BELGIUM’S NEUTRALITY

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 53, Issue 3830, 6 November 1936, Page 11

BELGIUM’S NEUTRALITY

A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. WANTS TO RETIRE ONCE MORE INTO ISOLATION. Belgium became “front-page news” the other day when King Leopold publicly announced her hopes of remaining neutral in the next war. “Our policy,” the King said, “must be resolutely to place ourselves outside the conflicts of our neighbours.” •These words disturb most of the calculations that have been made since 1918. Germany is pleased, France is alarmed, Britain is calm, but thinking hard; and the whole world is looking eagerly for clearer indications from the little country which the warring armies trampled underfoot in 1914. / The curse of Belgium is that her business is the vital concern of three Great Powers which are her neighbours. “All our greatest wars,” said Sir Austin Chamberlain, speaking for Britain, “have been fought to prevent one great military Power dominating Europe, and, at the same time<, dominating the coasts of the Channel and the ports of the Low Countries.” Geography has made Belgium, in hostile hands, a deadly potential menace to France and Britain. (Incidentally, most of the German air-raids on London in the last war were carried out from the neighbourhood of the Belgian town of Ghent) /A German military critic has emthat in spite of her territory being closely criss-crossed with railways, canals and motor-roads, Belgium has no self-contained system o£ communications of her own, but is merely “a halfway house on the way between France and Germany, and between the Rhine Valley and tfee Channel.” Belgium in the last war was simply a factor in both the Garman and the French plans of campaign. The Germans looked upon Belgium as the way through for her right wing, and the French regarded the southern part of the country as the place where the German right wing was to be smashed.

Since the war, France, for her own greater safety against Germany, induced the Belgians to plan their eastern frontier defence as a pro-, longation of the French system. Britain has hoped for access (in the event of a German attack on herself) to the aerodromes of Belgium, which would enable her to “get at” Germany effectively. She has looked to the right to fly over Belgian territory, and to the aid of Belgian watchers in learning of the flight of hostile bombers towards her own capital. Neither France nor Britain can view without unconcern the loss of the advantages that the use of Belgian territory wduld give them in defending themselves against Germany. Nor can either feel confident of the ability of Belgium to maintain her neutrality, and prevent another German occupation a move which might entail disaster for themselves. Two different interpretations have been placed upon the Belgian declaration. According to the first, Belgium is repudiating here and now her existing engagements, and saying definitely and finally to Germany —“lnvade France if you must, but let us alone, and we shall let you Alone. We shan't fight unless you actually cross our frontiers. Then, course, we shall have to fight, and *we propose to build up our defences in case you force us into that position.” According to the second interpretation, Belgium was not going nearly so far, or speaking so finally. She was not repudiating her existing engagements, but merely conveying that if a Five-Power Conference is held to discuss a possible agreement a’mong Britain, France, Germany, Italy and herself for peace in Western Europe, it will be her policy not to sign any pact which could drag her irtto someone else’s war. In other words, she will not join, at such a conference, in guaranteeing France against a German attack, or Germany against a French attack. This much, however, seems clear: If Belgium does not regard her present obligations as discarded, she is at any rate anxious to be rid of them soon. The result is likely to be the same in either casa. What are the commitments (apart from membership of the League of Nations) that Belgium has accepted ' <n the post-war years? The Germans offered darly to restore her neutrality, but Belgium was moving along different lines. She seemed convinced that neutrality would not “work.” In 1919 she applied not only to France, but to Britain for some form of defensive pact. , Franca fell in with the idea at once. The chief of staff of the French and Belgian Armies produced in 1920 a military accord entitled “A FrancoBelgian defensive agreement in case of an unprovoked aggression.” Their Governments gave approval. The details of the accord were never published, though Belgian Premiers have protested that it did not go beyond assuring the “technical pre-requis-ites” of a co-operation which must be legitimate, since it could not be-

come actual unless Germany unjustifiably attacked France. An attempt to match it with an Anglo-Belgian military understanding came to nothing. To the Germans, the Franco-Bel-gian understanding appeared to be a plain alliance. Post-war Belgium, they said, was a military dependency of France. Though many Belgians, as well as others, argued after 1925 that the Locarno agreements of that year made the separate understanding with Franca superfluous—and therefore especially suspicious it was not dropped. It lasted right up to the present year. On March 11th, 1936, how,ever, after Hitler had startled Europe with the remilitarisation of thei Rhineland (March 7th), the Belgian Premier, M. van Zeeland, told the Belgian Chamber about a change. First he referred to “the misunderstandings surrounding the 1920 accord,” then explained how the “difficulty” was being met. “At bottom,” he assured the Deputies, “there was no difficulty, really, but in certain minds the persistence with which the text was kept secret had aroused suspicions. ,c Wjhen I became acquainted with this famous text, I admit I was surprised. Most of its provisions referred to the period of occupation of the Rhineland, and were, therefore, completely out of date! Of the whole accord, there remained only one point —admittedly important—which was tha contract between the general staffs.” Then, he went on, Belgium and France had exchanged new letters replacing those of 1920; the two Governments now retained from the 1920 agreement only the maintenance of General Staff contilact, the object of which was “the carrying out of undertakings defined by the Treaty of Locarno.” It was understood that such contract could not lead to any undertaking of a political nature, or any obligation of national defence for either of the interested parties. The revised military accord is thus tied up with tha Treaty of Locarno. The text of- the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Great Britain and Italy (October 16th, 1925) “takes note,” specifically, “of. the abrogation of the treaties for the neutralisation of Belgium,” and ’involves Belgium definitely in the obligation to “take sides” if one of the Powers commits against another an unprovoked act of aggression.

iWlhen Hitler, on March 7th of this year, marched his troops into the German Rhineland and repudiated the Treaty of Locarno, it was on the application of Belgium and Franca together that the Council of the League of Nations found Germany guilty of a treaty breach. M. van Zeeland, as Belgian Premier, told the League Council emphatically: “I need hardly say that in our eyes the Locarno Pact is still in being. We maintain the obligations and assurances which it involves for the signatories, and particularly for us. The purpose of pacts of this kind is precisely to protect those of its signatories which remain faithful against those which may be unfaithful. Consequently, we continue to apply it . . . .” No neutrality, or shadow of neutrality, there! The Locarno Powers had split. Belgium was on the side of France in case Germany should strike. M. van Zeeland spoke to the Council on March 14th, 1936. King Leopold’s mention of neutrality this October is naturally a shock to France. What of Locarno now—and of the staff contract which was to ensure that Belgium’s understandings could be carried out? It is easy to guess the Belgian point of view. Belgium has been through hell. She can hardly wish to go through it again. It would be reasonable for her to do almost anything in order to escape. She may be convinced that the link between France and Russia threatens to drag her into a fight which, but for that link, might not occur. Germany is credited with aiming, first and foremost, not at war with France and Britain, or Belgium;, but at war with Russia—a war towards which she hopes all the Western Powers may remain neutral. Before there can be any likelihood of France’s remaining neutral towards a German war with Russia, the Franco - Soviet link must be filed through. Suppose that it remains unbroketn. Then Germany must be ready to attack France on the day she attacks Russia. She (with allies, of course, in the background) is liable, therefore, to strike simultaneously at both France and Russia by air—to try to take both by surprise at the same moment. To strike at Russia and withhold the blow at France until France herself had taken the offensive might involve too many risks for Germany. The German surprisel shower of air-bombs on Paris, however, would be “an act of unprovoked aggression” calculated to bring Belgium in on France’s side, according to the Locarno agreement. The expectation of Belgium’s entry would place Hitler (so Ithe Belgians may reason) under the same necessity of dropping bombs on Brussels, also without warning. “Unless we declare our neutrality early, and thus assure Germany that

we meian to stand out of any war actually begun because of Russia, we may be caught in just such a struggle.” That may be the Belgian view. iGermany scores over France in isolation. two ways if Belgium retires into First, the defection may make France more disposed to listen to Germany’s terms—those terms being, by almost universal report, “Peace in the West and a free hand in the East.” Second, if there must be Western war after all, the breaking of the intimate contact between France and Belgium in the meantime is bound to make Belgium more vulnerable — easier to violate, should Germany once more choose the Belgian road towards France. It might be a mistake to assume that a parting with France would be a sentimental wrench for anything like a majority of Belgians. The truth is that the Belgians are far from unanimous in admiration of France. They are divided into the Walloons, who are French-speaking and gather French in their outlook, and the Flemings, who speak Flemish and have little love for their Gallic neighbours. The conflict of the two sections tends to express itself on even' the vital question of defence policy. The Flemish Nationalists—-that is, the most ardently “Flemish - feeling” Flemings—would like to see Flanders separated from the rest of Belgium and incorporated with Holland in a new Netherlands State. They are a rather small minority in the Chamber of Deputies, but they well increased representation at the last election (in Mjay). They have been working for the suppression of international engagements affecting Flanders, including the Franco-Belgium military understanding. When, under the pressure of Walloon nationalist elements in 1931, M. Jaspar’s Ministry was forced to plan the defences for the eastern frontier as a virtual extension of the famous French system, there was much hostile comment in the Flemish districts. Thel hope there was that Antwerp, at any rate, would not again be made a stronghold, and the saying went round: “Let the Walloons dig in if they choose, but let them leave us alone.” (Whether Belgium will remain neutral in a futurel war may seem to rest with herself, but is much more likely to rest with Hitler. A sudden attack by air and land might leave her with only a few hours, or days, to mobilise the necessary forces for resistance.

For Germany to start bombarding her five concentration points would be a matter of minutes. Brussels and Antwerp could be attacked after sixty minutes’ flying, Charleroi after fifty-five, Alost after forty-five, Liege within thirty-seven. The aerial attack might paralyse the whole mobilisation, and make it impossible for Frenchmen or British to' save Belgium from becoming a great German base. The extraordinary density of the railway system between the BelgoGelrman frontier and Cologne would enable the Reichswehr, the Belgian Staff has calculated, to throw 250,060 men into the Belgian province of Limbourg within twenty-four hours. This would involve the crossing of the Dutch territory of Limburg—a patch of ground which military experts say cannot be successfully defended. The breach of Holland’s neutrality is believed to be part of the German plans in the event of a Western war. “The open way to Belgium lies through south Holland; the way to the most convenient submarine and air bases against Great Britain through north Holland,” wrote on of the best-known European correspondents recently, as he drew attention to German preparations significantly close to the Dutch border. “When the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.” This African saying aptly sums up the position of the little would-be neutral in conflicts of tha Great Powers.