistress of Constantinople, eren without remaining on the Danube, would bring Austria into the field. For of what avail to her would be a free Danube were the Bosphorus blockaded by Russian forts and Russian men-of-war? Austria's interest m keeping open the mouth of the Euxine is at least equal to ber interest m keeping open the mouth of the Danube. Here, too, England's interest would be directly threatened. On tbis point all parties seem now to be un ted. The only difference between the two schools of thought is that the Bussophobists bid us go to Constantinople to keep the Russian out and help the Turk, and the Turltophobista bid us go thsre to turn the Turk out and put ourselves m.

Constantinople can be approach ed by land and by sea. When I think that before Russian troops can arrive there by land they must traverse a distance of some 800 miles, and cross two such obstacles as the Danube and the Balkans, opposed by the whole force of Turkey, m imminent fear of. an Austrian irruption upon their communication, I confess there seems to me but little need for us to hasten to send a force to defend Stamboul against an attack by land. I hear that our engineer officers who have surveyed the position extending from Derkos along thn Kara Srt to Bojok Tschekmedshe report that m three weeks' time a force of 70,000 men could throw up works that would make the position impregnable if held by British troops and flanked by British ships. There is, therefore, time before as m which to prepare against the remote contingency of the arrival of the Russians at this point. Bat remote as the contingency b», it is one against which we ought to be prepared, and preparation means the mobilisation and equipment of every detail of a sufficient force for the task, and the placing that force within reach of the point to be defended. Should the Russian troops, however, by

any unforseen turn j D the political whed, be i. « e( L 7 Austria to cross the Danube and Balkans and defeat the Turkish army, it would be necessary for us immediately to occupy Constantinople; and not only Constantmople, but the neck of land which connects the Chersonese with the main land on the we.tern shore of the Dardanelles. Long ago Sir John Burgoyne pointed out that this position is quite as important as, even more so, than Constantinople. " Without it," he taid, "we must retire not only from the Black Sea, but from the Sea of Marmora also, losusg with it even all communication with Constantinople." "And it must be remembered," he continues, " that the Dardanelles, the position on which everything hangs, is much nearer for the enemy to fain than Constantinople, and that his first effort would naturally be made against that station, m order to cut off the communication between Turkey and her allies, and thus preclude all further exertion m her favor." There, at Bulalr, at the beginning of tha. Crimean war we threw up lines. Their traces still remain, und tbo same position would again have to be occupied by a force of from 10.JOO to 12,000 troops With the position west of Constantinople held by 40,000 English and a forca of Turkish troops, and the lines of Bulair on the Dardanelles by 10,000 or 12,000 more, with our fleet cruising between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, we might look on English material interests m their narrowest sense as being protected against Russian aggression, so far as the European continent is concerned. Once the action of England would hare been very different. There was a time when she drove the armies of France from Lisbon to the Pyrenees ; it is but a quarter.of a century since she sought and attacked Russia on her own soil. It is not a dignified r/oU for a great nation— this part of sitting down behind entrenchments to await the attack of a possible . foe, but for tho moment Turkey has put it out of our hands to play any other; and it is a part so clearly marked out as our very least • duty towards the British Empire, that. jev«n .. from the adversaries of the Government it could scarcely meet with opposition. But there are places nearer home where our vital interests are m immediate danger. That which all parties are agreed to defend is our line of communication with India, that . direct line which traverses tho Mediterranean; and; passes through the Suez Canal. Were Russia to be allowed to establish herself m • any good harbor close t > that line, we should . directly suffer. V our correspondent at Paris to-day throws out a hint that may well make us reflect. He alleges that the Russian Governmeut has informed the Khedive that it., will consider itself entitled to make reprisals should an Egyptian contingent be sent to the aid of Turkey. No one can doubt that m this Russia is acting strictly within her rights. But were a Russian fleet to appear before Alexandria, and Russian troops to be landed there, or were even a Russian bteamer allowed to advunco beyond Port Said, and temporarily check the navigation of the canal, English interests would be materially damaged. It is for our fleet to hinder this. Fortunately ' we are strong at sea. We hare no need to pause and consider what we can or cannot do upon the ocean. There, as m the olden time, Britannia remains mistre<s and ruler. But the fleet of Russia must be watched, and authority to act must be given to our admirals. We cannot afford to wait till Alexandria has been bombarded, till a Russian force has landed on the Egyptian coast, and Russian engineers have impeded the navigation of the Suez Canal.

And this brings me to a matter which. seems to have been entirely overlooked by all writers upon the existing situation. Ido not for a moment suppose that the Russian fleet can cope with ours m the Mediterranean or m any other waters. But Russia is not bo utterly powerless at sea as the silence of the prsss would appear to indicate. Enough may be learnt from Mr Reed's letters m the Times, and from M. Merman's articles m the Revue dea Deux Monde* to show that she has no inconsiderable number of vessels of war at her disposal, and that of these some are powerful uonclads; and it may be that Russia, counting upon the necessity under which the Porte labors of protecting its Black Bea shores from any attempt at attack — a necessity whioh must involve the retention of the greater part of the Turkish fleet ia the Black Sea — may be tempted to muster her naval forces m the Mediterranean. I have reason to believe that our own statesmen are not asleep to the possibility of this danger. It is by no means improbable that Ruisia may attempt a deicent upon Egpyt, or on Crete. Were Russia to capture Crelo, our interests would, as pointed out by a writer m " Black • wood's Magazine" for this month, be almost as directly involved as by the occupation of Alexandria. That island is now held by a Turkish garrison of barely 8000 troops, and it is no secret thit an insurrection is prepared there. Ammunition has been for long, and is now being, smuggled into the island. Arms, which have been concealed since the revolution of ten years ago, are ready to be brought forth. But still the supply ia deficient. There is now, however, m the water* of America, that great neutral ground for sale of arms, a Russian »quadron. If that sqrudron, laden with arms and ammunition,: is joined m the Mediterranean by the Bussian fleet from the Baltic, it would take all the Turkish strength to prevent a landing m Crete. Supplied with arms and. ammunition, the whole Cretan manhood would rise, and the small Turkish foroe. must do that which . they even now contemplate — retire behind the shelter of fhe fortifications on the seaboard. If the Russian fleet can defeat tho small Turkish squadron detached to watch Crete, the island falls into the hands of Rujt sis. This also our fleet must be charged to prevent. , , ;■., J

If theie surmise* have m them »ny groundwork of truth, it seems that the conUst between the Sultan sad the Cttr will nofso' certainly be " localised" as sanguine «nthasiasta for Slavonic autonomy would bare us belieTe. It seems that if Russia and Turkey are left to deal: with each other without interference, English interests may be gravely compromised, while jot Russia, is many hundreds of miles distant from the Bospho'rus, anil that those interests can only be protected "by our n&ral force if Russia insists upon her right to attack Turkey, with whom she is at war, m Egypt or m Crete. Should Russia attempt t^ land troops m either of these countries, c* should she attempt to impede the Sue* Canal, we must attack her ; and I can only presume that our Government will give fair warning of our resolve. Such warning wouldcompelßussia to abstain, or to declare war against ' England. But if we warn her that there are certain points which we cannot allow her to touoh on peril of war with England it would bring us no nearer to war itself, And, would greatly strengthen our position to occupy those points with our troops — Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Egypt, And Crete. Thote are the points whose occtrpn--tion we must resist. For reasons already given, and also because of the difficulties it might cause with Turkey and with a fanatical Mussulman population, I do not adrocate our going to Constantinople till our doing so can no longer with safety be/ delayed. But the nearer our' trcops are to Const antinopU, the longer can that occupation be postponed, and with the greater calmness can we look on. For this reason we should at once occupy, a position on the Dardanelles— a position,/" already shown, even of greater importance, and more open to attack by Russia than Constantinople itself. There is even a stronger reason for our going at once to Crete. Our presence there would stop the insurrection about to burst forth, would hinder the bloodshed and the destruction which 'must otherwise once again turn that fair island into a scene of wreck and rain. No more admirable station for a Urge force could possibly be imagined. It is full of healthy camping grounds; its climate, even m the hottest summer, is so tempered by sea breezes as : to» be well suited to English troops ; the mountain sides afford a hundred sites for sanitary stations. IU spacious land-locked harbor;

wtfnid allow a great fleet of transports to lie peaceably at anchor, and give a refuge to our men-of-war, within little more than 48 hours' steam from either Egypt or the Dardanelles. It has the one and only h*rbor for a fleet m all the islands of the Levant. Just as, holding the Dardanelles, we may abstain from immediate Advance to the Bosphorus, so holding Crete, we can afford to watch events m Egypt. Of course, against these grounds, it will be said by the party of coercion that this would bo to co to Crete and to the Dardanelles as the friends of Turkey. I see no reason why such an occupation of certain fixed points should involve an ofensive and deftVnsive alliance with Turkey. It need only involve a defensive alliance for the protection of these particular places ; and if it be ruled that we cannot fight (or Turkey, we must at least protect our own imperial interests, which are threatened ; and the fact that Turkey is on sur si3e is but an accident of the situation, far which we are not responsible. Those among our military authorities who save had experience of the difficulties and delays m the equipment even of small expeditions,' owing to our system of centralising stores, and oar total absence of any organisation of ammunition columns, and other important services, warn me that [a despatch of even a force of 40,000 men .will take far longer than the six weeks calculated upon by the Government ; and it is therefore, of primary importance that the Government should at once commence the preparations for mobilising such a body of troops as we may be compelled <o send out of the country. It behoves ns now to assume an attitude of neutrality,: for no* human eye can foresee what dimensions the- struggle now commenced may assume. In this letter I have touched only on otar threatened interests m the Bosphorous and m the Mediterranean, and said no word of that probable advance from the Caucasus which now,- as when I addressed you as long ago' as February, I still hold to constitute " England's greatest danger m the East."