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SIR IAN HAMILTON'S DESPATCH.

STORY OF THE ANZAC AND

SUVLA ATTACKS,

TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC DIVERSIONS.

MOST PREGNANT ENTERPRISE IN

MILITARY HISTORY.

HIGH PRAISE OF THE ANZAC

TROOPS

CAPTURE OF LONE PINE

ATTEMPT AT SARI BAIR

STORMING OF TABLE TOP

CAPTURE AND LOSS OF CHUNUK BAIR.

THE SUVLA FAILURE

FATAL INERTIA.

■t»nif(Wii>Jati.: y6^

Sir lan Hamilton's "doßpateli-.cn the Gallipoli campaign,, a portion of which was published yesterday, proceeds as follows:—

The 6th August was now approaching, and in order to divert the enemy from the main strategical conception a certain amount of ingenuity was essential. My scheme for hoodwinking the Turks included, first, etrategica! divereioiiis intended to draw away the enemy reserves not yet landed on che Penin-sula.-Secondly, the tactical diversion was meant to hold up the reserves already on the Peninsula. The strategical, diversions included a surprise landing 'in the north of the Gulf of Xeros, demonstrations of friendship opposite Mitylene, concentration at Mitylene by Admiral de Robeck and myself. The tactical diversions' included maintaining the attack at Cape Helles and the attack at Lone Pine ■trenches.

As & result, the Turks, despite their excellent spy system, were completely off- guard At.dawn xm the 7th August. - It< was *. impossible to concentrate on the Peninsula- even one-third of the fresh troops required for the attack. The forces destined for the offensive were the day before the battle at Anzac, Imbros, 3Vludros and Mitylene, the last three detachments 14, 60, and 120 milos respectively from the-arena of the attack. .

I believe the clearness andscompleteness of the Goneral Staff's orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter be studied as models by military academies.

An 'enormous quantity of water was \ secretly stowed in the reservoir at Auzac, holding 30,000 gallons, and in j petroleum tins, holding 80,000 gallons, which had boon collected. Accidents transpired at both places, but the Anzacs, ever resourceful in the face of misadventure, did not meet the disaster with folded hands. I took up ir.y headquarters at Imbros, which is 45 minutes from Helios, 45 minutes from Anzac, and 50 minutes from Suvla. ' . . The attack at Helles on August Gth showed that the Turks, who were regarded as a half-beaten enemy, were again offering as stout a resistance as to ihe original landing. This was due to the news of the Austro-German advance in Russia, and the arrival of reinforcements at Helles. Although the ;attackß were only;© partjaJU they drew certain Turkish reinforcements to the southern area.

Passing to the operations at Anzac, Sir lan Hamilton says:—The ntiro details of the operations, formulated by General,, Sirj.William■;",Birdwood_£ were; subject to n.y finftl approval. The local preparations reflect the greatest credit not only on General. Birtfwood and his staff, but on the troops who toiled like slaves to accumulate food, drink and munitions for the. accommodation of extra troops to be landed. This necessitated an immense amount of work in preparing concealed bivouacs and making interior communications. The Australians and New Ze»landers--vork- ■ ed-entirely at night. TBe. uncomplaining efforts fo£ these- much-tried,troops arc as much to their credit as their \ heroism in the following- battles.

General Birdwood' s■> troops numbered--37,000 rifles and 72 guns, supported bj two cruisers-;' four monitors; and two destroyers. The enemy's left and centre were subjected to a slow bombardment for three days, and the assault on the Lone Pine entrenchment was ordered on. the-afternoon (of August; Gth, with the object of .drawing the Turkish reserves from the grand attack.

Major-General Walker, of the First Division, worked out the scheme with forethought. The assault -was entrusted to Colonel Smythc, of the First Brigade, and carried . out •by the "Secdrfd;' Thiid,' and. Fourth Australian Battalions. The first rush' across the open. \vas tleath.. Then there vas a, -terrible • -moment, when it feeenied physically impossible to pnnetrate the trenches. Overheed cover and stout pine-beams resisted all

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individual efforts, and the loopholes continued to spit fire at the groups of men. When tho men had bodily lifted up the 'beams'individual soldiers leapt down into the semi-darkness of the galleries, and were amongst the.'Turks. Within seven minutes, the Third and Fourth Battalions were well .within the enemy's vitals. The reserve Second Battalion advanced over their parados and made good the whole of the trenches. The Turks organised'a violent coun-ter-attack, and wave upon wave of the enemy swept forward with the bayonet, the battle continuing until August 12th. • The Turks were in great? force, and very full nf fight, yet a weak Australian brigade, numbering 2000, supported by two weak battalions, carried Lone Pine under the eyes of a whole

enemy division and maintained a grip like a vice for six clays. Successive counter-attacks and other, frontal; attacks at Anssac were less fortunate, but they kept the Turkish reserves at Battleship Hill from becoming available to meet the real push, which was a night attack on the summits of Sari Bair Ridge. Our object was to effect a lodgment along the crest of the main ridge vsith two columns of troops. We planned for two assaulting columns to work up the three ravTnes to storm the high ridge. These were preceded by two covering columns, of which the first was to capture the enemy's position commanding the foot of tho hills and the other was to strike out northwards until from Dama Pejik Bair it could guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bair from Anafarta Valley. The whole of this big attack was under General Godley.,

The Anzacs, assisted by the -warship Colne, had been educating the Turks how to lose the redoubt near Table Top. Every night at 9 o'clock tUo Cp'lno threw a searchlight and .bcmibarded, the -■. redoubt, for ten Then after 10 miimtos' interval: there was a. second illuniinated: bpnibardnient, concluding precisely at 9,30. The idea was for the enemy to get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling ended. On the night of the 6th the searchlight was switched off at 9,30, and instantly our men poured out •of the scrub and jungle into the empty redoubt ,and the whole series of entrenchments was carried by 11 o'clock. .

Sir lan Hamilton, referring to the' attack at Chanak - Dere, says:—This! was less cleanly carried out than the Lono Pine attack, indeed it made an ugly start. A little column of stormers were held up by barbed wire entanglements of unexampled height,' depth, and solidity, wnich completely! closed the ravine. Here a splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and1 best, but when things became desperate > & passage was forced with the most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Sheraanda party of' New Zealand i Engineers, supported-by the Maoris,' who are descendants of the warriors of Gate Pa.

Simultaneously an attack on Table Top was launched under cover <if the Colne's heavy bombardment. The banks are so steep that Table Top gives tho impression of a mushroom oh 'the summit, lodging over on the stem. But as faith moves mountains so valour carries them. J The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent was recog-i nised in the regulations as impracticable for infantry, but neither the Turks nor the angle of the ascent was destined to stop Birgadier-General Sir A. H. Russell and his New Zealanders that night. There is a moment in battle when men become supermen. This was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled and the | plateau carried by midnight.

With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering forco was tended. The -attacks /were made- with, bayonet and bomb* only. The'magazines .were empty by order. No-words can do justice to the achievement of Sir A. 11. Russell and his New Zealand Mounted Rifles, the Otago Rifles, the Maoris, and the New Zealand field troops. Meanwhile the right assaulting column, under General Johnston, with ■ the New Zealand. Infantry Brigade, an Indian mounted battery and a company of the New Zealand Engineers, entered the southerly ravines, and at midnight commenced a hotly contested fight in the trecheson the lower part of Rhododendron Rpur, whilst the Chanak Dere column pressed up the valley. ~ The' grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff climbing, even to officers arid, men who had graduated on the goat-tracks at Anzac. The darkness of j the night and tho density of the scrub made progress blow on hands and knees up the spurs. The men suffered! from sheer physical fatigue and exvhaustioni of spirit duo to repeated hairbreadth escapes. All these things combined1 to. take- the edge 'bff.-ith.o-

energies, of the troops. The Fourth Australian Brigade, with the - left assaulting co-lun.ii under General Cox, struggled, fighting hard as they went, making for Hill 305. The * crest: line was not captured by dawn, although considering all things General Cox's column made a marvellous advance, the enemy being flung from ridge to ridge. An excellent line for the renewal of

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the attack was secured, and the auspices were propitious except for the exhaustion of the troops. General Johnston's column was led by the 'Otago Battalion, which had to pick a ivay -amongst pitfalls and forced a passage through the .scrub at Chanak Dere, where fierce opposition was met. It was the n.qrning of the 6th before the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur and eventually entrenched on the top spur, within a quarter of a mile of Chunuk Bair , which would have been a victory.

Soon after the Fourth Australian Brigade, assisted by the Fourteenth Sikhs, was ordered to assault Hill 305. The enemy's reserves were now moving up' from Battleship Hill. An attack on the right assaulting column at Chunuk Bair was checked. —

Our aims at Chunuk Bair were not fully attained. In the afternoon it was hoped to have help from S-uvla, but this was not forthcoming. I fully endorse General Birdwood's words that the troops performed a feat without parallel. Great kudos is due to MajorGenerals Godley and Shaw, and Briga-dier-Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox and Travers, but most of all to the rank and file.

During the afternoon of the 7th reconnaissances were carried out. The Sari Bair troops prepared for fresh advances in three columns in the early morning. At the first faint glin.mer of dawn an observer saw figures moving along the sky-line at Chunuk Bair. Were they our men or Turks ? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted, and as the light grew stronger the men were seen to be climbing up-from our sid.i of the ridge. They were our own fellows. Thu topmost summit was ours! General Johnston's column was on the right, headed- by the Wellington! Battalion and supported by the Auckland Mounted Rifles and 'the' Maoris. | The ■Seventh Gloucester's;!led - most > gal--laritly by Lieu tenant-Colonel Malone, raced each other up the steep face. Nothing could check them. They went on until with a last determined rush they fixed themselves firmly on the crest of the knoll. Here Lieutenant-Colonel Malone was mortally wounded as he was marking out a line to be held.

The Seven ih Gloucester suffered terrible losses. The fire was so hot that their trenches were only six inches sleep. Every officer, sergeant-major, and quartermaster-sergeant was killed or wounded. Yet this battalion of the new army fought from mid-day till sunset without any officers.

The Fourth Australian Brigade, advancing from Asmak Dere on the left, was meanwhile held up by, cunningly-! placed machine guns. When the heavy | columns pf Turkish; reinforcements approached the Australians were virtually surrounded arid were withdrawn to| their original position, after losing over j a thousand. Here they stood, thouglli the 7m§n.' were^ Mslf.'dead from thirst] .and fatigue, and bloodily repulsed at-r. tack after attack. So matters stood | at noon on the Bth.

The expected support from Suvla hung fire, but the capture of Chunuk Bair was a presage of victory. The troops were full of fight, so I decided on essaying another grand attack with Generals Johnston's, Cox's and Baldwin's columns on Chunuk Bair ridge. Hill 2 was heavily shelled at dawn on the &th, until the' whole ridge was a mass of flame and smoke whence.huge clouds of dust drifted slowly in strange patterns skywards. General Baldwin was commanding the 38th Brigade of the new army, massed behind the trenches of the New Zealand Brigade.

General Baldwin lost his way through no fault of his ow£. When the Ghurkas attacked at Sari Bair General Baldwin's column was a long way off, and instead of General < Baldwin's support, the Turks countercharged the Ghurkas and Lancashires, who saw the promised land, but were forced to fail back over the crest.

Other battalions of the new army attacked with fine audacity, but the Turks were now lining the whole crest in overwhelming numbers. The enemy, much encouraged, turned his attention to the New Zealand troops and other battalions holding the south-west of Chunuk„Bair. -Constant attacks were urgod with fanatical persistence and I were met with sterner resolution. Although our troops were greatly ex-; [haufited at the endl of |he day they still kept their footing on the summit, which the Narrows themselves and the* roads leading to ' Bulair and Constantinople. Eight hundred men held' the crest of Chunuk Bair in slight trenches hastily dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the fire of the enemy prevented solid work. The First Australian Brigade was now reduced from two thousand to a thousand^ the total casualties on the evening of the 9th being 8500. - . - . ' | The troops were stilj in extraordin-| I arily" good' "heart; and," nothing could I<lamp, tho keenness of the New Zealanciers. The-new army at Chunuk Bair was relieved at night, half dead from far- ! tigue, and Chunuk Bair, which they-had so Toagnineently held, was handed to the Sixth North Lancashires and Fifth Wiltshires. The Turks delivered a grand assault at daybreak on the 10th, and the North Lancashires were sim-. ply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wiltshires, who were caught in the open, wero iiterally almost anniluUted. The assaulting column, which consisted of a fulL division plus three battalions^ swept over the crest! and swarmed General ."Baldwin's, column, j 1 which" ivy as -only* extricated- wichlthe"Heaviest losses--. ■ ' ' .'■..-. ■' - It.was now. our turn. The warships, and the' NtiW Zealand-and Austialiaij artillery got the chance of a lifetime, ami an iron rain fell on the successive 'solid lines of Turks. Ton machine-

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guns of the New Zealand infantry played on tho serried ranks at close range until the barrels wero red-hot. Only a handful struggled back to their own side of Chunuk Bair. By the evening of the 10th General Birdwood's casualties wero twelve thousand, including a largo proportion of officers.

The grand coup had failed to come off. The NaiTows were'beyond field gun range. It was not General Birdwood's fault, nor the fault of any officers or men of his command. General Birdwood had done all that mortal man could.

General Godley handled his two divisions with conspicuous ability. The a troops faced death with joyous alacrity as if it was some form of exciting recreation, which even astonished an old campaigner like myself.

the .operations at Suvla Bay were en* trusted to Lieutenant-General Stopford. It-was believed that the Turkish defenders were under 4000. The Eleventh Division was ferried from Inibros, disembarking half an hour after, the attack on the northern flank at Anzac. | I hoped Chocolate Hill would bo cap- ' tured by daybreak. The surprise of ' the Turks was complete. The weather . was the hottest, and the new troops suffered much from lack of water. Parly owing to the enemy's fire and partly owing to the want of nous which is second nature with old campaigners, they hung fire. Lieutenant-General • Stopford, recollecting the vast issues hanging on success in forestalling the enemy, urged the divisional commanders to push on, but they believed themselves unable to move owing to the men being exhausted from the fighting on the 7th. The Suvla commanders overlooked the fact that the half-de-feated Tucks wero equally exhausted, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving tho water trouble and other difficulties. The divisional commanders' cbiections' overbore ■ Lieutenant-General Stopford's resolution, and he told them he did not -wish them to make* frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them to turn any trenches , possible. This instruction was the root ofi our failure to make any use of the priceless daylight hours ol 1 August Bth, Driving power was required, and even a, certain ruthlessness, to brush aside the plea for a respitefor the tired troops. One fatal error was that inertia prevailed. I went to Suvla, - hoping. that it would enable Lieufcenant-General Stopford 1 to secure commanding ground in the bay. I i finally appointed Major-General De | Lisle in Lieutenant-Generals Stopford's ; place. * .

When the fighting ended' , General \Birdwood was commanding 25,000 rifles, and Major-General : Da vies at Helles- 23,000 ;:in addition to 17,000 French.^

The Turks had 110,000 with all the advantages of ground. I therefore -sent your Lordship a-long cable askinfg ior- sa,oQGf.•fresh? 'rifles' for. the- British, divisions, and also 45,000 under "the establisfan*.enfc. If the reinforcements had been sent immediately it seemed certain, humanly speaking, that wo could still clear the passage for the fleet to Constantinople. It may bo judged how deep was my disappointment when, I. learnt that the essential; reinforcements and munitions could not bo Heart, the reason given preventing further insistence. Your Lordship cabled on ■ October 11th asking for an estimate of the losses involved in tho evacuation of the peninsula, and I replied «a the 12th that such steps seemed to me unthinkable. I received a cable on the 16th recalling me to London,», as the Government required' a fresh and unbiased opinion on the question of an early evacuation, so I farewelled with special God-speed the campaigners who served me right through from the terrible yet most glorious early days, the incomparable 29th Division, young veterans of tho NavaL Division, - the - ever victoriousAustraKans and New Zealanders, the stout Ecst Lancashires, and my brave-fellow-countrymen from the lowlands of Scotland. (Signod) LIN HAMILTON, General.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TC19160108.2.33.5.1

Bibliographic details

Colonist, Volume LVII, Issue 13979, 8 January 1916, Page 5

Word Count
3,040

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S DESPATCH. Colonist, Volume LVII, Issue 13979, 8 January 1916, Page 5

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S DESPATCH. Colonist, Volume LVII, Issue 13979, 8 January 1916, Page 5