THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 63, Issue 4462, 11 August 1941, Page 3

THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

DEFENCE FORCES STRENGTHENED AND READY.

EVER-PRESENT FEAR OF A JAPANESE ATTACK.

(This article by Roy Sherwood in the Christchurch Press is biased on facts supplied by the Royal Netherlands Government.)

As long as there is any uncertainty about Japan’s intentions the defence position of the Dutch East Indies must remain of paramount interest. For they are not only one of the main item's on the Japanese part of the Axis new world programime, but they also form a sort of half-way house between Japan and Australia. The first thing to be realised in this question of Netherlands East Indies defence is that, although Holland’s overseas empire lies so far away, the position in no way resembles that of the German colonies dur ing the 1914-18 war, or that of the Italian possessions in Africa in this one, both of which were lost primarily because their would-be defenders lacked the essential element of seapower. Though the Netherlands East India fleet is no match for the Japanese Navy, the facts in the present case are radically different. LOCAL DEFENCE MEASURES. The Dutch East Indies have a population of almost 70,000,000, of whicn only about 200,000 are Dutch. But the natives are not recently-con quered, backward, resentful tribes. Tfvey are people of Malayan stock with a tradition of their own, long since recognised, by the way, as superb fighters. There is also a good sprinkling of the more adventurous, and enterprising, type of Chinese. They have lived under Dutch influence, first under the Dutch East India Company and since the beginning of the nineteenth century under the formal rule of the Netherlands colonial administration, for more than three cetnuries. Their loyalty to Holland is unquestionable, and they have never favoured the idea of Japanese expansion into their regions. Racially they arc nearer the Chinese than the Japanese, which means that they have consistently disliked Japan’s recent activities in China, and are equally critical of the new attempt at penetration in Indo-China. Militarily the Dutch East Indies are difficult to defend because they do not represent the clear-cut case of one solid block of land. There are mjany islands of different size and importance, nearly all exposed to the danger of enemjy landings; and if the total coast-line of the islands were added together it would be seen at once that the defence of such a territory “ in depth ” is a task in comparison with which the defence of Great Britain, for instance, is ridiculously easy. However, what can be done has been done. When Holland was pitchforked into the war by the German invasion, a military decree brought every Dutchman in the world under military orders. In the East Indies every Dutchman between the ages of 18 and 46 years has been fully mobilised and under intensive training since that time. NATIVES AND HOME GUARDS. The native population’s insistent demand to participate in the defence effort has, so far, been met only by their incorporation in the voluntarilyrecruited Home Guard, which has trained them into uncom'monly efficient coastal watchers and local defenders. But their eventual inclusion in the conscripted forces is contemplated. If it has not yet taken place, the reason is simply lack of modern military equipment in sufficient quantities. As soon as that becomes available—it is hoped from America—the Dutch East Indies full-tiihle army will almicst at once jump to vast numerical superiority over anything any invader could ever spare for overseas enterprise. While the exact number of forces at the disposal of the authorities is naturally kept secret, it is possible to state that they are already formidable and steadily on the increase, as more material comes to hand; ano that every likely and unlikely point where an enemy landing might be at tempted is perpetually guarded, witi. xcelient inter-comfmunication to facilitate the prompt arrival of reinforcements wherever they may be needed. It is also possible to state categorically that, on the purely precautionary ide of things, adequate steps have been taken to make it “ highly improbable,” as the military people put it, that the oil fields should ever fall undamaged into any aggressor’s hands. The centre of the defence system is in Java, and there are fully-manned garrisons at all points of strategical importance, with smaller units cunningly spread over the whole- archipelago. The most vulnerable of the islands is New Guinea, of which the Netherlands own one half, while the other half is Australian-mandated. Both militarily and economically this is the. least important part of the Dutch East Indian possessions. TWO-FOLD AERIAL DEFENCE FORCE. Air activity nlays a considerable part in the defence scheme. The army and navy have their separate air forces and air duties, as in the United States. The personnel of both forces is partly Dutch and partly Malayan, and here the colony benefits from the intense air-mindedness of a people lone* interested in the number and the importance of the aerodromes dotted all over th? islands, dialing- from civil aviation days before the war. Pilots and other specialists are arriving in ever-increasing numbers from the Dutch training centre l in Canada, established and maintained en•tirely under the Netherlands Government’s financial responsibility evei’ since the early days of Holland’s participation in the War. (At the same time, Holland’s military and naval training- colleges were also transferred to Canada.) The division of duties between naval and military air forces is too technical for public discussion but it may be said that it ensures

every approach to the archipelago being adequately patrolled. The number of aeroplanes remains undisclosed but it is admitted that more are required for pursuit and fighting purposes. THE NAVY. The Far East Dutch fleet consists of a number of light cruisers, many destroyers, submarines, numerous mine-layers, mine-sweepers, and gunboats. Most of these are modern, and they are manned by Dutch, crews recruited in Holland before the war, mostly with several years of Far Eastern experience at the back of them. The largest naval base is Sourabaya, 750 ,miles from Singapore; and (about 1000 miles from Port Darwin, Australia. Sourabaya is capable of accommodating anything up to the largest cruisers, but not battleships. Malayan and locally resident Dutchmen serve in the various auxiliary naval services, for which competent training i s locally available. This is not a war of improvisation, but an old-established feature of Dutch Far Eastern naval organisation. The overwhelming majority of the .Dutch crews of the warships consists, not of conscripted recruits, but of longterm professionals. ADVANTAGES AND DIFFICULTIES. The main difficulty of the defence is that, although armaments are nolw arriving in increasing quantities, particularly accelerated since the close co-oneration recently established between the Dutch and British Purchasing Commissions in America, there is still pressing need for more and more equipment before the full war potential of the colony can be developed. This is intensified by the nature of the territory to be defended, with its enormous coast-line and innumerable points open to attack. Against this may be set the favourable fact that the Dutch East Indies, distant as they are, are nearer to their friends than to any likely emn.y, Singapore’s 750 miles, and Port Darwin’s 1000 miles become almost a stroll round the neighbourhood compared with the distance any aggressor would have to cover. And the further the Japanese, for instance, may advance south, the longer becomes their vulnerable line of communication. It is almost certain that they would have to rely mainly on submarines for their supplies, and of these the Netherlands East Indies have quite a few' themselves, in addition to a particularly efficient antisubmarine branch. The United States too, can hardly be' left out of consideration in any question of warfare in .the Pacific. But as that gives rise to a further question, we inlay leave it at that.