The Southland Times THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1944. The Burnt Voting Papers

Southland Times, Issue 25546, 14 December 1944, Page 4

The Southland Times THURSDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1944. The Burnt Voting Papers

BEADERS who studied the long report, printed yesterday, of the Parliamentary debate on the conduct of the General Election in the Middle East, may have wondered why so much time should have been given to matters which now seem to belong to the past. In spite of attempts to decry its importance, however, the debate was both necessary and valuable. Ever since it was revealed that the Middle East voting papers had been burned, the subject has been discussed throughout the country. Its implications could not be disregarded either by the Government or by the Opposition. If there had been irregularities in the conduct of the election, they had to be challenged and explained. The alternatives were to allow the people to base their conclusions on faulty and inadequate evidence, or to permit the dissemination of rumours that would weaken public confidence in the electoral system. The debate produced a number of inconsistencies on both sides. Mr A. G. Osborne, chairman of the select committee whose report was being discussed, claimed that the special returning officer, Major Bryan, “had done a great job of work.” The Prime Minister, however, said that the burning of the voting papers was “a wrong procedure,” and that the reasons given by Major Bryan were “inadequate.” It is difficult to see how an error of judgment which provoked and justified the whole inquiry could in no way detract —according to Mr Osborne’s point of view—from “a great job of work.” Similarly, Opposition speakers who criticized “a shocking weakness in the arrangements made for the conduct of the overseas voting,” could not go beyond that point without destroying their own case. Mr T. L. Macdonald, for instance, declared that “if Major Bryan had been in any doubt about the disposal of the papers he could have cabled New Zealand for instructions, and the Government would have had no hesitation in telling him they should not be destroyed.” This gave an opening of which Mr R. M. Macfarlane was quick to take advantage. He pointed out that Mr Macdonald had himself answered the Opposition’s argument, because his suggestion “indicated his own confidence in the integrity of the Government.” This was a strong debating point; and we think that the people as a whole will see its force. The Government can be accused of making weak arrangements, of delays and evasions which encouraged suspicion; but there is ho evidence of collusion. Clumsy Methods

It remains necessary to examine a curious feature of the committee’s inquiry. According to Mr W. A. Bodkin, the Government attempted to blame the Chief Electoral Officer for not advising it when he learned by cable from the Middle East that the papers had been burned. It was then revealed that no fewer than six copies of the cable were taken. The Prime Minister, who wanted to see every cable about the election, was away when this particular cable arrived. It was not shown to the acting Prime Minister, but was locked in a safe until Mr Fraser returned, and then —with other cables —was “carefully burned without being shown to him.” It seems obvious that somewhere in the series of events, from the time the papers were burned in the Middle East until the disclosures before the select committee, there was an attempt at concealment. Someone clearly realized that the burning of the papers was a blunder which might have awkward consequences. What cannot be decided, however, is whether the consequences were expected to be personal, departmental or political. It has been established that Major Bryan acted in good faith, after obtaining advice from the officer in charge of administration of the 2nd N.Z.E.F. This makes it doubly certain that no form of collusion could have existed between the special returning officer and the Government. The tangle of contradictions in Wellington could therefore have arisen in only one way—as the result of attempts to explain, and perhaps to conceal, the weaknesses of the arrangements brought to light by unwelcome inquiries from the New Zealand Alliance. These weaknesses were glossed over in the committee’s report, which stated that although the used ballot papers should have been returned to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 1927, the Emergency Regulations 1941 provided that “the result of the count, as notified by the special returning officer .... should be deemed correct and accepted for the purposes of any recount.” The report made no mention of the fact that specific instructions for the forwarding of the used ballot papers, included in the Electoral (Members of the Forces) Regulations 1940, were not repeated in the amended regulations of 1941, which cancelled the previous regulations. It may not be altogether surprising that omissions of this kind are able to occur in the mass of regulations imposed upon the country in wartime. They point to dangers that are not fully understood until a casewhich involves the public interest is given a full investigation. The special returning officer would not have made an error of judgment if his powers had been more carefully defined. As a last word on the case, it may be said without hesitation that the Government’s integrity cannot be questioned. It has been protected by a democratic process with which it has too often been impatient—a full and fearless criticism.