THE GREAT CRUSADE

Taranaki Daily News, 10 March 1916, Page 6

THE GREAT CRUSADE

ANZAC-SUVLA BAY. HOW THE GRAND COUP FAILED. THE FALL OF BE AVE COLOXEL MALONE. COLOXIAL TROOPS' FINE WORK UNSUPPORTED The following ig the continuation of the main portion of Sir lan Hamilton's dispatch dealing with the big battle of August, the first portion of which appeared in the Xews yesterday:— FIGHTING WITHOUT OFFICERS. During the afterneon of August 7 the troops were got ready for a fresh advance of three column's next morning at 4.15 a.is. "At the first faint glimmer of dawn observers saw figures moving against the sky-line of Chunuk Bair. Were they our own men, or were they the Turks? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted; the light grew stranger; men were seen climbing up from our side of the ridge; they were our own fellows —the topmost summit was ours! "On the right General Johnston's column, headed by the Wellington Battalion, and supported by the ~7tli Battalion Gloucestershire 'Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Bth AVelsh Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel W. 0. Malone, had raced one another up tire steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until with a last determined rush, they fived themselves firmly on the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave Lieutenant-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out the line to be held. "The 7th Gloucester? suffered terrible losses here. The fire was so hot that they never got a chance to dig their trenches deeper than some six inches, and there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights every single officer, company sergeantmajor, or company quartermaster-ser-geant was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by midday consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates. Chapter and verse may be quoted for the view that the rank-and-file of any army cannot long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting unless they are given confidence by the example of good officers. Vet here is at least one instance where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, from midday till sunset, without any officers.

"ENOUGH DONE FOR HONOR." "So stood matter at noon. Enough had been done for honor and much ground had everywhere been pained. The expected support from Suvla hung fire, but the capture of Cluimik Bair was a presage of vietory; even the troops who had been repulsed were quite undefeated —quite full of/fight—and so it was decided to hold hard as we were till nightfall, and then to essay one more grand attack, wherein the footing gained on C'hunuk Hair would this time be used as a pivot. "At 4.30 a.m. on August !) the Chnnuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. "General Baldwin's column (38th Infantry Brigade) had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnston's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this colmnn immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence it was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to ensure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough scrub-cov-ered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the Farm —Chunuk Bair—till 5.15 a.m. "LOST HIS WAY." "In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed careful reconnaissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night. "And now, under that fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the 6th Gurkhas of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade, pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the knolls between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q. viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the Cth South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fastretreating enemy. "But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's column wa 8 still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell. These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish commander saw his chance; instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashires and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land, and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backward oyer the crest and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started." "But where was the main attackwhere was Baldwin? When that bold but unhjeky commander found that he could not possibly reach our trenches on the top of Chunuk Bair in time to take effective part in the fight, he deployed for attack where he • stood, i.e., at the farm to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's trenches on Rhododendron Spur. Now, his men were coming on in fine style, and, just as the Turks topped the ridge with shouts of elation, two companies of the Oth East Lancashire Regiment, together with the 10th Hampshire Regiment, charged up our side of the slope with the bayonet. LATE BY *A TEW MINUTES ONLY. ■ 'They had gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll £5 C|uaiui'Sair ; and a few .mimites earl-

ier would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashire*, and, combined with them, would have tarried all before them. But the Turks by this time, were lining the whole of the high crest in overwhelming numbers. The Army troops attacked with a fine audacity, but they were flung' back from the height and then pressed still further dow:i the slope, until General Baldwin had to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the farm, whilst the enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops and the two New Army battalions of No. 1 Column still holding the south-west half of the main knoll of Chumik Bair. ''Constant attacks, urged with fana-' tieal persistence, were met here with a sterner resolution, and although, at the end of the day, our troops were greatly exhausted, they still kept their footing on the summit. And if that summit meant much to us, it meant even mora I to the Turks. For the ridge covered our landing places, it is true, but it covered not only the Turkish beaches at Kilia Leman and Maidos, but also the Narrows themselves, and the roads leading northward to Bulair and Constantinople, "That evening our line ran along Rhododendron Spur up to the crest of Chvmuk Bair, where about 200 yards were occupied and held by some SOO men. Slight trenches had hastily been dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the iire of the enemy had prevented solid work being done. The trenches in many places were not more than a few inches deep. They were not protected by wire. The Ist Australian Brigade was now reduced from 2SOO and 1000, and the total casualties up to 8 p.m. and on the 9th amounted to about 8500. But the troops were still in extraordinary good heart, and nothing could damp their keenness. The only discontent shawn was by men who were kept in reserve. "During the night of the ftth-lOth the New Zealand and New Army troops on Chunuk Bair were relieved. For three days and three nights they had been ceaselessly fighting. They were half dead with fatigue. "Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently held, was now handed over to two battalions of the 13th "Division, which were connected by the 10th Hampshire Regiment with the troops at the farm. WILTS ALMOST ANNIHILATED. At daybreak on Tuesday. August 10th. the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Cliunuk Bair—Hill Q against there two battalions, already weakened in nunil . •.. though not in spirit, by previous Jiting. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the "Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous mass of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the TTampshires and ("Jen. era] Baldwin's column, which had to give ground, nrd were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses. "Now it was our turn. The warships and the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, and the (iflth Brigade Royal Field Artillery were getting the chance of a lifetime. As the successive solid lines of Turks topped the crest of the ridge, gaps were torn through their formation, and an iron rain fell on them as they tried to reform in the gullies. "Not here only did the Turks par dearly for their recapture of the vital crest. Enemy reinforcements continued to move up Battleship Hill under heavy

and accurate fire from our guns, andatill they kept topping' the ridges and pouring down the western slopes of the Chunuk Bair as if determined to regain everything they had lost. But once they were over the crest they became exposed not only to the full blast of the guns, naval and military, but also to a battery of ten machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which played upon their :.;. 'id ranks at close range until the barrel.-* were red-hot. .Enormous losses were inflicted, especially by these ten machine-yuns; and, ' of the swarms which had once fairly crossed the crest line, only the merest handful ever straggled back to their own sjde of Chunuk Bair. "At this same time strong forces of the enemy (forces which I had reckoned would have been held back to meet our advance from Suvla Bay) were hurled against the Farnrand the spurs of the north-east, where there arose a conflict so deadly that it may be considered as the climax of the four days' fighting for the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced, and the troops driven clean down the hill. At the foot of the hill the men were rallied by Staff-Captain Street, who was there supervising the transport of food and water. "Without a word, unhesitatingly, they followed him back to the Farm, where they plunged again into the midst of that series of struggles in which Generals fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat. So desperate a | battle cannot be described. The Turks came on again and again, fighting magnificently, calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the oM traditions of their race. There was no flinching. They died in the ranks where they stood. "Towards this supreme struggle the absolute last two battalions frem the General Reserve were now hurried, but by 10 a.m. the effort of the enemy was spent. Soon their shattered remnants began to trickle back, leaving a tracK of corpses behind them, and by night, except prisoners or wounded, no live Turk was left upon our side of the slope." Two more attacks on our position were delivered the same day, August 10th, but both were repulsed with heavy loss by the 4th Australians "and the 4 th South Wales Borderers, the men of the New Army showing all the steadiness of veterans. The Borderers lost their leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie. OUR HEAVY CASUALTIES. "By evening the total casualties of General Birdwood's ferce had reached 1-,000. and included a verv larhe proportion of officer?. The 13th Division of the New Army, under Major-Gen-eral Shaw, had alone last (1080 out of la grand total of lfi.:>oo. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff. Ten eommand- | ing officers out of thirteen had disappearj ?d from the fightine effectives. The j Warwieks and the Worcesters had lost I literally every single officer. Physie--1 ally, though Birdwood's forces were pre- | pared to hold all they had got, they were now too exhausted to attack—at least until they had rested and reorganised. "At times I had thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn central battle, where probably they j would have turned the scale.' But each j time the water troubles made me give | up the idea, all ranks at Anzae being | reduced to one pint a day True thirst | is a sensation unknown to the dwellers I in cool, well-watered England. But at

AnEae. when mules with water pakhals arrived at the front, men would rush up to them in swarms, just to lick the moisture that had ei'udcd through the canvas bags. "The grand coup had not come off," says Sir lan regretfully, but lie has praise and no blame for General Birdwood, who had "done all that mortal man can do," to deserve success, and for Major-General Godley and MajorGeneral F. C. Shaw. He'adds: "As for the treops, the joyous alacrity with which they faced danger, wounds, and death, as if they were some new form of exciting recreation, has astonished aie —old campaigner as I am." THE SUVLA BAY COMMAND. The dispatch deals next with the Suvla Bay operations:— The conduct of the operations which were to be based upon Suvla Bay was entrusted to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir F. Stopford. At his disposal was placed the 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and the 20th Brigade of the 10th Division. This dispatch deals in detail with the landing at Suvla Bay, the surprise of the Turks and the heavy fighting of August 7th, when the Turks were found to be strongly entrenched on the high ground. The troops, however, were exhausted, and lack of water in the hot weather added much to tiieir sufferings. Divisional commanders believed themselves unable to move, and their pleas for delay were well founded. "But it seems to have been overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front of us were equally exhausted and disorganised, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving the water trouble mil cvpiv other sort of trouble. Be this as it may, the objections overbore the corps commander's resolution. He had now got ashore three batteries (two of them mountain batteries), and the great gnus of the ships were ready to speak at his request. But it was lack of atrillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in a policy of going slow, which, by the time it reached the treeps, became translated into a, period of inaction. "The divisional generals were, in fact, informed that 'in view of the inadequate artillery suppert,' General Stopford did not wish thein to make frontal attacks, on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try to turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of August S." On the Sth Sir lan Hamilton went himself to Suvla, and found the forces more or less inactive instead of pushing on the attack. Precious hours thus lost enabled the enemy to be reinforced, and despite subsequent brave work the troops could not dislodge the Turks, while they lost heavily. On the evening of August In General Stopford handed over command of the flth Corps, MajorGeneral H. de B. De Lisle being appointed temporarily to it. After describing the failure of the big effort of August 21, and the reversion practically to trench warfare along the Anzac-Suvla lines, Sir lan Hamilton concludes:— , "•EVACUATION UNTHINKABLE." i ''Trorn this date onwards up to the c.ate of my departure on October 17 the flow of munitions and drafts fell away. Sickness, the legacy of a desperately trying summer, took heavy toll of the "survivors of so many arduous conflicts. No longer was there any question of opera- | tions on the grand scale, but with such troops it was difficult to be downhearted.

All ranks were cheerful; all remained confident tliat, so lonjj as they stuck to their guns, their country would stick to them,"ami see iheni victoriously through the last and greatest of the crusades. "On October 11 Your Lordship (bird Kitchener) cabled asking me for an estimate of the losses which would he involved in an evacuation of the peninsula. On October 12 I replied in terms showing that such a step was to me uathinkable. On October 111 I received a cable calling me to Lmdon for the reason, as I was informed by Your Lordship on my arrival, that His Majesty's Government desired a fresh, unbiassed opinion from a responsible Commander, upon the question af early evacuation. "And now, before affixing to this dispatch my final signature as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, let me first pay tribute to the everlasting memory of my dear comrades who will return no more. Next, let me thank each and all, generals, staff, regimental leaders, and rank and file, for their wonderful loyalty, patience, and self-sacrifice. Our jirsgress was constant, and if it was painfully sl»w —they know the truth. So I bid them all farewell, with a special God-speed to the campaigners who have served with me right through from the terrible yet most glorious earlier days—the incomparable 29th Division the young veterans of the Naval Division, the ever-vietorioua Australians and New Zealanders, the stout East Lanes., and my own brave fellow-coun-trymen of the Lowland Divisions of Scotland."