U.S. WAR SECRETS

Taranaki Daily News, 19 May 1928, Page 23

U.S. WAR SECRETS

INTERESTING REVELATIONS SITUATION ON THE SEAS. THE ANTI SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN San Francisco, April 9. io stand as an official account, a history of “American naval participation in the Great War, with special reference to the European theatre of operations,” lias.been written by Captain Dudley W. Knox, of the Navy history section. Written because of many requests to the Navy Department, it sets forth in eight chapters the situation existing on the seas when the United States entered the war, and follows American fleet activities through to the finish. Recalling that when America joined the Allies, Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare was destroying approximately 900,000 tons of shipping monthly, and that the German high command believed its submarine could prevent large-scale transportation of American troops, Captain Knox declared that creation of the United States Navy’s antisubmarine war craft prevented that development and also kept the Allies in supplies. The German high command discounted American participation, the account said, because “it was a elear ease of our apparent weakness at sea being responsible for getting us into war.”

RIGHTS OF’AMERICA IGNORED. “When Germany felt strong enough at sea to ignore our rights, she did so,” he continued. "German calculations as to the effectiveness of submarines at first proved to be painfully correct. Allied navies appeared to be taken by surprise. No counter measures of consequence mid been developed, and the opening months of the submarine campaign seemed to portend the quick and decisive defeat of tho Allies.

“Upon the arrival of Admiral W. S. Sims in London early in April, 1917, he was informed of tfiis exceedingly grave situation by the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, who stated that ’it is impossible to go on with the war if the losses like this continue. They will win unless we can stop those losses and stop them soon.’

“Losing 900,090 tons of shipping a month and building only 177,000 tons, the total allied and neutral tonnage of 34,000,000 tons faced destruction.’”

Admiral Sime pointed out, the account continued, the eeriousness of tbe situation, and said it was irgently necessary that the maximum number of destroyers and other anti-submarine craft be sent abroad as soon as possible. Official diepatches from Ambassador Page at the same time said there was reason for great alarm, and the British transport of troops and supplies w.ie strained to the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field woe threatened. It appeared the sharpest crisis of the war for the Allies. UNITED STATES AID OUTLINED. American naval aid was outlined, which Knox set forth as follows: Employment of destroyers, converted yachts, cruisers and other suitable craft to serve as patrols and escort vessels for convoys. Organisation and administration of transport service to put the American army across, and of overseas supply service to supply the army and others. Reinforcing the grand fleet with a few American battleships and utilising the remainder of them to train personnel for naval duties.

Development of offensive means of combating the submarine. Two principal measures were adopted. First, a great mine barrage across the North Sea extending from Scotland to Norwegian territorial waters, and, second, development of sound detection devices for installation on destroyers, submarines and submarine chasers to enable these vessels to hunt down enemy submarines. Creation of naval aviation force to assist in both escort and hunting work. Augmenting the American Army by furnishing quotas of marines and great gun units.

Writing of the convoy system, Captain Knox said: “It was not adopted earlier principally because of a shortage of war vessels to serve tho tremendous amount of shipping passing through the danger zone. “It was due to this fact that American naval aid was at first so important, that American destroyers and other suitable vessels were available in fairly sufficient numbers to place world shipping on a convoy basis at a very acute crisis. This was true especially of destroyers which necessarily had to form the keystone of the whole convoy system. i

“The fact that not a single American soldier en route to France under the protection of the United States Navy was lost through a submarine attack is very largely due to the efficient and unremitting work of the American destroyers.” During the eighteen months of war when American vessels escorted convoys through the war zone, 183 attacks were made by them upon submarines; 24 submarines were damaged and two known to have been destroyed. A total of 18,653 ships were escorted, carrying vast quantities of freight to armies in France and the civil population of the Allies, as well as more than 2,000,000 American troops.

Recounting the glorious record of the marine corps in overseas fighting, Captain Knox told of the accomplishments of marines in the Second Division at the turning point of the war at Belleau Woods, and in the other critical battles. Writing of the battle at Belleau Woods, Capain Knox said: "This event derives its importance principally from its having turned the psychological tide of all Europe. It n arked the zenith of German confidence and success, and the nadir of allied despondency and reverses.”