SCIENCE IN WAR

Southland Times, Issue 25641, 7 April 1945, Page 3

SCIENCE IN WAR

PREPARATIONS FOR FUTURE Science and its applications must bulk largely in the professional careers of military officers after the war, in the opinion of Dr E. Marsden, secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. When he adressed members of the Canterbury branch of the Royal Society of New Zealand at Christchurch on the subject of science in the post-war world, he said that he thought the time had arrived when science should be considered almost as a fourth arm of the Services. 7

“In this hour of Allied triumph we may be in danger of forgetting the hairsbreadth which separated victory from a defeat worse than death,” said Dr Marsden. “The essential fact is that new or improved weapons have won the war for us, and that our early failure arose because in the period since the last war we neglected to do as much for military science as we assuredly should. There are, in fact, excepting radar and V bombs, very few practices of the present war which could not have ben foretold from the lessons of the last war, U-boat defence, anti-aircraft artillery methods, improved communications, air bombing, mines and tanks. OBSOLETE WEAPONS

“But in point of fact we were content with the state of these weapons from the point of usefulness at the end of the last war, without realizing that development is ■ a continuous process, and that this fact is more likely to be driven home to the vanquished nation than to the victor. Thus we laid our weapons into cold storage, or entrusted them to an organization whose motto was like that of the old manor in which, comically enough, radar was first developed in Britain—‘plutot mourir que changer’ (better die than change). World War H caught us with obsolete weapons. I think, in venturing to criticize the system, I should make it clear at the outset that I differentiate between the system and the officers who operate under it. Our officers and men have performed most effectively under a system which is not calculated to make the most of science and technology in modern war. “Military tradition has in the past called for planning in terms of existing weapons and planning for immediate campaigns must always be done in terms of existing weapons,” continued Dr Marsden. “The long-range planning of a whole war or a future war must Igo further. It must be done in terms ■of the evolution of weapons and strategy. In the future the presence or absence of this type of planning at a high level may determine the entire course of war. The course of modern war is so largely determined by the evolution of new techniques and the training of officers and men quickly to evolve or assimilate them that it is absolutely essential that first-class thinking be done, which combines military considerations with the possibilities opened up by technical progress. “You may, of course, ask what this has to do with New Zealand. I take it that whatever arrangements are made for co-operation overseas we are primarily responsible for and concerned with our own defence, and we are concerned that our immediate allies shall be progressive in science as applied to new weapons and to warfare. The solution of the problem does not lie simply in the establishment of an agency through which the assistance of civilian scientists can be made available to the forces when war breaks out. There will not be time on the next occasion for this to be effective. The participation of civilian scientists in the scientific aspect of military problems is only one small portion of the total problem. The very heart of the problem lies in the postwar organization of the forces themselves. Not only should men in responsible positions have better technical training, but also soundly trained technical men should be eligible for higher command. SEPARATE ORGANIZATION “We want a separate organization within the Services for research, for development, and for rapid procureI ment, in experimental production, of i small lots of equipment to be used for field testing, and in critical situations for actual use against the enemy. Such an organization must be in the hands of trained enthusiasts, and although linked at all levels with all branches of the Services, it should report directly to an officer at the very top level of command. In addition there should be some form of partnership between civilian scientists and the military. Third, there should be a responsibility thrown on the universities in regard to this scientific training. The requirements are similiar to those of industry —a training in fundamentals not bookish, but based on a maximuyi of practical work of a type incorporating actual work in teams on development projects. “The research effort in this war has already indicated new types of weapons, new methods of defence, which, although too late for this war, will make World War 111 as different in its weapons and strategy from World War II as World War I even was different from the Napoleonic wars. It is not merely a question of physics, chemistry, and engineering, but all sciences will be involved in future, from mathematics to psychology. Civil -science must still retain its independence, and thus be in a position to make its true contribution.” Dr Marsden added that finally the elements of an instrument making industry were needed in the country, so as to have the necessary skills to repair and devise., instruments which sudden conditions in an emergency showed to be necessary. Such an industry was equally required for industry and science generally, and for the same purpose. It would need some kind of Government assistance.