Cards on the Table

Sun (Auckland), Volume II, Issue 492, 23 October 1928, Page 9

Cards on the Table

ANGLO-FRENCH COMPROMISE

Earnest Quest for Basis

WHITE PAPER EXPLAINS WHOLE THING

British Official Wireless Received 12.40 p.m. RUGBY. Monday. A WHITE PAPER dealing with the Anglo-French proposals for the limitation of naval armaments was issued this evening. It is a comprehensive document, covering the history of the negotiations leading up to the exchange of Notes containing the terms of the proposed compromise, and the subsequent correspondence with the other chief naval powers.

As the result of unauthorised and incomplete disclosures, the compro- i mise became the object of public specu- : lation, often of an erroneous and misleading character, ana it is believed ; the White Paper will place the matter in its true perspective. , In a circular dispatch to the British representatives in the caiptals of the J , countries represented on the Frepara- j j tory Commission, Lord Cushendun, j ; act ilit ■ Foreigu Secretary, emphasises ( that “the Anglo-French compromise 1 cannot be regarded as a detached or isolated event. It is the most recent link in a long chain of endeavour to implement the provision embodied in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the effect that members of the League recognise that •the maintenance of peace requires a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. LEAGUE’S FIRST STEPS “The first steps taken by the League to fulfil this obligation were turned in the direction of comprehensive schemes of mutual assistance, in the belief that the creation of a general sense of security was the most promising avenue to an all-round reduction and limitation of armaments. “In the face of continued failure to reach an agreement on any such scheme, this of approach was abandoned in favour of more direct methods, and in December, 1925, the Assembly set up a special commission with a mandate to prepare the ground for a general conference.” “This commission, known as the Preparatory Commission, attacked its main task at its third session in March to April, 1927, at which the British and French representatives each put forward the draft of a skeleton convention as a basis of discussion. WIDE DIVERGENCE “There was a wide divergence between these two drafts. On the naval side, the British draft provided for limitation of vessels of war in nine separate categories. The French draft was for limitation, broadly speaking, by total tonnage. CHIEF CONTROVERSY “It was between these two prin.» ciples of limitation by classes or limitation by total or global tonnage that the chief controversy has turned. The other Governments represented on the Commission ranged themselves sc on one side and some on another. In the hope of bridging this divergence, the French delegation some days later putforward a modified proposal, which went so far to meet the British view as to introduce classification by four classes. It contained a provision, however, for the unlimited transfer of tonnage from one class to another, and partly for that reason, and partly owing to the small number of classes, it proved inacceptable to the British ■ delegation. “Confronted by these actual and seemingly irreconcilable divergences, and axious to do nothing which might prejudice the success of the Naval Conference, to which the United 'States Government had recently issued an invitation, the Preparatory Commission adjourned without having made any progress toward the agreed text of the skeleton convention. Two months later, the Naval Conference met in Geneva, only to break down after seven weeks of effort. “In the face of the deadlock in the Preparatory Commission, followed by the failure of the Geneva Conference, all prospect of immediate progress appeared to be extinguished. Informal conversations, however, were frequent at Geneva, and ultimately culminated in a conversation between M. Briand and Sir Austen Chamberlain in March, 1928, which led to the compromise under review. In the course of their discussions, Sir Austen mentioned certain suggestions which had been made by the British Admiralty, an dhe subsequpently communicated a written Note of them to M. Briand, at the latter’s request. They provided for limitation by six clauses, all types of vessel being included. They were not acceptable. “In considering these successive steps toward the compromise, it should be borne in mind that the British con-i tention had always been for limitation in detail, and the French contention for limitation by total tonnage. Thus the original British plan had been for a classification by nine classeh. Under the modified British proposals, as submitted to M. Briand after the March conversation, the number of classes had been reduced to six, but they included vessels of all types. On its side, the French Government was no less anxious than the British Government to promote agreement. It had shown a disposition to meet the British thesis so far as was possible. “In the end a compromise was reached on the basis of a limitation applicable to four classes of war vessels. ADMITTEDLY INCOMPLETE “While thi swas admittedly incomplete as a final solution of the naval limitation question, they would, if adopted, have added two further classes to the two classes limited under the Washington Treaty. They could only lead to useful results, if the other principal naval Powers were ready to regard them as offering , possible basis for a resumption of negotiations in the Preparatory Commission. “As in the matter of naval disarmament, the question of classification versus global tonnage had hitherto impeded progress, so in the matter of land disarmament the question of limitation of military trained reserves ah dproved a stumbling block. The

French Government and the majority of the oGvernments represented on the Preparatory Commission had held that reserves should be excluded from limitation, while the British Government had consistently supported the opposite thesis. For some time, however, it had realised that further opposition on its “part to the exclusion of

these trained reserves could, in the face of the attitude maintained by the majority of the Preparatory Commissyon. °blv have the effect of preprogress indefinitely.” So long ago as April, 1927, Viscount Cecil clearly foreshadowed a withdrawal, for the sake of agreement, of the British opposition. When, therefore, the two Governments were advancing toward a compromise in the matter of naval limitation, It was felt that the process of agreement could only be facilitated by a formal intimation that a concession made to the views of the British Government on naval classification would enable it to withdraw its opposition to the French standpoint in the matter of military trained reserves.” ALLEGED SECRECY Referring to criticisms of the alleged secrecy of the negotiations. Lord Cuslienden recalls the March announcement that, conversations were proceeding, and points out that when the compromise proposals were ready for submission to the other naval Powers, the fact was announced by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons. “I myself gave to the Press on August 30 a full account of the circumstances in which the compromise was reached, and an emphatic denial of speculations as to the existence of secret classes and political understandings. The whole case is revealed in the correspondence, and any suggestions to the contrary are totally devoid of foundation. The proposals were submitted at the end of July to the Governments of the United States, Italy and Japan. While the Japanese Government expressed concurrence in the purport of the proposals, the United States and Italy, for reasons clearly and cogently explained in their Notes, have not seen their way to accept them. The communications are receiving attentive consideration, and a reply will be made in due course.”