PHANTOM ARMIES.

Taranaki Daily News, 30 October 1915, Page 9

PHANTOM ARMIES.

•THE ENEMY'S AVAILABLE HUMAN RESOURCES.

The !.:;•'. that the Central iPowers were able to concentrate a considerable force for the invasion of Serbia must have come rather as a shock to some of the critics in the Old Country. An article in the Nation on the subject of "Phantom Armies,' is being quoted in various quarters just now, possibly as an antidote to the prevailing pessimism, but if its arguments were sound the Central Powers would not he at all anxious to undertake fresh enterprises. The Nation mentions a War Office calculation that in July-there were about 750,000 men in training in Germany, and accepting the French oflieial estimate of the wastage of the German armies, based on the results of the first live months of the war, it argues that by the end ot August the men available for fresh formations would be 500,001), and that these would be absorbed 1 by the cud of October. After this,month, according to the Nation's estimate, Germany should not even be able to maintain in the field the armies already there. It will not be unprofitable to recall the French calculation made at the beginning of the year. Official reports of German recruiting showed that the number of men available for military service was approximately nine miliona. Half a ! million of these were employed in necessary industries, ou railways, and so forth —this figure was certainly too low —four millions were in the field, and the definite losses to the middle of January numbered 1,300,000. The available resources in January were thus reduced to 3,200,000, of whom 800,O!W) were eliminated in the French calculation, as being over thirty-nine years of age. and therefore of doubtful military value. The German allowance for incflkicnts was "23 j>er cent, and the calculator thus arrived at the conclusion that under two millions would be available during 11)15, sufficient only to (ill the gaps for a space of eight or ten months

If this calculation had been correct and the early rate of wastage had been maintained the Germans should now be in the position of having insufficient recruits to repair the wastage; and if, as is probable, they utilised their supplies of fresh troops not merely to make good the losses in the field but to create new formations, 'their position must be still more serious. The fresh troops were the classes for 1915, 1910 and 11)17 called out in anticipation. But it is objected by the critics of the estimate that the French calculation did not take into account the thorough manner in which the Germans had built up the Ersatz, or compensatory, reserve, a reserve consisting of all the surplus young men who were eligible but were not called to the colours in their respective years. It is stated that as soon as the rate of loss in the war could bo averaged the Germans set to work to create a sufficient Ersatz supply to meet the current losses, and that the creation of new formations has had to go on independently of this important department. The 'Ersatz reserve, it should be explained, is really the reserve from which the wastage of war is made good. The French believe that it was inadequate and remained so; the Germans assert that they have never allowed it to fall below a strength calculated according to the needs of the campaigns.

There is another objection urged against the present use of the French official figures, and it is that the enemy's losses have not been so high during the present year as they were during the first months of the war. However, the rate of wastage in France, except in certain months, must have fallen to a fairly low figure, though the losses on the eastern front have undoubtedly been continually heavy. lately an Italian estimate was published that set the German losses during September alone as high as 400,000, and, with the renewal of the offensive by the British and French, the wastage is necessarily Increasing. It may perhaps be contended confidently that the Germans are getting to the point where it will be impossible to' maintain the existing formations, and indications of an approaching difficulty in that respect are not wanting. It is known, for instance, that sound men over the age of forty-five have already been called out, and quite recently it was reported from Copenhagen that men up to the age of fifty-four had been or. dSred to report themselves at the depots. If this report'is true, it means that the enemy is bringing even old men into training in the cil'ort to maintain its forces, and it is fair to argue that the critical period for the Germans in the matter of supplies of men is not far distant.

The main purpose of the Nation's comments is to show that the Germans could not possibly bring half a million men from the eastern to the western front to open a new offensive against France. The figures on which this contention is based need not be given here, but it may be stated that they make the extraordinary blunder of ignoring Austria's part in the war. Not only have the Central Powers been able to hold the British and French in France and Flanders, but they have also held Italy in check, and since May they have been steadily driving the Russians back. In spite of all their losses, they have been able to organise a new offensive campaign against Serbia, an amazing achievemen, surely, for countries that were supposed to have reached the limit of their offensive capacity. There is no means of ascertaining what the enemy's losses actually are, because no Austrian lists are available. Attention is commonly confined to the German losses because they are published, and consequently sufficiently accurate computations can be made. The latest enumeration gave the Prussian losses at 1,868,000. On a proportional basis, the losses of the rest of the German Empire should exceed a million. These figures are, presumably, up to the end of August, in which case they represent a wastage of about 230,000 a month.—Lyttelton Times.