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BRITAIN’S EGYPT POLICY

No Change Contemplated HENDERSON REASSURES COMMONS ASSURING the House of Commons that no change was contemplated in Britain’s policy toward Egypt, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Arthur Henderson, said Lord Lloyd had resigned the High Commissioner ship following conversations with him. The Foreign Secretary had emphasised the differences between Lord Lloyd and Sir Austen Chamberlain, pointing out that the Labour Government’s policy would not be less liberal than that of the previous Foreign Secretary, whos? liberality Lord Lloyd had challenged. (United P.A.—Bp Telegraph — Copyright) (Australian and N.Z. Press Association) (United Service)

Reed. 9 a.m. LONDON, Friday. In the House of Commons, on a motion for adjournment for the summer recess, Mr. Stanley Baldwin called attention to the great gravity of the matter of the resignation or dismissal of Lord Lloyd, British High Commissioner in Egypt. He said he hoped Mr. Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, would be able to dispel Wednesday’s mist, which developed on Thursday for the House of Lords. Mr. Baldwin traced the history of our policy toward Egypt to the 1922 declaration, recognising Egypt’s independence, subject to certain reservations. He alluded to the failure of the Zaghloul Pasha Treaty, in which it was stated that the presence of British troops in Egypt in no way meant occupation, or prejudiced Egypt's sovereign rights. (Labour laughter.) Mr. Baldwin: The failure was due to the extremists’ belief that they would get better terms under another Government; but there is nothing in the negotiations between Zaghloul Pasha and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to show that the latter was prepared for any serious departure from the 1922 declaration. Mr. Baldwin recalled Mr. MacDonald’s statement in the House just before his defeat in 1924, that no Government, in the light of the world war, would divest itself wholly of its interest in the Suez Canal, the vital link in British communications. (Opposition cheers). Lord Lloyd occupied one of the most difficult posts. He was of the type that was not afraid to speak its mind, able to argue and criticise, and it was the Foreign Office’s duty to listen and receive. Their representative must carry out his instructions, or, if he disagreed, he must resign if he regarded the subject as a sufficiently important matter of principle.

“Why did Lord Lloyd resign, or why was he dismissed? The question is far greater than Lord Lloyd’s personality. Did the Government desire his resignation because it did not want a public servant who criticised its decisions? Did it want a dummy, or was there a change of policy which would lead to Lord Lloyd’s resignation, so that it was simpler to get him out of the way before the change of policy occurred?” (Opposition cheers.) „ The Foreign Secretary in Ms statement said that within a few days of his going to the Foreign Office, a communication was received from Lord Lloyd. He read the communication, and was very much struck by the language, and what he believed to be the spirit underlying it. He at once asked for the papers to be handed to him, going back during the greater part of the time during which Lord Lloyd had been High Commissioner. “I must say,” continued Mr. Henderson, ’’that I could not but be impressed with the very wide divergence of views manifested in those papers, between the position taken up by my predecessor in office. Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Lord Lloyd. I think I can say that there were four or five occasions when the difference of opinion between my predecessor (and I suppose to some extent the Government) and the High Commissioner was most marked.’’ Mr. Henderson gave several instances where this divergence of view ha(J been shown. It was these considerations which led to his predecessor issuing to Lord Lloyd on May 28, two days before the General Election, a complete re-statement of the principles whereby the Government had decided to conduct the relations between this country and Egypt. Examination of the papers clearly demonstrated that the policy of Sir Austen was a minimum of interference with the internal affairs of Egypt. "X want to say that very frankly," continued Mr. HendersoD. “I ran through the whole of the proceedings, as far as my predecessor was concerned. There were numerous instances that Lord Lloyd was clearly out of sympathy with this object.” Having read these papers, having very carefully considered the position, he came to the conclusion that the best thing he could do was to intimate to Lord Lloyd that the Government was dissatisfied with the position, as it had obtained during the last three or four years. He made the intimation to Lord Lloyd in the following note: —

“In the short time at my disposal since taking office, I have endeavoured to review in their broad outline the sequence of political events since 1924. To be quite candid, I feel bound to tell you that I have been impressed by the divergence of outlook which has from time to time been apparent between my predecessor and your Lordship. That this difference of outlook was possibly sincere. I do not for a moment doubt, but I confess that it appears to me to be so wide as to be unbridgeable. The success of my policy, which will certainly not be less liberal than that of my predecessor, will depend on the extent to which it can be interpreted with understanding and sympathy by his Majesty’s representative. In the light of recent correspondence, I should be lacking in frankness did I not warn you that the possibility of your views harmonising with those of either my predecessor or myself appears to be remote, and in the circumstances I should like to discuss the situation with you on your return.” Lord Lloyd arrived in this country on this day week. The Foreign Secretary Mid he j

saw Lord Lloyd last Tuesday morning. They discussed the position with each other, not merely with frankness, but with friendliness. After they had been together half an hour. Lord Lloyd handed him his resignation. Sir Herbert Samuel (Liberal) said the House was far more concerned to know whether any serious change of policy in our relations with Egypt was or had been contemplated. Mr. Winston Churchill, formerly Chancellor of the Exchequer, said the reading of the correspondence between the late Foreign Secretary and Lord Lloyd had undoubtedly produced a wrong impression of the actual relations between the parties concerned. Lord Lloyd, as the man on the spot, facing difficulties and risks, naturally had his viewpoint. What was there in Mr. Henderson’s oration to show anything but a healthy, active, reasonable discussion between the parties? The Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, paid tribute to Lord

Lloyd, vrho, he said, went to Egypt under the most difficult circumstances. He had a great task imposed upon him. When Sir Lee Stack met his death at the post of duty, Lord Lloyd was asked to fill the position, which was perhaps one of the most difficult in the British Empire, and he accepted it. He did what he considered to be his duty; but he (Mr. MacDonald) claimed that the Government in administering the office of a colony or dependency must have complete and full confidence in its representative. After a perusal of the records, Mr. Henderson took action because he did not feel that full confidence in the High Commissioner which was necessary. The Government was going to enter into a full examination of all the questions connected with Egypt, but nothing of the final decision would be come to until the House had agreed to its ratification.

“We know our responsibilities," said Mr. MacDonald. “We know our position here. We shall just do what we think the interests of this nation and the interests of Egypt require us to do, remembering all our responsibilities to this country. The Government was exploring the situation." Mr. Churchill had asked for a pledge that the Government would not go beyond the extreme limit which he and his friends embodied in the Sarwat Treaty. In connection with each of the reserved points, said Mr. MacDonald, there were many proposals as to how the position should be handled. There was the question of the military occupation of Cairo in the Sarwat Treaty. It was stated that this might be revised in ten years, and then every fifth year afterwards. “Is that the last word in securing our communication through Egypt?" asked the Prime Minister. “If it is, we have come to a very bad impasse. Are there no means of securing our communications through Egypt except that? If Mr. Churchill and his colleagues are in any doubt about that, I will tell them that the whole matter, while I am talking, is be-

ing considered by the three head* of the Services Department.” Mr. MacDonald added that the same variety and possibilities were being treated with the same cautiousness, and only w’hen everything had been explored and the best proposal that could be made had been devised, would an instrument which was vital and to which the Government would commit itself make its appearance. Mr. Henderson said: “Every move we have made, or contemplate making, to improve Egyptian relations will be influenced by a spirit of goodwill. I say emphatically that there has been no change of policy. There is no secret about it. It bas been suggested that negotiations were being carried on behind Lord Lloyd’s back. I challenge that most emphatically. “Whatever our policy is, it will not be put into operation until it is submitted for the approval of the House of Commons and the Egyptian people. We shall take no step without consulting the Dominions.

“Mr. Churchill said there had been a certain streak of prejudice in the Foreign Office against Lord Lloyd, part of which was natural and intelligible, since Lord Lloyd was not in the civil service.” Mr. MacDonald described Mr. Churchill’s speech as a mischievous and unjustifiable attack on the civil service, based on contemptible tittletattle. He added: “We will pursue examination of the Egyptian question. Nothing final can be done until the House has ratified it.” He appealed to the House not to do anything further to damage Egypt, but let them get on with the business. The debate then terminated.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/SUNAK19290727.2.108

Bibliographic details

Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 726, 27 July 1929, Page 11

Word Count
1,716

BRITAIN’S EGYPT POLICY Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 726, 27 July 1929, Page 11

BRITAIN’S EGYPT POLICY Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 726, 27 July 1929, Page 11