THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

Sun (Auckland), Volume III, Issue 726, 27 July 1929, Page 10

THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

Sir, “An Armchair Dabbler” seeks some intelligent discussion on the question of the ego or self. He inclines toward the belief that the ego transcends the organism. Neither psychology nor any other science gives support to that view. The whole evidence points to the conception that personality moulded by a combination of heredity and environment. There is, of course, no question of the reality of the of self, whatever be our explanation of it, but to accept that is not to admit the spiritualistic hypothesis of a separate entity, which arose in the mistaken conceptions of our early progenitorsThe self is not something superior to experience, but is born of experience. May I quote from Hume for your correspondent's information, should n® not already be acquainted with the extract: “There are some philosopher* who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call Self, that we feel its existence and its continuity in existence; and are certain beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. ... It must be some on® impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which OUT several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference. K impression give rise to the idea of sejt. that impression must continue i nv s r ** ably the same. through the wnoie course of our lives, since self is posed to exist after that manner. Bin there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure •• • passions and sensations succeed eacn other, and never all exist at the sam* time. It cannot, therefore, be wtM any idea of these impressions . . a that the idea of self is derived. my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I stumble on some particular perception or other; of heat or light, love 0* hatred, pain or pleasure. I ner *nf catch myself without perception, ad never can observe anything but tn® perception. When my perceptions ar® removed for a time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself. • • • And were all my perceptions removed by death, I could neither think nv feel. . . . After the dissolution o* body, I should be entirely ... If anyone upon serious and vr prejudiced reflection thinks he different notion of himself, I must cot* fess I can reason no longer with nwjj . . . But I venture to affirm O* “Jr rest of mankind that they are notm» but a bundle of perceptions which ceed each other with inconceivaag rapidity, and which are in a perpend* flux and movement.**