WHAT IS LAW?

Taranaki Herald, Volume XXVIII, Issue 3564, 13 October 1880, Page 2

WHAT IS LAW?

[CON'TIUIJUTED.] We notice that an attempt is being made by the members of the legal profession to supply the want of Law Reports, which has been severely felt since the Xcir Zealand Jurist became defunct. The new reports are styled Olliuicr, Jh'll, and l-'itv/eratd's Ilepnrtx, and the first monthly number was published at Wellington in the month of July last, in ordinary pamphlet shape, at the price of ten shillings. This price is certainly a high one, but if our friends of the long robe, who will bo the only purchasers, succeed in getting some faint idea of " what is law,'' we suppose tho clients will profit. Whilst to the uninitiated liiyin.au the correct reading of certain words iv au Act of Parliament seems to present little difficulty, we find iv the reports of the Superior Law Courts, both iv England aud in the Colonies, that apparently the most simple sentences are frequently construed differently by the most eminent Judges, aud form the subject of jippcals from Court to Court, aud Judgments and Reversals of Judgments of a most complicated and costly nature. In the July number of Ollirier, Dell, and Fit:i/rrald\s Hqutrlx wo find an example. A Mr. Boylan was indicted at Xapier for a breach of the Arms Act iv having sold a gun to a person who had no license to buy, but who produced a license issued to another person. There was no evidence to show that the person who produced the license was the agent of the person in whose favour it was made, but there was some evideuce that Mr. ]3oylau did not notice that the license was not made out iv tho name of the person who produced

it. Chief Justice Prenclergasfc at the trial directed the jury that the offence was committed if the license was not one authorizing a sale to the person to •whom the sale was made, though the defeudaut himself believed that the license was an authority for the sale. The jury found the prisoner guilty, but that he did the act unwittingly under the belief that the license was in favor of the person to whom he sold the guv. Upon this finding a case was stated for the Court of Appeal — the question being whether the verdict was a verdict of " guilty," and if so, whether the conviction could be upheld. The case was elaborately argued before the Chief Justice, and Justices Johnstan, Richmond, and Gillies, with the following result: — The Chief Justice thought that the conviction should be quashed because the verdict might be interpreted as one of " not guilty," the prisoner having done the act unwittingly. ATr. Justice Johnston also thought the conviction bad, but rested his judgment upon another ground — that the prosecution ought to have proved that the prisoner was not the agent of the person to whom the license was issued. Mr. Justice Richmond also thought that the conviction should be quashed, on the uround of the want of agency not havimj been proved, hut not on that of the prisoner having acted unwittingly. Mr. Justice Gillies thought that on both grounds the conviction ought to be quashed. So that on two grounds of appeal, one Judge based his judgment on the first ground, two other Judges based a similar judgment on the second, whilst the fourth based his on both. Thus from the two points being raised together the conviction was quashed, although had they been raised in separate cases one conviction, and perhaps both, would have been affirmed through the difference of opinion of the Judges. "We notice in a recent case in the English Courts a still more striking instance of the difficulties which beset the interpretation of the Law. The "Pharmacy Act, 1868," imposed a penalty upon " any person " who kept an open shop for retailing poisons, not being a duly registered chemist. The Pharmaceutical Society brought an action to recover the penalty from a Joint Stock Company which retailed X^oisons in an open shop, although under the conduct of a qualified chemist — the main question being whether the words " any person " included a corporation. The County Judge held that no penalty had been incurred. The Society appealed, and the Queen's Bench Division (the Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Mellor) reversed the judgment of the County Court. The Company appealed, and the Court of Appeal (Lord Justices Brain well, Bagallay, and Thesiger) reveised the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division. The Society appealed to the last tribunal, the House of Lords, and that body a (firmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. Again (to quote from a report of a recent case), when, on a trial for bigamy, a seven years' absence is proved, the prosecution must show that the prisoner knew that the person he or she first married was alive some time during the period of seven years before the second marriage, otherwise no conviction can take place. Some judges, however, have held that notwithstanding the seven years have not elapsed, if the prisoner believed on reasonable grounds that the person first named was dead, there should be an acquittal. On the other hand, other judges take an opposite view, and think the statute precise as to the seven years. Lord Justices Bramwell, Brett, and the late Mr. Justice "Willcs held this view : whilst Baron Martiu, the late Baron Cleasby, and Lord Justice Amphlett and Mr. Justice Dcnmaii have held that there is no Until of gears. The perusal of a volume of Law Reports tends more to induce a feeling of intense humility in the reader than the most eloquent sermon that was ever preached. Since the most learned jurists arc continually differing in the interpretation of apparently the most simple words, all that can be expected from our legal advisers is that they will keep themselves well posted up iv the new decisions, and do the best they can to guide their clients through the mysterious labyrinths of the Law.