GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Taranaki Daily News, 10 June 1932, Page 3

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

THE OFFICIAL HISTORY

"WORLD’S CLASSIC TRAGEDY.” MISSED OPPORTUNITIES. Recording for future generations one of the most dramatic episodes of the Great War—an episode which is still accorded proud remembrance in New Zealand—the “Official History of the Gallipoli Campaign” has just been published in England. According to critics, the history brings out vividly and honestly the tragedy and folly of the enterprise, but, at the same time, reveals the compensating elements of fortitude and high endeavour, responsible for the classic phrase about “the most glorious failure in history.”

Reviewing the work in a London paper, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart says that the history shows Joffre as “the villain of the piece.” Mr. Churchill, he adds, is the one statesman who comes out well, and Sir lan Hamilton the military leader who comes out best, even if not scathless. The following are extracts from the concluding stages of the history. The drama of the Dardanelles campaign, by reason of the beauty of its setting, the grandeur of its theme and the unhappiness of its ending, will always rank among the world’s classic tragedies. The story is a record of lost opportunities and eventual failure. Yet it is a story which men of British race may ponder, if not without pain, yet certainly not without pride; for amidst circumstances of unsurpassed difficulty and strain, the bravery, fortitude and stoical endurance of the invading troops upheld most worthily the i high traditions of the fighting services. There is little doubt to-day that the idea of forcing the Straits with a view to helping Russia, eliminating Turkey from the war and rallying the Balkan States to the side of the Entente, was one of the few great strategical conceptions of the World War. There can be still less doubt that in the spring of 1915 the operation was not beyond the capacity of the Entente, and that a combined naval and military, attack, carefully planned in every detail before the troops embarked, and carried, out with the essential advantages of surprise, would have succeeded. LACK OF PREPARATION. Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915 would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to spring from one fundamental cause—an utter lack of preparation before the campaign began. Despite this fundamental folly, the early pages of this history have shown that twice dining the early spring of 1915 —at the naval attack on March 18 and again at the April landings the issue hung in the balance. But the naval attack was abandoned—never to be repeated—at the very moment when the defenders were resigning themselves to defeat; and, in the case of the military attack, absence of early preparation had brought its inevitable penalties. Nor was it only in the early part of the campaign that opportunities were missed. On August 7 at Anzac the chance of capturing a key position on Chunuk Bair was lost by over-caution on the part of one column commander. At Suvla on the same morning 20 British battalions were opposed by a Turkish detachment of only 1500 men. They were well placed to outflank the main Turkish forces already hotly engaged at Anzac; there were no Turkish re-surv-es within a radius of 30 miles ana the British force had only, to press forward to the empty ridge in front to make its position secure and to furbish that eagerly-awaited support for the main battle, which was the essence of the British plan.

JOFFRE’S OPPOSITION. Whether or not, after the failure at Anzac and Suvla, the prompt despatch of the reinforcements asked for by Sir lan Hamilton on August 17 would have enabled him to achieve his object must remain a matter of conjecture. It was then and later that the opposition of General Joffre was the main bar to an immediate and vigorous prosecution of the campaign. There can be no doubt that by tiie middle of November there was no sane alternative to the policy of evacuation. Yet, even after an evacuation which was more successful than anyone had dared to prophesy, a heavy penalty had still to be paid for the failure to solve the Turkish and Balkan problems in the spring of J 915. The hope which underlay General Monro’s recommendation of a withdrawal was that a heavy, drain on the resources of the Allies wouid be stopped. But this hope was not fulfilled. The failure of the August operations on the peninsula had led, as the result of French insistence, to the initiation of the Salonika enterprise. The evacuation of Gallipoli necessitated an increase of troops in Egypt to protect the Suez Canal. In March, 1915, when Sir lan Hamilton was despatched at a day’s notice, and without the semblance of a plan, “to assist the fleet to force the Dardanelles,” the strength of his army was 75,000. One extra division in hand on the day of his first landing would probably have turned the scale. Yet by the end of the campaign the total numbers that had been sent to the peninsula, in a vain attempt to retrieve the initial error amounted to nearly 000,000.

CAUSES OF FAILURE. In examining the causes of British failure in Gallipoli, two important factors must not be overlooked—the splendid fighting qualities of the. Turkish soldier in defence, and the brilliant leadership of the Turkish Fifth Army. It would be impossible to appraise too highly the assistance which Lunan von Sanders received from that ‘-^ an Destiny,” the present ruler of Turkey, who showed on the peninsula, at the head of an infantry division, an outstanding genius for command. , It was that officer’s ready grip of the situation on April 25 which was primarily responsible for the failure of the Anzac corps to gain its objective on the first day of the landing. It was his vigorous action on August 5, when entrusted at a moment’s notice with the command of the northern zone, that checked and defeated the long-delayed advance of the IX Corps. Twenty-four hours later, following a personal reconnaissance, it was his brilliant counter-attack at phenuk which placed the Turks in undisputed possession of the main Sari Bair ridge. Seldom in history can the exertions of a single divisional commander have exercised on three separate occasions, so profound an influence not only on the course of a battle, but perhaps on the fate of a campaign and even the destiny of an Empire. . Though the campaign failed in its main object, it was not an unredeemed failure, and the work on the peninsula in 1915 contributed largely to the even-

tual winning of the war. It was in great part due to the attack on the Straits that the Germans cancelled their heavy offensive in the West which they had planned for the spring of 1915, that Italy entered the war, that Greece remained neutral, and that Bulgaria held aloof till the result of the campaign seemed clear. Finally, it was the heavy fighting m Gallipoli that destroyed the flower of the Turkish army and prepared the way for Lord Allenby’s victory in Palestine. These were solid advantages, even though they 'bear no comparison to the rich reward that awaited the capture of the Turkish capital. Truly may it be said that those who fell in Gallipoli did. not fall in vain.