The Southland Times SATURDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1944. British Labour and Greece

Southland Times, Issue 25548, 16 December 1944, Page 4

The Southland Times SATURDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1944. British Labour and Greece

THE ANNUAL conference of the British Labour Party was held at a time when public opinion had been stirred and troubled by events in Greece. Its reactions to the Greek crisis were affected by the difficulties and embarrassments of the coalition. If the Labour Party had not been sharing the responsibilities of wartime government, its leaders would probably have been much more outspoken when the issue was discussed. There was, of course, no lack of strong comment from party members. Mr Aneurin Bevan, who is always at home in a controversial atmosphere, “felt moved to say that he was astonished at the bad language used by delegates about the Prime Minister.” Nevertheless, the resolution moved by Mr Arthur Greenwood, and framed to express the general attitude of the conference, was noticeably temperate. Instead of condemning the Government, the resolution expressed deep regret at the turn of events, and urged that all necessary steps be taken “to facilitate an armistice without delay” and to arrange the formation of a provisional national Government. This was asking for no more than the present aim of official policy. The explanation of what has been described by London newspapers as “a wise restraint” is probably to be found in Labour’s representation in the Cabinet. Mr Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, told the conference that he “was a party to the Cabinet decisions on Greece, and could not bring it to his conscience that they were wrong.” His speech was notable for a realism which seemed to show the effect of ministerial experience on a strong and practical mind. He made his stand on military necessity, and on the integrity of agreements. The Papandreou Government represented six parties. It was formed on the understanding that Britain would help to maintain order and distribute food, although she would not provide occupation forces for the entire country “because she could not afford the manpower.” Leaders of all six parties gave theii’ signatures to this agreement. “I do not think Labour members in any Government could take a greater precaution than that,” said Mi- Bevin. “We believed in the Cabinet, and that the party signatures would be honoured. We did not believe that ELAS or any other of the armed bands would go back on their signatures.” And he added a comment that could have come from Mr Churchill —or, for that matter, from any Englishman: “One of the great causes of this war has been the ignoring of honest signed agreements. There is no security for our movement in office unless you stick to the principle between nations that signatures must be honoured.” Policy and Force

Left-wing opinion in the Labour Party found its most vigorous spokesman in Mi’ Aneurin Bevan, who was alarmed at the possibility that the unanimous carrying of MiGreenwood’s resolution might be regarded as an endorsement of Mr Bevin’s speech. “One complete answer to' Mr Bevin,” he said, “was that only three bodies of public opinion in the world had gone on record in his support—Fascist Spain, Fascist Portugal and the majority of the Tories in the Commons.” This automatic party response does not make it any easier to judge a case objectively. Mr Bevan went so far as to ask the conference to insist that “Labour representatives inside the Government should exercise a more decisive influence on the conduct of Government affairs, or leave the Tories to do their own dirty work.” The answer to that type of criticism had been given in advance by Mr Ernest Bevin, who warned the conference that “if we win the next election you will find you cannot govern this world by emotionalism.” If it is possible to judge the case at a distance, or to separate the facts from opinions, it seems fair to assume that the British Government has made mistakes in Greece, but that they were made with honest intentions and in good faith. It is right to insist on the fulfilment of pledges, though it may be a little unwise to imagine that British scruples are shared universally, and especially by European politicians. The beliefs of Machiavelli have seldom been more widely accepted than they are today in countries which have passed from a German occupation to the edge of revolution. To have made a faith in the value of political signatures the basis for military policy, may have been more than unwise. Britain could not spare troops for the full occupation of Greece. At the same time she could not afford to risk a revolutionary upheaval while Greece remained part of a war zone. The political agreement was therefore intended to reduce Britain’s military commitments. This may explain why the British Government emphasized its political obligations instead of its military necessities. The results obtained have been exactly the opposite of what were expected. Britain has been compelled to divert more troops to Greece, and to use them in a tragic conflict which has disturbed public opinion throughout the world. There can be little doubt that Britain’s military weakness was deliberately exploited by Greek parties, though it is not easy to decide whethei’ EAM planned a coup d’etat, in advance, or whether distrust of the right-wing groups and provocative action brought a resumption of the occupation feuds. Whatever the truth may be, it has to be admitted that British prestige has been endangered by a policy which does not seem to have been sufficiently realistic. It is a little early to look for political integrity in countries which are emerging from a savage repression. Force is still the basic fact in Europe, and no policy which underestimates it can have any hope of success.