RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Stratford Evening Post, Volume II, Issue 240, 11 May 1933, Page 6

RUSSIA AND JAPAN

POSSIBILITY OF WAR NOT GREAT Rumours of impending Avar between Japan and Russia over events in Manchuria continue to filter down—the latest being based on a dispute that has arisen locally over the use and working of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which passes through Manchuria. Bui it is considered very unlikely that the trouble will have more than local interest, and the possibility of a Avar between (be two countries is not grear. It is true that, oi <• ; ' ?'-> ■ lls sia has been streug.htsm; ..or resources in the Far East, and repairing ber weakness on the Manchunan horde/. Difficulties of transport are still serious, the capacity of the transSiberian line not exceeding lour pairs of trains in 24 hours. The weakness of this link, and of the Amur Railway to Vladivostock, has been strengthened by increasing the local supply of aeroplanes, tanks, heavy artillery and munitions, and 14 divisions, comprising 140,000 troops, are said to be located in the Maritime and Amur Provinces.

Vladivostock has been re-fortified, with the assistance of German technicians, and 24 submarines, shipped in sections, have been re-erected there, together with the establishment of seaplane bases. Russia also relies on the Red Armies in the Yangtss Valley, and in north-vest China, and on her allies in Machuria itself, where there are well-established centres of Soviet and Chinese activity that give the Japanese commander considerable trouble.

It is possible, too, that Russia looks to general risings in Mongolia and Korea, not to mention support from those countries annoyed by Japanese action in the Far East.

The interests that Russia stands to lose in the Far East are immense. She has spent much money and energy in a policy of "Sovietisation" in China, and the Far East generally, .but her polciy has been one of peaceful penetration, rather than of actual war with a martial and powerful nation Avhom she fears. Her lines of communication over a distance of 3000 miles are tenuous and fragile; supply and transport, offer insuperable difficulties and Japan holds all the interior lines. ■ Nor can the Soviet leaders rely on the army, and it is said that what Stalin and his colleagues fear most would be the return to Moscoav of victorious troops. The Red Army itself has been effectively "Sovietised" and is possibly loyal, but a long drawn out campaign would necessitate extensive recruitment from hostile and unwilling peasantry.

Nor are the relations between the two countries at all strained. Japan fears Communist penetration in the East; Moscow fears for the safety of her Eastern territories at Japan's hands. But for months past the two Governments have been on the verge of concluding a non-aggression paci, an agreement has been signed for the delivery to Japan of 2,50,000 tons of all Russian oil annually; the Soviet has expressed its willingness to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan, knowing that the railway is no longer of any use or value to Russia. And Vladivostock and the Maritime Provinces are ready to fall like ripe plums into Japan's hands whenever the occasion is opportune.

In such circumstances, and surrounded as she is by internal and external fears and risks, Russia's leaders have no thought of a disastrous war with such a powerful and wellsituated power. Nor is Japan any better placed for entering on a great war the end of which she could notforsee. Her economic' situation is parlous in the extreme; she has her hands full already with Manchuria and China; she has incurred the hostility of the whole world, and her own internal troubles are as great almost as those of Russia. No doubt in the dim and distant future these two great Powers may clash, but neither is ready nor prepared for such an eventuality at present. The military position of Russia in the Far East must always remain weak, because of the length of her communications, the inability to make use of sea transport, the severity of the northern winter, and the questionable morale of the troops engaged.

Nor has Russia any sea power, in which Japan is supreme. For military and economic purposes, Manchuria is now part and parcel of Japan. A comparison of the simple railway system which gives Russia access to her distant territories with the highly developed, efficient and intricate system of railways on the mainland under Japanese control, explains Russian mortification with the gradual extinction of Vladivostock as a great Eastern port and commercial centre, and with the steady rise of the Japanese port of Dairen. Stratagetically, Japan holds all the cards in this theatre, and Russia has practically none. The military and economic factors do not trouble Japan, as much as the spread of what is termed "dangerous thought." The contagion of the silent disease of Bolshevism is far more alarming to Tokyo than all the noisy sabrerattling of Moscow, which Japan can afford to treat with contempt. The East is riddled with Communism. Three hundred thousand square miles of country in China it; today governed by Soviets which control regular and irregular Red military units. The Third Internationale is now repairing the fruits of 10 years' arduous work, and anti-Japanese elements are here, there and everywhere. For these reasons each Power fears the other.

Russia roars the might majesty and dominion of Japan's military strength: Japan fears the more subtle spread of Communist, propaganda. But it is improbable that an outbreak is imminent at this juncture. The world is not likely to witness yet awhile the spectacle of the great Buddhist Empire engaged ni a life and death struggle with the forces of anti-God.