The Stratford Evening Post With which is Incorporated "THE EGMONT SETTLER" (Established 1890) FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1936. BRITAIN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume IV, Issue 155, 12 June 1936, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post With which is Incorporated "THE EGMONT SETTLER" (Established 1890) FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1936. BRITAIN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

It is always a possibility that British supremacy in the Mediterranean might cease in certain circumstances. Since the openingup of Africa by the Powers, and in particular since the cutting of the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean has become the centre of various competing national interests. To France, direct communication with her North African empire is vital; Italy, with Tripoli, Abysfinia, and her Red Sea colonies to look after, relies on the narrow sea; from west to east runs the British high-road to India, with its keypcints at Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus and Suez;| Russia is concerned in the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean, since the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles) leading from the Black Sea are the sea-outlet to her whole southern coastline. Greece resents the British occupation of Cyprus, and Malta is, according to the latest cables, considered to be most vulnerable to any air attack that might come from Italy. The discussion of the Cape of Good Hope route as an alternative to the Mediterranean route for Empire shipping is at least 40 years old. When Germany and Italy had small navies, Britain could station in the Mediterranean a fleet sufficient to deal with the French fleet; but when, some years before the Great War, German naval building compelled concentration of British naval strength in the North Sea. the Mediterranean naval position had to be safeguarded' not 'by ships but by diplomacy—that is to say, the increasing bonds between Britain and France enabled an understanding to be arrived at whereby the Mediterranean became the special charge of the French navy, and the North Sea the vital responsibility of Britain against Germany. When the Great War was well advanced diplomacy further safeguarded the Mediterranean posL ticn by securing Italy as an ally; but how safe would the Mediterranean have been without allies? ,

Consequently those people In Britain who see no special grounds for Anglo-Italian friction apart from Abyssinia and "sanctions" - desire to liquidate the whole Abyssinian incident as soon as possible. But as friction with Mediterranean Powers may at any time occur again—who could have foreseen Abyssinia prior to 1935? —the practical testing ofjthe Cape route by shipping—referred to in recent cablegrams—is of importance; and the Cape route will remain, as it has always been, n live question for naval and shipping authorities.