FRANCE’S DISTRUST

Te Aroha News, Volume XLI, Issue 6408, 30 October 1923, Page 5

FRANCE’S DISTRUST

(By J. Ellis Barker.) :

The world has been hypnotised by the reparation problem and by the complications to which it has given rise. Politicians and publicists in all five continents are discussing Germany’s capacity to pay and France’s policy in the Ruhr. The infinitely •more important subject of Germany’s future and policy has been lost sight :-of. Will Germany keep the peace, or is she planning a war of revenge? Has ■the war of 11)14-18 created a permanent settlement? The experience of the past is an excellent guide enabling us to foresee the future. France and Germany, in truth, have been hereditary enemies. Great controversies between neighbouring nations are apt to come to an end only when one of them has been weakened so much that it recognises the futility of renewing the struggle, abandons all hope of revenge, and is satisfied with a relatively humble position. It is difficult to realise nowadays that, only two centuries ago, Sweden and Holland were militarily Great Powers. Prusso-Germany has grown great by the sword. Its history reads like a fairy tale. In 1650 Berlin was a village of 800 inhabitants, and Prussia was one of the weakest and poorest statelets in Europe. By war and conquest, under the rule of the Hohenzollerns, that poor and backward nation has become rich and powerful. The rise of Prus-so-Germany is as miraculous as that of the Roman Empire. Germany has been'defeated in war, but the spirit of the people has not been vanquished. Every patriotic German believes that the eclipse of his country is only temporary, and that it will rise to greater power than heretofore. There is a solid ground for that faith. In 1806 Napoleon destroyed, in a few days, the armies of Prussia, which, under Frederick the Great, had held all Europe in awe. Berlin was occupied by the French. Prussia was cut to pieces. A poor little remnant was left to the wretched King, who became an abject vassal to the conqueror. French troops garrisoned in the country. Prussia was- allowed to keep only a few thousand soldiers'.

WHY GERMANS HOPE

In 1813 Prussia saw her chance and took it. The country, which was sup-* posed to be completely disarmed, raised vast armies and took a leading part in defeating Napoleonic France/ The precedent of 1806-13 serves as an encouragement to all patriotic “Germans, for every child is made familiar with Prussia’s rise from the deepest humiliation to triumphant victory. Every good German hopes that the story of 1806-13 will repeal itself. The Germans, believe that providence is on their side. They he: ” been taught that they are the chosen nation. I hey hate and despise the French. They think that presentlythey will again advance to new heights; that their predominance is certain arid inevitable. There are certainly important factors which justify that belief. The German race breeds fast, while the French population is almost stagnant. In 1871 there were 4,000,000 more Germans than Freftch. When the war broke out there were 80,000,000 more Germans French. Previous to 1914 Germany’s population increased by from 800,000 to 900.000 per year, while France’s population grew only from 60,000 to 70,000 per year. Germans calculated that, in a few years’ time, there would be two Germans to every French man if not three Germans to every Frenchman, and that, before long’, France would sink to the position of another Belgium. The latest statictics show that Germany’s population has grown since the war by about 800,000 per year, while France’s population continues stagnant. The vast majority of Germans were and are expansionists. The traditional policy of Prusso-Germany was based upon conquests on land, and Russia was considered to be Germany's natural ally. Wilhelm II abandoned the traditional policy of the country, embarked on the sea, and quarrelled with Russia. That led to • Germany’s undoing. The intellectual leaders of Germany have preached since 1918 the necessity of returning to the traditional policy of their country. To them, Russia is Germany’s partner. The. military leaders, the professors, and the publicists, have proclaimed, that a union with Russia, in some form or other, would make Germany unconquerable and all-powerful. A Russo-German combination could not be blockaded, for it would be self-supporting. Stretching from the

Rhine to the Behring Strait, and hav-" ing a population of at least 250,000,000 people, that combination would . dominate the world. A German-Russian union is by no means impossible. For two centuries Russia has been virtually a German protectorate. The ruling family 'of | Russia, though called Romanoff, was, in reality, a German family, the mily of Holstein-Gottorp. Since the \ time of Peter the Great all the Russian rulers have married German con-

sorts. v. Germans controlled the Russian na- ■ % vy and army, the diplomatic .service. and economic affairs. The Russians, having exterminated the uppeiv \ , middle classes, must import teachers Afrom atjroac!, and Germany provide them. .i/l Foreseeing the dangers of a ;Ger-gH|| man-Russian combination vVhich ypf would be able to tear up the Tf|faty >|.e of Versailles and to dominate'. , world, France has strengthened all • means in her power Poland, which .f/j separates Germany from Russia. The French insist upon adequate repa- .\|,|| rations because they foresee that ||j| otherwise Germany will overwhelm jyj them. - v POPULATION MENACE.

The population of France has been stagnant because inadequate natural ■ y resources made its rapid expansion ■ (:' impossible. Germany’s population has increased very fast with the increased V of the national wealth. M. Poincjare; -£|ji has rightly pointed out in his lafestUNote and in preceding ones that ; France’s population will not merely.g become stationary, but will, decline V she has to bear the burden of rations. v ‘{ral While. many Englishmen • wfeh settle the reparation problem almo4t|p| on any terms, hoping that settlement will improve trade, more far-sighted French insist the Germans, not they, should beaiU|v|| a large part of the cost of the foreseeing that otherwise will become all-powerful while Franc|M| will decline to insignificance. ||||s The French do not wish to figh|?f|| another war with Germany, a war in which they might be attacked overwhelming numbers. It is understandable, therefore, that they refuse to abandon their claims upon Germa/|A'| ny, and that they hesitate to disarm, .fe^l ' ill