AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 66, Issue 5598, 29 March 1943, Page 2

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

LIMIT ON PRESIDENT’S POWERS TO PERFORM

(By Herbert Agar in the London Observer)

How is American foreign policy created ? To what extent can a President make promises which will be considered binding in the future? Can the speeches of the Vice-President or of the Cabinet members be taken as commitments on the part of the Government? These questions are often asked in England to-day; it is important that they should be answered accurately. The answers in many cases are disappointing to the British public. Yet the answers should be stressed, since nothing but harm can come from building false hopes. As Mr D. W. Brogan recently said, “Truth may divide us; polite fiction certainly will.” The truth is that American foreign policy is immediately subject to the fluctuations of the popular will. No Government can bind that will, or make certain that it remains unchanged. No Government can make commitments which are necessarily binding. When a British Cabinet Minister makes a statement he is committing his Government to a policy. When an American Cabinet Minister makes a statement he is merely trying to lead the country in a direction which he thinks wise. He has no responsibility to the legislature, and the legislature assumes no responsibility for what he says. If the British public would learn to regard the speeches of even “the most important public officials” as attempts to lead public opinion rather than as definitions of future policy, misunderstandings would be avoided. FUTURE OF THE CHARTER The people, of course, can be misled as well as led. They can be confused by adroit politicians, and their will can be misinterpreted. Great decisions can be taken which do not necessarily represent the desire of the people. But in the long run, on such basic issues as world-participation or world-fight, the people will decide. And their decision is subject to change every few years. Only when the people have shown themselves overwhelmingly in favour of a policy for a considerable period of time, and have learned to identify the national well-being with that policy, can the outside world assume that the issue is settled and plan accordingly. The Munroe Doctrine is a case in point.

During a recent debate Senator Taft said that the Atlantic Charter and the agreement among the United Nations not to make a separate peace were statements of Presidential policy and should not be regarded by the world as permanently binding. And Senator Vandenberg added that it was “terribly important that the world should understand this, so as not to mistake the nature of the agreements.” The Senators were not saying that the Atlantic Charter will be disregarded, or that a separate peace is conceivable; but they were reminding the world that the international commitments made by the President alone are subject to reconsideration by the Congress at a later date. “I do not believe,” said Senator Taft, “that Congress is bound to make any treaty carrying out the policies of the Charter.” In other words, if we assume a post-war reaction into isolationism there is nothing to prevent such a reaction from finding expression in national policy at an early date. Nothing that Mr Roosevelt or the members of his Government can say or do today can bind the people if later they turn against the policy of world-col-laboration.

Mr Vandenberg is accurate in saying it is “terribly important that the world should understand this.” It is also important that the world should not, as a result of understanding this, lapse into discouragement and conclude that it is impossible to count on the Americans for help, or for stability of policy. That does not follow. What does follow is that it is necessary to win over

a majority of the leaders and the voters in both the major parties before a basic national policy can be regarded as fixed.

Woodrow Wilson’s ambiguous statement is as close a definition of the President’s powers as can be made. If the President loses his hold over public opinion, there is little limit to the extent to which Congress can thwart his policies; if the President maintains that hold there is little limit to the extent to which he can enforce his policies. It follows that in foreign affairs there can be stability only when a majority of the people have believed over a considerable period of time that a policy is clearly in the national interest. SAFETY AND HONOUR Those who are eager to see the United States firmly anil irrevocably committed to a world-minded plan must hope that harsh experiences of modern history, and the repeated disasters which have afflicted our world, will persuade the American public that international co-operation is the path to safety and of honour. The United States is as likely to accept large responsibilities out of a desire to act magnanimously as out of a desire to save itself from danger. The national leaders can do much in their speeches to enforce this lesson. But unless the lesson is accepted no speeches and no statements of intention should be accepted as permanently binding. Senators Taft and Vandenberg are doing a service in remind, ing the world of this fact.

It may well be that by 1944 both parties will accept a large measure of world-responsibility. The Democratic Party, although there are many dissidents within its ranks, has accepted the President’s views on foreign affairs. The Republican Party, with an equal or larger number of dissidents, may well accept the views of Mr Willkie and Governor Stassen. If this happens it will be a sign that a considerable majority of the people has decided that the United States can best serve its interests and discharge its responsibilities by joining with the other free peoples to promote an international order which can maintain the peace of the world. POSITION OF PRESIDENT If the Republican Party rejects the Wilkie-Stassen leadership it will be because a large part of the people are still undecided on this most vital of issues. In that case there will be. no recourse except to the people themselves. < What is the relation between the President and the Senate in the field of foreign policy? It is difficult to describe because it is dependent to a great extent on the shifting prestige of the President. As Woodrow Wilson said, the office of the President “is anything he has the sagacity and force to make it.” During any President’s term of office his sagacity is likely to vary and his force is certain to vary. The powers and privileges of his office are therefore inconsistent. The Constitution of the United States provides for a division of powers between a legisulature which makes laws and an executive which enforces them. But the President is given power to make recommendations to Congress. Strong Presidents have always used that power to create the main lines of national policy. The President is the only elected officer, who represents the nation as a whole, rather than a subdivision of the nation. So long as a President’s policy is strongly supported by public opinion he is able to get his way (or most of his way) with Congress; but if his hold,on the public weakens his power to make policy and to secure Congressional support for his policy weakens to the same extent. This is especially true of policy which must be embodied in a treaty, since “two-thirds of the senators present” must give their consent to a treaty.