CASE FOR JAPAN

Taranaki Daily News, 23 November 1932, Page 7

CASE FOR JAPAN

DISPUTE OVER MANCHURIA

LEAGUE OF NATIONS DEBATE

report of, commission

OBJECTION BY JAPANESE

PEACE WANTED; NOT WAR

By Telegraph—Press Assn. —Copyright. Geneva, Nov. 21. Considerable animation marked the opening of the momentous session of the League of Nations, dealing with the Manchurian crisis, by the Chairman of the Council, Mr. de Valera. Lord Lytton and Other Commissioners were among the spectators. 'The Speech of the Japanese delegate, Mr. Matsuoka, followed the general lines of the memorandum of October. He asked the League to outlaw the Chinese boycott proposals. Japan and the Japanese were not hostile to the Chinese. Japan believed that China’s main desire was for peaCe, but the Chinese were misled, terrorised and misrepresented. ' “We don’t want war; we don’t want more territory; we are not aggressors and w6 desire deeply and earnestly the welfare of Our great neighbours,” said Mr. Matsuoka. “Japan cannot consider any alternative in Manchukuo because it would possibly lay the entire Far East situation open to serious disorders.” ,

Japan states that ‘the Lytton Plan, which requires that each party shall have as a sine qua non a strong and stable Government, would make the confusion worse. Japan considers it impossible to demilitarise Manchuria and maintain order by an international gendarmerie.

In addition to the foregoing points Japan states that the report contains many unjust conclusions, “flowing mostly from observed facts, but they are enveloped in a mist of optimism and glamour whereof they will certainly mislead anyone unaware of the true facts. “The commission, Japan states, through the shortness of time available, acquired only a superficial impression. If the commissioners visited other parts of the country, especially South China, their optimism regarding the Chinese situation would be considerably modified. WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

Japan casts no reflection on the conscientious nature of the report, but feels that the comparative Weight of evidence has been wrongly? estimated in the report find used invariably against Japan. This was particularly noticeable in the section dealing with the incident of September 18, 1931, and the establishment of an independent State of Manchukuo. The reply disclaims any such bitter feelings towards China as certain passages report and suggests, on the contrary that Japan looks forward to friendly and prosperous co-operation with China.

It declares that the military operations from September 18, 1931, were entailed by the execution of a plah carefully prepared to meet the alarming eventuality. of a Chinese attack. They were not related to anything but selfdefence. Japan could not allow either their lack of necessity or inapprOpriateness to be the subject of discussion. Any scheme tending to destroy the condition of peace and orderliness now being restored would irresistibly produce a new era of disputes and difficulties. Settlement of the Manchurian question would pave the way for a settlement of the whole Chinese question. JAPAN’S DETAILED REPLY. Following are the principal points of Japan’s reply to the report, the dominant feature being a flat rejection of the proposals for & settlement of the problem:— (1) China y is an abnormal country in a condition'bordering on anarchy. (2) Foreign lives and property cannot be adequately protected because of the internal conflict and the Kuomintang’s “revolutionary” policy against foreign Powers. (3) Foreign Powers have been obliged to exercise exceptional powers and privileges in Order to protect their subjects and interests. (4) Japan suffered more severely than any other Power from China’s anarchical condition and anti-foreign policy. (5) Japan’s position in Manchuria, geographically and historically, by virtue of treaty rights, economic interests and the need of national security, is exceptional. • (6) The former Manchurian authorities intrigued to Undermine this special position and frequently and flagrantly encroached upon Japan’s rights and interests in Manchuria. (7) None of Japan’s actions to September, 1931, exceeded rights of self-de-fence. (8) Manchuria has always occupied a separate position' with relation to China itself, and the foundation of Manchukuo was accomplished by the Manchurians’ spontaneous action. (9) General recognition of the present regime would contravene'no international obligations, would satisfy Manchurians’ aspirations, and would be eventually realised by China as the only satisfactory basis for stable relations. (10) Disguised international control of Manchuria would be acceptable neither to Japan nor to Manchukuo. - Dr. Koo said that though Mr. Matsuoka had made Japan appear a meek lamb her teeth were those of a ferocious lion. Her traditional policy had been to' interfere with Chinese unification, while complaining abroad of a disunited China. Japan’s policy seriously menaced the peace of the Far East and disturbed the remainder of the world. China was content to learn from the Council whether the Kellogg Pact covered the invasion of Manchuria. Dr. Koo and Mr. Matsuoka are both American graduates and spoke English throughout. The debate was adjonrned until Wednesday. Lord Lytton, broadcasting from the League’s shortwave station, said the outlook at the moment; while not bright, was not hopeless. He hoped that the storm advancing from Manchuria might be diverted by wise statesmanship into a harmless direction. The success of the negotiations about to begin would be profoundly important for the peace of the world. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT. The most important proposals for a settlement of the Manchurian problem made by the Lytton Commission, appointed to investigate by the League of Nations, are:— China’s sovereignty in Manchuria to be maintained, but the provinces to have a special administration, with a large measure of autonomy. Japan, although denied political or economic control in Manchuria, to have in practice* through advisers and the

like, a big hand in the country’s administration, and to enjoy far-reaching rights, including an extension of the Whole area of the right for Japanese to settle and lease land. Japanese and Chinese troops to’ be withdrawn as soon as an effective gendarmerie, with a foreigner at its head, has been organised. A treaty of non-aggression to be concluded by the countries interested (including Russia). China to reserve control of foreign relations, Customs, Post Office and the salt taxes, and to appoint at least the first chief executive of the Manchurian Government. The railway question to be settled by a working agreement, or an amalgamation of the Chinese and Japanese railway interests. It is proposed that if the two countries agree to a settlement on these lines the League should call a conference in which the League and the Chinese and Japanese populations of Manchuria will be represented. If the countries agree neutral observers would be present. It is suggested that the two Powers should agree that Manchuria should become a demilitarised area. If the Soviet Government desires to participate in this understanding the appropriate clauses dealing with non-aggression and mutual assistance would be embodied in a separate agreement. A commercial treaty should aim at encouraging the exchange of goods between China and Japan, while safeguarding the existing treaty rights of other countries. It should also contain an undertaking by the Chinese Government to repress boycotts against Japanese trade, y \