The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1918. ECONOMIC PRESSURE.

Stratford Evening Post, Volume XXXV, Issue 73, 23 February 1918, Page 4

The Stratford Evening Post WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED THE EGMONT SETTLER. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1918. ECONOMIC PRESSURE.

The peoples of the Allied nations hardly realise the weight and force of the economic pressure which is being brought to boar on the Central Powers. The.other day a memorandum was addressed by the “German Union of South Sea Firms” to the 'Reichstag, the ostensible object of which was to call for the return of the German South Sea colonies and, 1 for retention of former spheres of activity in the Pacific; but really the memorandum was a wail against the .pressure of the economic blockade w’ith which the Allies have got Germany firmly within their grip. Peace by hook or by crook, is what the German nation desires. They now recognise fully that partial victories by their field forces do them no good whatever, and that the longer the war is spun out the harder it will be for Germany to recover after the war and the more difficult to resume friendly relations with nations which Germany has antagonised and whose commerce is vital to her national existence. The present position of Geiis interestingly dealt with by Mr J. Saxon in an article in the London “Daily Chronicle,” in which lie remarks: Her oversea commerce is annihilated, her industries are para-j lysed, and she has not a square mile of colonial territory to call her own.j The Hun may husband his naval and military strength, and he may continue to fight for months and perhaps ( oven years to come. So long as he has the materials available tor making munitions and guns, and elementary j ,foodstuffs for his armies and people, so long as he can finance himself with promises to pay, he is able to prolong his resistance. But decisive victory is now beyond his power, and behind, the military scene, looms the darkest, economic prospect which ever faced any nation, » prospect which grows darker with every month of the war s prolongation. The Allies have in thenpower of industrial and commercial pressure a weapon of crushing and shattering effect. The extent to which Germany had pushed her “peaceful penetration,” laid her hands on the resources of other na- ( tions and empires, and become dependent on foriegn supplies, measures the effect of this weapon when the time comes for its decisive use. Think of those tentacles which Germany had cast over the supply of many essential metals within the British Emrpire—especially the zinc and tungsten ores of Australia. Every year half a million tons of zinc concentrates went in German ships, and mainly to Germany, from British Australia,' England being content with a niggardly dole of 20 000 tons. Of the precious tungsten ores, wolfram and scheelite, more than half the amount imported into Germany is now at an end, and Germany will have to look elsewhere for her supplies of those materials, and alternative sources, with three-quar-ters of the world leagued against her, 1 m ay not ho too plentiful. But these S are only the most familiar examples. / Not to mention the resources of our Al-

lies, the closing of the British Empire alone to the German importer and manufacturer would mean a crushing economic blow. That Empire has apractical monopoly of many indispens- . able raw materials. Canada produces by far the greater part of the world supply of nickel, cobalt, asbestos, and, , with British India, of mica. New Zealand has a monopoly of kauri gumi . and phormiura fibre. India is the solo producer of jute. The British West African Colonies yield the greater portion of the world’s supply of ' palm nuts and palm kernels, which have a rapidly growing industrial utility. If America were to stand in with the other Allies in declining to supply Germany with raw materials until the Allied war aims were secured, the German cotton industry would have to put the shutters up. for the Allied Powers control the entire world-supply of cotton fibre. It may, perhaps, he thought that the alternative supplies of wool are so many that the. closing of the British Empire toj Germany might not seriously affects her. But consider merino wool. In 1913 Germany imported 245 million, pounds'tof this article, of whieh 197 million pounds came from the British

Empire. If this source of supply were denied her, Germany would have to turn to Argentina and TTruguay, from which countries, however, the total supply of merino wool before the war was only 170 million pounds per annum, and a vast deal of that would, of course go to other competitors. The analysis, Mr Saxon points out, might be continued much further. Germany imported from British India so many hides and skins that it became a common remark that England was “running India for the benefit of. Germany.” In the year 1913 Ger-j many drew nearly 18 million pounds’ worth of materials from British India. Germany' has, indeed, had the free run of the whole of England’s vast tropical domains, and the extent of that benefit she will not realise until «he loses it. From what has been said some idea may he gathered of the extent of Germany’s dependence upon the British world and of the leverage which this affords to the British Empire if Germany were to prove recalcitrant when the peace negotiations set in. But England does not stand alone. Each of her many Allies can contribute in varying degree, to the same economic pressure. To take two more examples, the Allies together could deprive Germany of five-sixths of her copper and nearly all her rice. This aggregate power pf the, Allies places the ultimate issue of the war beyond question or cavil; Germany may continue ; the military struggle and put off for a. time the day of decision. But she is beaten in the. economic field before she enters it. And the longer she resists, the . more determined will her enemies he to, apply the tremendous power they have in reserve, and to insist inexorably on the full satisfaction of their demands.