SINGAPORE

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 63, Issue 4463, 13 August 1941, Page 6

SINGAPORE

GIBRALTAR OF THE EAST. SUPER NAVAL BASE. RAFFLES’ LEGACY TO EMPIRE. (By W.G.8.) The British stronghold of Singapore assumes 'every day a new significance. Situated at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the island fortress is the focus of world attention as the war in the west moves east, and the war in the east moves south—and w T est. The closer one studies the map the greater becomes one’s admiration for the man who gave us Singapore. The story of Sir Thomas Raffles has been told before, but never has there been a more appropriate time for its retelling. Raffles was sent to Malaya at an early age as a servant of the East India Co. Within a few months of his arrival at Penany, he had mastered the difficult Malayan language, and had gained the confidence of the natives, with whom he mixed freely. His activities in Malaya, and in particular his report advising the British Government against abandoning Malacca—advice which was subsequently acted upon brought him under the notice of the British Government, which later, again acting

on Raffles’ advice, occupied Java and Sumatra, appointing Raffles as lieutenant-governor. When subsequently the British administrators were in favour of abandoning the whole of their settlements in the East Indies, Raffles, acting on his own initiative, took steps to ensure British commercial supremacy in Malayan peninsula. In an historic letter, dated December 12, 1818, to a certain Mr Marsden, Raffles makes first mention of Singapore“We are on our way to the westward in the hope of doing something, but I much fear the Dutch have hardly left us an inch of ground to stand on. My attention is principally turned to Johore, and you must not be surprised if my next letter to you is dated from the site of the ancient city of Singapore.— Yours, etc., T. S. Raffles.” “MY LAST ATTEMPT.” Raffles immediately saw the strategic importance of Singapore (City of Lions), but was unable to persuade the East Indian, or local, officials to take any action towards securing it for Britain. Fear of the Dutch was ’made the excuse for attempting to dissuade Raffles from his project. By the beginning of 1819 he was in despair, and in another letter to Marsden, dated January 31, 1819, he writes: “ ... . This therefore will probably be my last attempt. If I am deserted now I must fain return to Bencoolen and become philosopher. ... If I keep Singapore, I shall be satisfied, and in a few years our influence over the archipelago, as far as concerns our commerce, will be fully established.” Even after Raffles had persuaded the Sultan of Johore to cede the island for a few thousand pounds, and British troops were stationed there, the head of the British forces in the East warned Raffles to evacuate the island, and threatened him that in case of Dutch attack he could expect no assistance. Eventually recognition was forthcoming from England, and the local administrators notified that henceforth the British settlement at Singapore was to be accorded the same rights and protection as any other part of the British Empire. JUNKS AND SAMPANS. To-day many monuments in Singapore testify to the belated gratitude and recognition of Raffles’ service to the British Empire. Raffles Street, Raffles Square, Raffles Plain (main park), Raffles Hotel, Raffles Museum, and tfie fine Raffles memorial, all help to remind one of the founder of Singapore. Raffles’s foresight was amply justified. Singapore became the great commercial clearing house for southeast Asia, seventh among the world’s ports, with 25,000,000 tons of shipping cleared annually. Overseas shipping is fed by the thousands of junks and sampans of every imaginable pattern which float down the broad, muddy Singapore river, depositing their cargoes of tin ore and crude rubber at the busy go-downs and wharfs. To-day the commercial importance of the port is clearly outweighted by its strategic value. The great naval base, with its 50 square miles of anchorage sufficient to shelter the combined British and American fleets —is the key to British, Australasian and American defence. Its underground fuel depots, huge floating docks, its 18-inch coastal guns—the largest in the world—its squadrons of Australian bombers, its army of technicians, are all kept at the highest pitch of efficiency waiting for the first sign of approaching danger. AXIS ANGER. Frequent jibes over the Axis radio that Singapore was a perfect naval base —if only Britain had a navy to put there—led to speculation about Anglo-American co-operation in the use of Singapore in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. The merest mention of the possibility of American units being stationed at Singapore was sufficient to arouse howls of anger from Axis sources. The fact is that Singapore is as essential for American as for British defence, and if Singapore does come into action it will be to protect American as much as British interests. * The American base at Manilla is a base in name only, with no dry-dock-ing facilities for overhaul and repairs comparable to Singapore. America is as interested in preserving the status quo in the Dutch East Indies as is Britain. The Dutch East Indies and Malaya mean rubber and tin to America. That being so, it is natural that American warships should be installed at Singapore, just as it is natural that Australian bombers based on Singapore should ceaselessly patrol all waters within 500 miles of the base.

From the sea Singapore, with adequate naval and air forces to protect it, is impregnable, but from land there is a danger which has only been apparent during the past months. Singapore is situated just off the tip of the Malayan Peninsula, and 400 miles to the north there is a channel of Thai territory separating British Malaya from Burma. This narrow strip of Thailand could be made a conceivable base of attack against Singapore. THE KRA THROAT.

A point of interest about this strip of Thailand is that it narrows down—at the Kra Isthmus—to a throat only 25 miles wide, separating the Indian

and Pacific Oceans. If this throat were cut several days would be saved on the shipping route from Europe to China, and much of Singapore’s commercial importance would be transferred to Saigon. From a military viewpoint also, such a canal—already projected would permit Japanese naval forces to transfer to the Indian Ocean without passing Singapore. Aeroplanes based on the Thai Isthmus would be within a couple of hours’ flight of the British fortress.

Meanwhile, however, British defences in South Burma and Northern Malaya are being strengthened, and any move to seek control of the strip of territory between those two points would be strongly contested. The greatly increased air strength at Singapore, and the recent anouncement of American air forces in the Philippines being increased to 1000 planes within the next few months, lends emphasis to the view that any action to disturb the status quo in the South China Seas will be met with devastating force.