THE KEY TO THE NARROWS.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 144711, 21 June 1915, Page 8

THE KEY TO THE NARROWS.

I A POWERFUL'ARMY NECESSARY. I FORMIDABLE DEFENCES Eastern Mediterranean, April 12. Tlte days of the Turk in Europe are .'lumbered, but no one will deny that he dying hard ami game. It came as a disagreeable shock to many to road on tnc morning of March 1!) that two British battleships and one French had been sunk in' tiio Dardanelles, whilst .several others had been hit and damaged. Tho blow was all the more sudden, because the public had been led to believe from previous official and unofficial reports that all was going well. We were told that the outer forts had been completely destroyed, and that the work of mine-sweeping had made excellent progress. This nows was given in perfect good faith, and was also quite true, but we built up on it too great a structure of hope, hut few realising the iimneii.se difficulties tho i licet lias had to tiiee. obstacles which do ! not really commence until tho Narrows are approached. Tile combined advance of the Allied Fleet up the Dardanelles on March IS was not an attempt to pass the Narrows. It was merely intended as a great demonstration against the j forts, in order that the destroyers and I sweepers might clear the minefield under cover of the guns of the ships. The work was carried out in the most gallant maimer, and was perfectly successful: but. unfortunately, the Inrther advance had to he abandoned, owing to the sudden and unexpected disasters to throe vessels inflicted by drifting mines. In the old days of sailing ships the Dardanelles wore a most formidable obstacle, which no admiral would have faced with confidence. The difficulties and dangers have been increased tenfold now by long-range weapons, torpedoes, and mines. .Nevertheless, the Navy is of opinion that the Narrows can be forced, in spile of these obstacles, and this opinion has been strengthened and confirmed by the great trial of March 18. It might mean the loss ol ships, but if tho occasion justified the .sacrifice the Fleet would not hesitate to make the attempt. Bui unless there is a powerful army ready to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula tlie moment the Fleet passed into, the Sea of Mamara, or made its way to Constantinople, the Straits would immediately be closed behind it. and. supposing the Turks, hacked up hy German officers and German intrigues, decided to continue the war, it would have to light its way out, and again clear the minefield. STRENGTH OF THE FORTS ! Nothing has surprised the gunners out j here more than the resisting power of the old forts round the Dardanelles. Those at Seddul Bahr and Kume Kale, at the northern and southern entrances

to tho Dardanelles, wore subjected to a terrific bombardment by tile combined Fleets on February 19, both at lone and short range. They were so completely smothered with fire that no one believed a stone or a gun could be left standing. Their fire was, in fact, completely silenced. Yet, when tho. landing parties wore put ashore to examine them, tho materia! damage was found to bo comparatively small, although they wore mere shambles. Many of the guns were still intact, ■and one 9in. was actually found loaded. Tho work of destruction had to be completed by the landing parties, and the forts are now heaps of unoccupied ruins, with their guns lying about at all angles. In like manner the forts at Chanak, on the Asiatic side of the Narrows, and at Kilid Bahr, on tho European. together with the batteries known as Nos. 7 and 8 lower down the Straits, wore silenced temporarily on March 18, because they were so completely smothered by a tremendous volume of fire that the gunners wore driven from tho guns to tho cover of their bombproof shelters; but in view of experience gained on February 25 the Fleet does not claim to have knocked out many guns in them, and after tho disaster to the Irresistible and Ocean some of the guns were manned again and concentrated a tremendous lire on these unfortunate ships during the work of removing the crews to destroyers. The Turkish soldier fights very well behind entrenchments, but he is a Tory had gunner and possesses absolutely no knowledge of the science of war. But the Turkish Army, directed by highlytrained German officers, and having the advantage of their science and technical skill, is a very different enemy. The Germans have adapted the defences to meet the immense power of naval guns, and have built up a kind of secondary defence out of any material available, which is now proving far more formidable, than tho old forts mounting tho heaviest guns. FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES The Fleet has three main obstacles to overcome, and to achieve decisive results ’ the assistance of a very large Expeditionary Force, supplied with powerful artillery, both field aud howitzer. is essential. First and foremost are the mine fields, which are constantly being renewed, and the floating mines, which are carried down by the four-knot current. It is now generally accepted that it was mines of this description which sank the Bouvet, the Irresistible and the Ocean. The second obstacle which must bo overcome is formed by the concealed batteries of heavy howitzers and directtire guns which have been placed in position since the first attack on the outer forts. The movable batteries of field guns and light howitzers, which are shifted from point to point under perfect cover, and which opt'n up on the ships from the most unexpected positions, present the third obstacle. Field guns and light howitzers can do little or no damage to a battleship cleared for action except to those in her control tops, lint they can indict very serious damage on trawlers and destroyers engaged in the task of sweeping the Straits. ’i he work has often had to be chocked on account of the severity of this tiro. The destroyers and trawlers go up the Dardanelles under the protection of a battleship'and commence their operations. They are immediately subjected to a tremendous fire from the enemy’s light guns, which are so carefully concealed that the secondary armament of the battleship in charge finds it almost impossible to pick up a target. They can only aim at the Hashes of the guns when those are visible, or else by tho j map, after au aeroplane reconnaissance ms located a battery. Some, guns and batteries are temporarily silenced, but on the following day they are shifted to a fresh position, and tile task of locating them has to commence all over again. If the ground on the European and Asiatic sides of tho Straits were flat the task would be comparatively easy, because the enemy’s guns could be kept out of range hy the long-range Gin. of the strips. Unfortunately, it is just the reverse. The Gallipoli Peninsula is a jumble of hills, valleys, small rivers, low-lying ridges, and spurs, which assume no regular formation, and which seem to have been especially designed by •Nature to assist the defence "of tho Straits. In parts the country is thickly wooded, in others the trees are sparse, and there are patches of lowlying ground which have been cultivated. The ascent from the shore is steep and fairly high, and the shins must clear this initial obstacle before they can reach their mark. CONCEALED BATTERIES:, Amongst this hilly country there are innumerable positions where guns can be concealed, in valleys, behind hills, or amongst trees. When a gun or battery has been located by an aeroplane it is often necessary to fire right over the top of several ridges of hills, and the smoke of the bursting projectiles cannot lie seen, even from ttie control tops. The Asiatic shore of tho Straits is lower, and is commanded along almost its while length by the European. Tho hills are not so flush with water, and it is therefore easier to locate batteries on that side. But even with this small assistance it has been found impossible to silence tho enemy’s guns. Amongst the hills and broken ground they conceal them with ease anil security, and they are also, apparently, able to move gnus with much greater facility on Dio south side. No fleet can advance ovon close to tho Narrows, much loss through thorn, until the mine field has been cleared. Tho enemy’s heavy concealed guns and light mobilo artillery render this task impossible, oven under tho covering lire of tile battleships, for the reasons I have already explained. In addition, there is every known reason to believe that tho Turks have placed a large number of torpedo-tubes along both shores. Therefore, the only way the Straits can ho opened is from tho land side. The guns of the battleships can cover a landing, and their fire will be able to assist an advance inland up to a certain 1 point, but once tho army is on shore it must do the real work of taking tho enemy’s positions in reverse by its own unaided efforts. IVo do not know the enemy’s numbers, but bo is entrenched everywhere, and the lessons of Flanders have brought it dearly homo what the cost of assaulting entrenched positions moans. Everything will depend on the number of guns available for shore work, and the numbers of infantry. Tho occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula would make it possible to clear tho Straits for tho ships to pass, because, as I have already said, the northern shore commands the southern, and the enemy’s artillery on the Asiatic side could thus bo kept at a distance.