COULD GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXI, Issue 144198, 15 September 1913, Page 6

COULD GERMANY INVADE ENGLAND?

MANOEUVRES PROVE INVASION POSSIBLE. LONDON, July 23. Tho mimic naval war which promises to settle some of tho vital problems entering into tho problem of defence began yesterday. Tho whole of the ships engaged number 347, and are divided into two fleets, tho red fleet attacking and tho blue defending. The latter is tho stronger, and consists of 24 battleships, 3 battle-cruisers, 27 heariy shins in all. In addition to this first line, of battlo there aro eight cruiser squadrons, two light cruiser squadrons with mine layers, five destroyer flotillas numbering 100 boats, and four submarine flotillas. The rod or attacking fleet consists of 13 battleships, 2 battle-cruisers, 1 cruiser squadron with threo attached cruisers, ono light cruiser squadron, 3 destroyer flotillas of CO boats, and 2 submarine flotillas. Tho problem to bo solved is whether an enemy such as Germany with greatly inferior strength can land troops in sufficient force to paralyse British credit, intimidate tho public security, - .and impcdo'oversea food supplies, without which England would bo starved in throe weeks. Tho enemy’s fleet, with tho exception of some torpedo craft, was at tho Noro when the manoeuvres started, while the main defending force was distributed between Scana Flow in tho Orkneys and Cromarty Firth in the North of Scotland, with somo smaller vessels in tho Firth of Forth. „ RAID SUCCEEDS RAID. Loudon, July 28.—Unless Admiral Callaghan has u big surprise in store which will sweep Vice-Admiral Jellieoo and tho attacking rod licet from the sea. tho naval manoiiivrce of 1913 will undoubtedly bo interpreted as a grave warning to tho country. Tho Daily Express, taking a somewhat alarmist view, says; “Although tho hostile red fleet is only half tho strength of the defending bluo fleet, the latter has met disaster after disaster. Raid succeeds raid on defenceless ports. Tho defeat of. an important section of tho defending British fleet in the fierce battlo off tho mouth of tho Humber has been followed hv the capture of Sunderland, Blvthc, and all coal fields in that district. To complete the chapter of catastrophes tho forts at tho month of tho Tyno mistook tho bluo cruisers anil destroyers for tho enemy, and opened flro on them, inflicting heavy loss'.” The Times, however, warns the public to await the umpire’s final decision before taking tho raids too seriously. It suggests that the raiders havo been unable to retire after coming ashore, and have, really, therefore, been captured. Tho Tiincs adds thaj nothing could bo plainer than that if tho raids have been successful their success has been duo to an insufficient protecting force afloat, not to tho lack of any shore defences. This is the answer tho Times gives to tho local authorities of Grimsby and Hull, who, made, fearful of raids in real warfare hv their experience of last week, aro already petitioning tho Government to construct more forts at tho entrance to tho river Humber. SUMMING UP THE MORAL. London July 30.—Now that tho most interesting phase of tho naval manmuvres is over, tho experts are trying to sum. mi . their moral. All soom to agree that they prove that raids arc more serious than was foreseen. It is apparently easier for transports to get through the lines of naval defence than was, anticipated. They can then make their wav up unfrequented waterways to convenient lamling-placcE. The raiders having landed and done considerable damage, can Sometimes get away without being caught. Equally general is the conviction that land forts, however well armod. aro no defence against such raids. Nobody seriously supports the alarmist local authorities along tho cast coast, who aro already begihning to clamour for fortifications and guns. Not oven wealthy England can fortify every possible land-ing-plare. As tho naval editor of tho Dailv Telegraph says: “There is onlyone 'form of protection for a long ana exposed coast-line, and that is ships,, preferably those using tho torpedoes. Tho manoeuvres suggest the startling rapidity with which tbo naval warfare develops under modern conditions. It is apparently proved that with a force exceeding that of the entire German naV y—such as was under the command of Sir George Callaghan—it is impossible to prevent an enemy landing at three or four places on tho cast coast within four days of tho outbreak of war. SECOND STAGE OF MANOEUVRES. London, August 2.—A state ol war once more exists in tho North Sea, and tho country this time is really excited. As a rule* tho naval manoeuvres aro regarded, like most other annual affairs as tbo official beginning of the holidays, tho end of tho London and the commencement of the yachting season. But the first week's operations have roused tremendous interest, especially all along tho east coast. Apricultural labourers at work in tho fields haymaking, discuss tho probability of another raid; there is over all a fooling of pent-up excitement that shows how deeply British imagination has been stirred by tho success of Admiral Jcllicoe last week. CHURCHILL ON THUNDERER. The Red, or attacking fleet, started the war again when it disappeared into the morning mists of tho North Sea Yesterday. Hr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of tho Admiralty, vanished with it on board Admiral JoUic'oo’s flag* shin the Thunderer. This battleship and the Orion aro sister- ships, and ot tho latest supox'-Drcadnought type, though tho new ships building outclass them. The Thunderer, however, has ten 13.5-inch guns, and can steam 21 knots under contract speed. She has made a good deal more than this on hor trials, hut tho Admiralty < is rather chary of giving accurate information regarding tho speed of tho new ships. It is recognised that speed combined with gun power is essential, and this problem is being carefully studied, during these manoeuvres. The question of bigger guns, the 15-inch gun is ordered for the Valiant and Queen Elizabeth, is also under examination, as there is a close relation between the size of the gun and tho speed of tho ship. SEAPLANES AS SCOUTS. The , other phase of the ' manoeuvres that is exciting groat attention is tho value of the naval seaplanes. As already advised, those did some wonderful work as scouts last week, especially with regard to submarine attack. It has transpired that tho Red fleet has taken with it three of the latest seaplanes and a number of the men of the

naval flying corps for aerial scouting. The importance of these seaplanes is obvious. If an attacking fleet can raid a coast under the cover of armed seaplanes which can also guard against ting power is very much enhanced. It must not bo forgotten that although the principal object of the Admiralty appears to be to prove the weak spots on the coast in enso of an invasion, it has also to test the ability of an attacking fleet to drive homo a blow, especially' in tho North Sea. The defence of the country lies on tho shores of the enemy. Tho fleet is not supposed in war time to be tied to British shores but to bo blockading the enemy’s coast and destroying its warships. The interest which has been aroused and tho way in which the newspapers are scanned for the latest tidings is one of tho most interesting things about the “war.” It would never have been believed that in one short week Iho whole country could be roused to such a pitch of excitement over what Mas hitherto been generally considered a naval panic. AN ABRUPT’ END. London, Aug. 4.—The naval manoeuvres have come to a somewhat abrupt end without any more dramatic incidents such as occurred in the fust phase. The second stage only lasted 48 hours. Presumably the defending fleet of Blues caught the Reds somewhere out iu the North Sea on Friday or Saturday morning and annihilated them, leaving the enemy nothing to go on with. It is said that heavy firing was hoard, hub nothing has yot transpired as to what actually occurred. Tho ships arc now all returning to tlieir various stations, and leave is being given. Tho manoeuvres show that the problems of defence demand early and very serious consideration. It is believed that when the full story is told m tho House of Commons the operations will have made it clear that most of tho theories of the impractibility of an effective invasion are wrong, and that something rather more serious Uian mere raids can he carried out with comparative immunity by an enemy despite tho great fleet with" which Great Britain can cover tho, North Sea.