The Taranaki Herald. NEW PLYMOUTH, OCTOBER 13, 1860.

Taranaki Herald, Volume IX, Issue 428, 13 October 1860, Page 2

The Taranaki Herald. NEW PLYMOUTH, OCTOBER 13, 1860.

The latest news from the coast will be found in the Journal. The Taranaki and Ngatiruanui rebels had determined to make a stand at Kaihihi knowing they would be attacked by the second expedition dispatched against them, and they have been compelled to effect a night retreat leaving three pas in our hands. As Major-General Pratt was concerting his measures for pursuing them, a despatch from Auckland, advising the General, it is conjectuied, of the Waikato movement against Taranaki has led to the return of the expedition which has already reached Tataraimaka. Nothing could be more unlucky, as we do not hear that the Waikatos are at all likely to reach Waitara for a week. What is wanted, and what has never yet been done, is to follow up an advantage over the natives, and give them no time to rally. The importance of this, the General seems to have been alive to. For want of this a thousand men have been fighting at Kaihihi when a hundred would have sufficed to complete the rout of these rebels at Waireka last March. The result of the expedition, cut short as it has been by the untoward circumstance stated, must be decidedly beneficial, and forms an agreeable feature in the war. The friendly natives have rendered a substantial service by effecting the capture of Hoera, a native of Ratapihipihi, and although he may not be chargeable with complicity in the butcheries in which Manahi was implicated, he is a rebel in the full sense of the word, and has carried arms against the Government from the commencement of the war.

We last week stated our views on the question of the liability of the Imperial Government to afford aid and protect the colony in the present emergency, and we now purpose to examine the reasons advanced by Sir G. C. Lewis why he does not consider it necessary or advisable for the proper government of the natives, that there should be a large accession to the military force of the colony. It is stated that " Her Majesty's Government cannot undertake to provide such -a force as will secure the colonies against prospective difficulties. Immediate and imminent dangers must be met as they arise." Acting on this idea has, we fear, had much to do with the present troubles. Despite of the repeated warnings of the probable result of reducing the military strength of the colony, the Home Government persisted in ordering the 58th Regiment home, and afterwards, when it became apparent from the agitated state of the natives that trouble impended, the Governor made repeated applications for reinforcements. But the Home Government had more confidence in their own judgment than in that of their officer, or, as we are given to understand, they acted on the settled policy that " prospective difficulties" are not to be guarded against, and thereby perhaps prevented. Wait until the danger is immediate and imminent, then we will meet it ; as though New Zealand were a portion of the British Isles, whither troops could be transported in a few hours. The Governor's despatch requesting reinforcements, quoted by Sir G. C. Lewis, was dated 27th April ; some time next month we may expect the troops sent in consequence of it. Seven months, therefore, will have intervened, and this is termed meeting danger as it arises, The course of events here is a sufficient comment upon this policy. But " the policy which requires the continued presence of a large force carries, in most cases, its condemnation on its face." Sir G. C. Lewis has to deal with a very special case. What would apply in other instances is, therefore, beside the question. We maintain that it is from the absence of a sufficient force that our difficulties have arisen ; that for want of it the Governor has not been able to rule the natives, but has been compelled to temporise with them, to yield to them, to see them transgress the laws unpunished, and, as a natural consequence, they now seek to repudiate British authority altogether. For this state of things the Home and not the Colonial Government are responsible ; and if ever a policy carried condemnation on the face of it, it is that hitherto adopted in New Zealand of yielding to a savage race in the place of governing it.

" Wise government and prudent conduct on the part of the settlers will do far more than an increased military force to maintain the relations between the Europeans and Natives on a satisfactory footing." Wise government, in dealing with either a civilised or a savage race, but more especially with the latter, is incompatible with weakness, and we believe the Maori would appreciate equally with ourselves the blessing of a government that could enforce their laws. It is a mockery to dignify with the name of government a system that can be carried out so far only as the natives will allow it. Prudent conduct has almost invariably characterised the bearing of the settlers towards the natives, but it would be a mistake to suppose that the relations of the two races have been, or can be, on a satisfactory footing, until the Government are powerful enough to do equal justice to both. We therefore hold that wise government cannot exist in New Zealand without a sufficient military force to overawe the turbulent and disaffected of the native population. In confirmation of our views, which are those of the colony at large, we reproduce an extract from Mr Swainson's work on New Zealand, although it has before appeared in our columns. It will be seen how totally at variance his opinions are with those enunciated by Sir G. C. Lewis. Mr Swainson's former position as Attorney-General of New Zealand, and bis well-known interest in the natives, give additional weight to his testimony, as he will not be suspected of counselling that they should be treated with undue severity.

" To be able to deal paternally with an uncivilised lace, there must be no doubt as to who is the strongest ; there should be no petty skirmishes, ending, not nnfrequently, in disastrous results, and tending to a state of chionic irritation. The father must not fight with the child ; his power should be too unmistakeably superior to require to be put in foice. The power at command, especially if we would never bring it into action, should be, or appear to be, omnipotent ; and if circumstances should compel us to have recourse to arms, it should be but once and for ever. The force employed should be irresistible s and the operation, at any cost, should be complete and crushing. For want of adequate power on the part of the local authorities, there was not only present danger to the colonists, but future danger to the natives themselves, [n bringing two races into contact under the {circumstances of New Zealand, the great object to be aimed at is so to administer the Government as to preberve a friendly feeling between them. The governing power should be not ineiely a Government in name, but in fact and in deed ; and it should be able to execute even-handed justice between the two races. No offence committed by one against the other will produce any deep or geneial ill-feeling, so long as the offenders on either bide, without fear or favour, are piomptly and impaitiallyTpunishcd. For several years, however, the executive authorities in New Zealand had not the powei of thus fairly carrying out the law between the two. They were able to do so, and they did execute justice on the settlers ; but they did not, and they could not, carry out the law against the offending native. The aboriginal race h yet inflicicntly numerous and powerful to maintain their ground against the English colonist ; but the time will nssntedly come, and that, too, at no distant day, when they will form an insignificant minority ; and whenever this shall be the case, it is equally certain that, if a state of permanent ill-feeling shall in the meantime have grown up between the two races, no power on earth can save the native inhabitants of these islands from ultimately becoming a persecuted people." Sir C. Lewis dwells repeatedly upon the circumstance that no volunteers have come forward to incur for the defence of their neighbours the dangers and inconveniences of personal service. The Governor in his despatch of the 27th April points out distinctly that the Militia cannot be embodied and employed elsewhere in the colony for any length of time, as it is here, without interfering with those opera • tions upon which the settler must necessarily depend ; and in a subsequent despatch, referring to the Auckland Militia, His Excellency repeats the same thing. To any person even slightly conversant with New Zealand this fact must be apparent, but were it otherwise — were we possessed of a redundant population (such as furnished the imposing scene in Hyde Park, which may have been uppermost in Sir C. Lewis's mind), so as to allow of a proportion being engaged in military duties, it would be imprudent in the present disaffected state of the natives for any volunteers in this island to quit their own homes. We believe, at the same time, that a force of volunteer riflemen would be the most efficient body to cope with the natives in their guerilla mode of warfare (where more depends upon individual effort than combined movement), and should rejoice to see the present force much augmented, as holding out the most certain means of bringing the war to a speedy close ; yet we are somewhat surprised that Sir C. Lewis should be so anxious on the subject. We ourselves feel convinced, that such a force would put our relations with the natives on a satisfactory footing, as proving to them that we are capable of aiding ourselves, yet we '

1 question whether thi3 is really the footing that the writer desires to see established. For, from the tenor of the despatch, we gather that it is not to a sense of our physical superiority, but to moral suasion alone (that delusive experiment which has been persisted in for twenty years, to be abandoned now, we trust, for ever), that Sir C. Lewis looks for a different and better state of things. But we repeat that is idle to hope for such a consummation until the natives are convinced that we are the stronger'party, and see the hopelessness of a struggle with the constituted authority. The natives must have more conclusive proof of our power than mere demonstration. Then, indeed, we believe that the two races, conforming to one law, might live together side by side in terms of amity and mutual trust, and the natives realise the aspirations of their best friends and wishers. Much disappointment was felt yesterday that H.M.S. Cordelia should have left for the Manukau without any intimation at the Post Office to allow of a mail being put on board. As it was the first time there has been anything worth communicating, tho public had no means of knowing that so favorable an opportunity for doing so was at hand.